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Abstract 
This study examines whether national and international tax factors can explain 
leverage decisions of European multinational corporations. Using the model specification 
proposed by Møen, Schindler, Schjelderup and Tropina (2011), the study predicts that an 
affiliate’s leverage depends on host country statutory corporate tax rate and differences 
between host country tax rate and foreign tax rates. Differences in international tax rates 
influence international debt shifting whose main idea is claiming interest income in low-tax 
countries and interest expenses in high-tax countries. Predictions of the model form the basis 
of my main research question and sub-questions, which are tested on a data sample of 
European multinational firms and their majority-owned subsidiaries, obtained from firm-
level Amadeus database. Historical ownership data on majority-owned subsidiaries of 
European multinational firms is initially obtained from firm-level Orbis database. The 
obtained results show that an affiliate’s financial structure depends on three tax mechanisms: 
host country corporate tax rate, external debt shifting mechanism and internal debt shifting 
mechanism. Due to correlation between the tax mechanisms, omission of any of them from 
the specification would bias the estimated effect on affiliate’s leverage of the other tax 
mechanisms that are included in the specification. Assuming a constant historical ownership 
structure over the sample period would result in misclassified subsidiary-parent relations and 
a subsequent downward bias in the estimated effect of international debt shifting mechanisms 
on affiliate’s leverage. Hence, adjustments to historical ownership structure changes are 
necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of variables that are measured based on data on all 
affiliates within the multinational group. Finally, European multinational corporations with 
majority-owned affiliates outside Europe must also be considered carefully. Capital 
structures of European affiliates which belong to these multinational corporations seem to be 
less responsive to international tax incentives. This finding can be explained by measurement 
errors in the international debt shifting mechanisms that arise due to disregarding financial 
and tax data on affiliates outside Europe that belong to the multinational group.  
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1.  Introduction 
Companies worldwide are prone to adjust their capital structures in order minimize 
tax payments in response to different tax legislations. This activity is referred to as tax 
avoidance, planning or engineering, and can be done domestically or worldwide, by taking 
advantage of different taxation regimes in various countries. What firms think is a legal tax 
planning may be considered tax evasion by tax authorities – the issue is a grey area where it 
is unclear what is legal (Møen, Schindler, Schjelderup & Tropina, 2011). The two main 
strategies used by multinational firms for tax planning activities are abusive transfer pricing 
and international debt shifting. In my study, I will focus on international debt shifting whose 
main idea is claiming tax deductions on interest expenses in high tax countries and paying 
tax on interest income in low tax countries. 
As revealed by public incidents, several global multinational companies pay very low 
taxes. For example, Google paid a tax rate of only 2.6% on its non-U.S. profits in 2012 
because it shifted most of its overseas profits to an affiliate in Bermuda, which does not levy 
a corporate tax (Bergin, 2013). Starbucks had reported a taxable profit in only 1 year during 
a 15 year period in the United Kingdom in 2013 (“Starbucks pays,” 2013). Furthermore, 
Apple has been claimed to be searching for “the Holy Grail of tax avoidance”, as the 
multinational company has used a sophisticated net of offshore entities and avoided paying 
substantial amounts of income taxes in the U.S. (Trotman, 2013). Hence, as multinational 
firms are globally expanding and have devoted substantial investments to implement 
sophisticated tax avoidance strategies, it is particularly interesting to examine the relation 
between their capital structures and international taxation. 
Moreover, profit shifting by multinational companies is a substantial political concern 
and a growing field in public finance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has recognized that base erosion and profit shifting is a global problem 
and requires coordinated solutions, as tax engineering activities erode the objectivity and 
integrity of tax systems worldwide. Fifteen actions are developed within the OECD/G20 
BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) Project in order to provide governments with 
instruments needed to address the widespread issue of tax avoidance and to guarantee 
taxation of profits where economic activities yielding the profits are performed and where 
value creation occurs. The first measures and reports were published in September 2014, but 
there still is work to be completed in 2015. Non-OECD and non-G20 countries are also 
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involved on a par, which is the first time ever regarding tax issues (OECD, n.d.a). Also 
Norway has committed to implement an automatic exchange of information starting 2017 
with respect to tax evasion (Finansdepartementet, 2014). The United Nations (UN) Tax 
Committee is also engaged in the fight against tax avoidance (United Nations, n.d.). 
The main advantage of debt financing is that interest payments to lenders are usually 
fully deductible for corporate tax purposes, while dividend payments to shareholders are paid 
out of net-of-tax income. Accordingly, debt financing is usually preferred over equity, and 
debt tax shield is an important determinant of capital structures of both domestic and 
multinational companies. The incentive to use debt increases with the corporate tax rate; 
therefore, high corporate tax rates are often associated with higher corporate indebtedness. 
Overall, due to the tax benefits of debt financing, companies tend to have more debt than it 
would be optimal for non-tax considerations. A firm which does not own any foreign 
affiliates only considers the domestic tax system while planning its capital structure. 
However, defining its capital structure is more complicated for a multinational company 
whose affiliates operate in different countries. A multinational firm profits from shifting 
income to low-tax countries and allocating its total debt internationally across domestic and 
foreign affiliates in order to reduce the global tax burden. It is able to use the debt tax shield 
more efficiently than a domestic firm by moving debt from lower-taxed affiliates to affiliates 
facing higher tax rates (Huizinga, Laeven & Nicodeme, 2008, p. 81). Consequently, the 
financial structure of a multinational firm reflects the tax systems of all its affiliates 
worldwide. 
Even though Modigliani and Miller (1958) highlighted the importance of differences 
in marginal tax rates for firm’s optimal debt policy, the empirical literature on capital 
structure choice was not very successful in identifying the importance of tax advantage of 
debt until early 2000s. Mintz and Smart (2004) were one of the first to study profit shifting 
of multinational firms. The authors show that it is optimal for a multinational firm to borrow 
in high-tax jurisdictions and declare its interest income in the lowest-taxed jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, even though several empirical papers study international debt shifting and 
multinational firms’ leverage responses to tax, they disagree on the mechanism. Among 
these, Huizinga et al. (2008) were one of the first to present a model of the optimal financial 
structure of a multinational firm in response to both tax and non-tax considerations. They 
consider the optimal allocation of external debt and test the model’s predictions on European 
firms. Furthermore, Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg and Winner (2010) have developed a 
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theoretical model of internal debt shifting mechanism. Their results show that multinational 
firms have substantially higher debt-to-asset ratios than purely domestic firms, and that this 
difference is especially pronounced in countries with high corporate tax rates. 
Both of the above-mentioned papers use total debt-to-asset ratio as the dependent 
variable in their empirical analyses, even though Huizinga et al. (2008) examine only external 
debt shifting and Egger et al. (2010) examine only internal debt shifting. Hence, the 
individual contributions of standard debt tax shield and external debt shifting mechanism on 
firms’ leverage are biased in the study by Huizinga et al. (2008) because internal debt shifting 
mechanism has been omitted from their analysis. The individual contributions of standard 
debt tax shield and internal debt shifting mechanism on firms’ leverage are biased in the study 
by Egger et al. (2010) because external debt shifting mechanism has been omitted from their 
analysis. Consequently, the empirical results of these studies cannot be interpreted as 
unambiguous as the results can be affected by an omitted variable bias due to focus on either 
external or internal debt shifting. This issue characterizes most of the empirical papers that 
analyse leverage responses to tax, which is a substantial gap in the existing research. Møen 
et al. (2011) were the first to show that both internal and external debt shifting mechanisms 
are equally relevant determinants of leverage choices of German multinational companies. 
They use a micro-level Midi database on German multinational companies, provided by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The results show that it is optimal for a multinational firm to use both 
internal and external debt in order to minimize the global tax burden and maximize the firms’ 
profits. 
Examination of the previous research forms the basis of my main research question: 
Is a European multinational firm's capital structure responsive to international 
tax incentives? 
To answer the main research question, four sub-questions are proposed: 
(1) Are external and internal debt shifting mechanisms important determinants of 
capital structures of majority-owned European affiliates that belong to European 
multinational firms? 
(2) How substantial is the omitted variable bias arising from omitting any of the tax 
mechanisms from specification while estimating the impact of tax on firms’ 
leverage? 
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(3) Are correctly specified historical ownership relations between subsidiaries and 
parent firms important while examining debt shifting among affiliates of 
European multinational firms? 
(4) Do European multinational firms that have majority-owned affiliates outside 
Europe react differently to tax incentives than European firms with only European 
affiliates? 
Hence, the additional contributions of my thesis to the existing literature are fourfold. 
Firstly, as Møen et al. (2011) use data only on German multinational firms, it is an open 
question whether their findings carry over to a data sample of European multinational firms. 
Variation in corporate tax rates is much larger when considering European multinational 
firms; therefore, the obtained results on the impact of tax on firms’ leverage can be 
substantially different. Thus, the first and main contribution of my thesis is investigation of 
whether international debt shifting mechanisms are significant determinants of capital 
structures of European multinational firms found in the Amadeus database. 
Secondly, the previous literature on corporate leverage responses to tax is 
characterized by an omitted variable bias and does not truly describe the profit maximizing 
behaviour of European multinational companies due to its exclusive focus only on one of the 
debt shifting mechanisms. Omitted variable bias leads to biased individual contributions on 
affiliates’ leverage of the other tax mechanisms that are included in the specification. Hence, 
the second contribution of my thesis is investigation of significance of the omitted variable 
bias found in the previous literature. 
Furthermore, several studies that examine capital structure responses to tax and use 
the Amadeus database to obtain data on multinational firms and their subsidiaries assume a 
constant historical ownership structure over their sample periods. As an example, empirical 
results and descriptive statistics presented by Huizinga et al. (2008) show that the authors 
assume a constant ownership structure over their sample period of 10 years (1994 – 2003). 
However, this assumption leads to misclassified subsidiary-parent relations as ownership 
structures tend to change over time. Therefore, the third contribution of my thesis is 
examination of importance of correctly specified historical ownership relations between 
subsidiaries and parent firms while analysing the debt shifting behaviour of European 
multinational firms. Moreover, the quality of my obtained estimates is improved, compared 
to studies which do not adjust for historical ownership changes. 
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Finally, previous studies that obtain data from the Amadeus database cannot examine 
whether European multinational firms own any affiliates outside Europe, as the Amadeus 
database provides data only on firms in Europe. Combination of ownership data from the 
Orbis database and financial data from the Amadeus database allows me to distinguish 
European multinational firms with non-European affiliates. Thus, the fourth contribution of 
my thesis is examination of differences in leverage responses to tax between European 
multinational corporations that have majority-owned affiliates outside Europe and firms 
without majority-owned affiliates outside Europe. 
In order to answer the research questions and address the existing gaps in literature, I 
use the model specification proposed by Møen et al. (2011, pp. 8 – 14) on a data sample of 
majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms. The model considers the optimal 
capital structure of a multinational firm, accounting for various costs and benefits of both 
internal and external debt and the possible debt tax shield effects associated with both of 
them. According to the model, there exist three debt tax shield effects that multinational 
companies can exploit to reduce their global tax burden: the standard debt tax shield effect 
and external and internal debt shifting effects, representing international debt shifting (Møen 
et al., 2011; pp. 2 – 3). The model yields that the affiliate’s optimal debt-to-asset ratio is 
positively related to all three debt tax shield effects, represented by three tax mechanisms: 
the host country corporate tax rate (standard debt tax shield effect), the sum of asset-weighted 
differences between host country tax rate and tax rates of other affiliates within the 
multinational group (defined as weighted tax difference or external debt shifting effect), and 
the difference between host country tax rate and tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate within 
the multinational group (defined as maximum tax difference or internal debt shifting effect). 
I initially obtain historical ownership data on European firms in the firm-level Orbis 
database, and then use the firm-level Amadeus database to find financial data on these 
European firms and their majority-owned subsidiaries over the sample period (2003 – 2014). 
Contrary to several other studies that use the Amadeus database and assume a constant 
historical ownership structure, my data sample is adjusted for ownership structure changes 
over the sample period. The total number of parent firms is 143,405 over the sample period, 
while the total number of subsidiaries is 229,703, operating in 39 European countries. 
Overall, there are 1,039,827 affiliate-year observations over the sample period of 12 years. 
In robustness tests, the sample is extended and includes purely domestic firms in Europe 
(non-multinational firms), which increases the number of observations to 3,792,982. All 
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regressions include parent (group) fixed effects (and in robustness tests, also subsidiary fixed 
effects), industry fixed effects and year dummies in order to control for common factors 
among multinational corporations, industries and years that have an effect on firms’ optimal 
leverage policies. 
Even in presence of multicollinearity arising from correlation between the three tax 
mechanisms, their coefficients can still be estimated. The economic significance of the 
estimated tax mechanisms can be assessed when considering a multinational firm which 
consists of two affiliates – one foreign subsidiary and the parent firm. The two affiliates are 
of equal size and the foreign subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax 
rate than the parent firm. Consider that the subsidiary’s host country increases the statutory 
corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points, keeping everything else constant. According to 
my obtained estimates, the total effect on the subsidiary’s debt-to-asset ratio will be an 
increase of 2.42 percentage points, while the total effect on the parent firm’s debt-to-asset 
ratio will be a decrease of 0.27 percentage points. For an affiliate with an average total debt-
to-asset ratio in the sample (0.59), an increase in the statutory corporate tax rate of 10 
percentage points will lead to an increase in the total debt of approximately 4.1%. 68% of 
this increase is explained by the standard debt tax shield, which can be exploited by both 
purely domestic firms and multinational firms. 32% of this increase is explained by the 
international debt shifting mechanisms, where the maximum tax difference mechanism 
contributes approximately two times more than the weighted tax difference mechanism. 
Furthermore, correlation between the tax mechanisms leads to an omitted variable 
bias if any of the tax mechanisms are omitted from the regression specification. When the 
host country corporate tax rate is the only tax mechanism included in the specification, its 
coefficient is biased upwards by approximately 51%. This specification is appropriate for a 
sample of purely domestic firms, as they do not engage in international debt shifting 
activities. If the maximum tax difference variable has been omitted from the analysis, the 
omitted variable bias is approximately 16% for coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable 
and 41% for coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable. As an example, Huizinga et 
al. (2008) do not consider internal debt shifting in their specification. Furthermore, if the 
weighted tax difference variable has been omitted from the analysis, the omitted variable bias 
is approximately 20% for coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable and 22% for coefficient 
on the maximum tax difference variable. All previous studies which examine the sensitivity 
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of total or external debt-to-asset ratio with respect to taxation do not consider external debt 
shifting in their specifications, except Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen et al. (2011). 
Robustness of the obtained results is tested in several ways. Firstly, the data sample 
is split into large and small multinational firms in order to examine the potential heterogeneity 
between large and small firms. The results show that large multinational firms are more likely 
to engage in international debt shifting than small multinational firms. Large multinational 
firms may be better able to pursue tax engineering activities due to more income, better 
connections and more affiliates facing different tax rates, which makes it less costly for large 
firms to avoid paying high taxes. 
Furthermore, existence of preferential tax regimes in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg contributes to lower effective tax rates of multinational firms. I examine 
whether the lower effective tax rates create a measurement error in the estimated coefficients 
on tax mechanisms by adjusting corporate tax rates downwards for affiliates involved in 
financial services or holding activities in these countries. This adjustment decreases the 
estimated coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable and slightly increases the 
estimated coefficients on the international debt shifting mechanisms. The small changes in 
coefficients after the adjustment can be explained by importance of more precise adjustments 
to corporate tax rates that are necessary to derive the effective tax rates. 
In order to examine whether inclusion of purely domestic firms in the main data 
sample changes the estimated coefficients on the three tax mechanisms, I expand the data 
sample and include purely domestic firms in addition to multinational firms. The estimated 
coefficient on the standard debt tax shield mechanism decreases, while coefficients on the 
international tax mechanisms increase. The results indicate that inclusion of domestic firms 
in the sample reduces the standard debt tax shield advantage. This can be explained by 
relatively many loss-making firms among small domestic firms, which have little incentives 
to use debt tax shield. 
To examine whether an assumption about a constant historical ownership structure 
over the sample period biases my results, I assume that subsidiary-parent relations remain 
constant over the sample period of 12 years. In contrast to other authors who claim that 
misclassified subsidiary-parent relations are unlikely to be a major concern in their studies, 
my results show that misclassifications bias the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms, 
and especially the weighted tax difference variable. This shows that misclassified historical 
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ownership relations introduce a particularly large bias in the estimated coefficients on 
variables which are constructed based on data on all affiliates within the multinational group. 
Furthermore, the main data sample includes multinational corporations which have 
majority-owned affiliates also outside Europe. To examine whether leverage responses to tax 
differ for European multinational firms that have affiliates outside Europe and European 
multinational firms that do not have affiliates outside Europe, I divide the main data sample 
into two parts, based on ownership of non-European affiliates. The results show that affiliates 
which belong to parent firms without any affiliates outside Europe are more responsive to 
the international debt shifting mechanisms. This observation can be explained by a potential 
measurement error in the international debt shifting mechanisms that arises due to 
disregarding financial and tax data on non-European affiliates that belong to the multinational 
group. 
The next robustness test focuses on existence of holding companies in the data 
sample. A multinational firm can establish a holding company, endow it with a very high 
amount of debt and then use these funds of the holding company to shift equity to other 
affiliates within the multinational group. Hence, the holding company can have a very high 
level of debt, while other affiliates within the thinly capitalized multinational group seem to 
have very low leverage. If the main data sample consists of a few heavily indebted affiliates 
(holding companies) and many affiliates with very small levels of debt, it might lead to biased 
estimates of the effect of tax on affiliates’ leverage. In order to control for highly leveraged 
holding companies, I create an aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio per multinational firm per 
country which aggregates information from all firm’s affiliates that operate within a 
particular country. The obtained results show an increase in coefficients on all tax 
mechanisms, suggesting that multinational firms’ capital structures are more responsive to 
tax than was estimated originally. The results suggest that existence of holding companies 
exerts a downward bias in the estimated coefficients on all tax mechanisms in the original 
specification. 
Furthermore, approximately 23% of affiliates in the main data sample have loss carry-
forwards. To examine whether loss carry-forwards affect tax elasticity of debt negatively, I 
create interaction terms of all tax mechanisms with a loss carry-forward dummy variable. 
The results show a significant adverse impact of loss carry-forward on the estimated effects 
of corporate tax rate and weighted tax difference variables on affiliates’ leverage, and a 
significant positive impact of loss carry-forward on the estimated effect of maximum tax 
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difference variable on affiliates’ leverage. The same results are obtained when the data 
sample is split into two parts – the affiliates that report loss carry-forwards and the affiliates 
that do not report loss carry-forwards. The standard debt tax shield and external debt shifting 
mechanisms are less important for leverage decisions of affiliates with loss carry-forwards, 
while internal debt shifting mechanism is more important for their leverage decisions, 
compared to affiliates that do not report loss carry-forwards. The high responsiveness of loss-
making affiliates’ leverage to the maximum tax difference variable suggests that 
multinational firms use internal debt to finance loss-making affiliates. 
To examine whether multinational firms respond to the tax mechanisms in a non-
linear fashion, I include quadratic tax mechanisms in the regression specification. The 
estimated coefficients on the quadratic statutory corporate tax rate and the quadratic 
maximum tax difference variables are negative, which suggests that the tax effect on leverage 
is concave in the statutory corporate tax rate and the maximum tax difference. The estimated 
coefficient on the quadratic weighted tax difference variable is positive, which suggests that 
for a higher weighted tax difference the marginal effect of tax on leverage increases and the 
affiliate is likely to receive even more external debt. 
Finally, to control for potential unobserved subsidiary heterogeneity characterizing 
their leverage, I include subsidiary fixed effects in the regression. The results show that 
subsidiary fixed effects reduce the effect of tax mechanisms on affiliates’ leverage. 
Coefficients on all tax mechanisms decrease, and coefficient on the maximum tax difference 
variable becomes statistically insignificant and negative. This suggests that subsidiary fixed 
effects substantially reduce variation in the data. When regressions control for no subsidiary 
or group fixed effects, coefficients on the statutory corporate tax rate and maximum tax 
difference variables substantially decrease, while coefficient on the weighted tax difference 
variable substantially increases. The extreme changes in the estimated coefficients confirm 
the importance of controlling for fixed effects, as there exists substantial heterogeneity 
among parent firms and subsidiaries in the data sample. 
In the remainder of this paper, section 2 presents literature review. Section 3 discusses 
methodology. Section 4 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses 
endogeneity issues. Section 6 presents empirical results. Section 7 discusses robustness of 
results with respect to various sample and specification choices and extensions of the main 
results. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
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2.  Literature review 
The study by Modigliani and Miller (1958) established that in a world with taxes, 
when interest expenses on debt are tax deductible, firm’s value increases with leverage. The 
additional value is created by issuing debt instead of equity, which results in tax savings for 
the firm. However, even though the study emphasized that tax has an impact on firm’s 
optimal capital structure, only a few empirical studies focused on different capital structure 
theories until early 2000s. Rajan and Zingales (1995), using data on 7 countries and allowing 
for international variation in tax rates, started filling the gap in knowledge by examining 
firms’ capital structure choices. While examining the impact of institutional differences on 
leverage, they found that taxes influence the aggregate corporate leverage in a country. This 
finding was contrary to the existing empirical literature on capital structure choice claiming 
that taxes have no impact on firms’ financing patterns.1 
There are several papers that show that taxes influence leverage decisions of 
multinational corporations. Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), using 
a dataset on 10 developing countries, conclude that countries which offer a higher debt tax 
shield advantage are characterized by highly indebted multinational firms. Furthermore, 
using data on U.S. foreign-controlled corporations, Mills and Newberry (2004) find that 
foreign multinational firms with low average foreign tax rates have more indebted foreign-
controlled corporations than firms with high average foreign tax rates. Ramb and 
Weichenrieder (2005) find that tax rate differentials have an impact on internal loans of 
foreign affiliates operating in Germany. Also Arena and Roper (2010), using a dataset on 23 
countries, find that tax-based incentives can explain the location choice of multinational 
firms’ debt. Their results suggest that different international tax rates and tax regimes affect 
where a multinational firm will locate its external debt and how much debt it will locate 
abroad. In addition, the analysis shows that if a multinational firm has a foreign subsidiary 
that operates in a country which provides a relatively greater tax advantage of debt than other 
affiliates, the firm is willing to increase the amount of debt issued there. 
Furthermore, several empirical studies quantify the effect of changes in tax rate on 
leverage decisions by multinational firms. Alworth and Arachi (2001), using panel data on 
Italian companies, find that both personal and corporate tax rates influence companies’ 
financing decisions. Their results show that an increase in the marginal corporate tax rate by 
                                                 
1 As an example, Mayer (1990). 
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100 basis points increases the ratio of growth of total debt to total assets by approximately 8 
basis points (p. 375). Altshuler and Grubert (2003) find that controlled foreign corporations 
(CFCs) of U.S. multinational firms in high-tax countries have much more debt than CFCs in 
low-tax countries.  Moreover, an increase in the foreign statutory tax rate by 1 percentage 
point is associated with an increase of approximately 0.4 percentage points in the total debt-
to-asset ratio of the CFC (p. 107). Also Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), using panel data on 
German outbound foreign direct investment (FDI), find that debt-to-asset ratio is positively 
related to the host country corporate tax rate. Their analysis shows that an increase in the 
corporate tax rate by 10% is associated with an increase in the debt-to-asset ratio of 
manufacturing firms by 5.6 percentage points (p. 10). Using a dataset on multinational firms 
in the European Union, Moore and Ruane (2005) find that an increase in the corporate tax 
rate by 10% increases subsidiary debt-to-asset ratios by 3.5% (p. 18). However, if a tax credit 
system is active in the home country, the positive relationship between corporate tax rate and 
leverage vanishes. 
Several authors examine how changes in interest allocation rules or thin capitalization 
rules affect leverage decisions of multinational firms. Froot and Hines (1995) investigate how 
the change in U.S. interest allocation rules in 1986 affected investment and financing choices 
of U.S. multinational corporations. The results show that tax deductibility of interest 
expenses decreased after the change in 1986, which led to an increased cost of debt and 
decreased debt usage. Also Jog and Tang (2001) investigate the impact of U.S. tax reform on 
debt-shifting behaviour of U.S. and Canadian multinational corporations. The authors show 
that the subsequent reduction in Canadian corporate tax rate in the late 1980s led to decreased 
debt-to-asset ratios of Canadian affiliates. Furthermore, Büttner, Overesch, Schreiber and 
Wamser (2012) investigate how financing and investment decisions of German multinational 
firms are affected by thin capitalization rules that limit tax deductibility of interest expenses. 
The analysis shows an adverse impact of thin capitalization rules on multinational firms’ 
financial structures, which suggests that the rules effectively reduce affiliates’ debt. 
Moreover, the study finds that introduction of thin capitalization rules increases tax 
sensitivity of capital stock investment decisions and decreases tax sensitivity of debt-to-asset 
ratio in countries that impose the rules. Also Blouin, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2014) 
investigate how thin capitalization rules affect financial structures of foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinational firms. The results show that thin capitalization rules have a significant effect 
on affiliates’ leverage choices. Restrictions on the total debt of an affiliate reduce its total 
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debt-to-asset ratio by 1.9%, and restrictions on the internal debt of an affiliate reduce its 
internal debt-to-asset ratio by 6.3%. In addition, restricted internal debt decreases affiliate’s 
total debt-to-asset ratio by 0.8%, which implies that regulations directed towards limiting 
internal leverage have also an indirect effect on affiliate’s total leverage (p. 20). 
All the above-mentioned papers provide evidence that financial structures of 
multinational companies across the world comply with the purpose of tax minimization. 
However, empirical literature examining whether and to what extent debt is used for profit 
shifting (utilizing the internal and external debt shifting mechanisms) or whether tax 
minimization effects reflect the conventional tax shelter of debt finance (utilizing the 
statutory tax rate mechanism), is not so broad. Even though interest deductions from taxable 
income result in tax revenue losses for host country in both instances, difference between 
them is important for tax policy. If standard debt tax shield is the main mechanism behind 
tax minimization, restraints on interest deductions from taxable income can be implemented 
as a countermeasure. If profit shifting is the main mechanism, any restrictions can lead to a 
shift towards other profit shifting mechanisms; thus, decreasing or removing differences in 
effective tax rates worldwide is the ultimate countermeasure. 
Mintz and Smart (2004) were one of the first to study profit shifting of multinational 
firms. The authors examine corporate income tax competition and financial planning 
strategies of multinational firms whose affiliates are located in multiple jurisdictions, which 
allows them to shift profits from jurisdictions with high corporate tax rates to those with low 
corporate tax rates. The model shows that it is optimal for a multinational firm to borrow in 
high-tax jurisdictions and declare its interest income in the lowest-taxed jurisdiction. By 
utilizing such a mechanism, the multinational firm maximizes the value of tax deductibility 
of interest expenses and minimizes the taxes paid on interest income. In addition, the model 
shows that inter-jurisdictional tax engineering can lead to asymmetries in statutory corporate 
tax systems around the world, when one jurisdiction becomes a tax haven to attract income, 
while others have higher statutory corporate tax rates. Moreover, an increased tax 
competition from tax havens can result in increased corporate tax rates by jurisdictions with 
already high tax rates. The authors find that profit shifting has a significant influence on 
taxable income in Canada. The elasticity of taxable income with respect to taxes is 4.9 for 
firms that engage in profit shifting, while the elasticity is 2.3 for similar firms that do not 
shift income (p. 1161).  
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Furthermore, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) find that tax incentives affect the level 
and composition of U.S. multinational firms’ debt. The results show that increased corporate 
tax rates lead to a higher use of debt – an increase in the local corporate tax rate by 10% leads 
to 2.8% higher debt-to-asset ratios of affiliates experiencing the increase in tax rate. 
Moreover, tax rate differences affect the use of internal debt to a greater extent than the use 
of external debt – the elasticity of use of external debt with respect to corporate tax rate is 
0.19, while the tax elasticity of internal debt is 0.35 (p. 2453). However, the authors do not 
have data on internal transactions among affiliates; therefore, they cannot investigate internal 
lending activities of financial coordination centres that undertake banking services within 
multinational firms. Financial coordination centres are frequently used by multinational firms 
worldwide and are located in countries with preferential tax regimes for banking services (for 
example, Belgium). Due to omission of data on internal capital market transactions, the tax 
sensitivity of internal debt can be underrated (Møen et al., 2011, p. 6). 
Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg and Winner (2010) compare debt-to-asset ratios of 
domestic and foreign plants and investigate whether differences between them can be 
explained by the global corporate tax system. Differences between debt-to-asset ratios arise 
because multinational firms can shift debt across jurisdictions where their affiliates are 
located, which increases incentives to adjust affiliates’ capital structures in response to 
different tax rates. Using a dataset on European firms, they show that foreign firms have 
substantially higher debt-to-asset ratios than domestic firms, and that this difference increases 
with the host country statutory tax rate. In addition, debt shifting is found to be a common 
mechanism for international tax planning of multinational companies. However, the dataset 
that the authors use does not have data on internal debt nor the overall ownership structures 
of multinational firms. Moreover, the authors disregard the total bankruptcy costs that the 
parent firm has to bear, and the external debt shifting mechanism in their analysis. 
Findings of the study by Büttner and Wamser (2013) conform to those of Mintz and 
Smart (2004). The authors investigate internal debt exclusively as a profit shifting 
mechanism, using a dataset on German multinational firms. Their results show that tax 
differences among affiliates of a multinational firm have a significant influence on firm’s 
internal debt. The analysis confirms that multinational firms whose subsidiaries operate in 
countries with low corporate tax rates use relatively more internal debt. Moreover, if the 
difference between the host country corporate tax rate and the lowest corporate tax rate 
among the firm’s subsidiaries worldwide increases, the use of internal debt increases as well. 
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However, the tax effects that the study finds are quite small. This indicates that German firms 
do not actively engage in internal debt shifting, which can be partly explained by German 
controlled foreign corporation rules. 
My paper is closely related to studies by Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008) and 
Møen, Schindler, Schjelderup and Tropina (2011). Huizinga et al. (2008) use a model of 
firms’ optimal external leverage choices in response to international taxation, and test the 
model on European firms in the Amadeus database. The authors distinguish whether a firm 
is a parent or a subsidiary of a multinational firm or a purely domestic firm, and take into 
consideration tax systems of all countries where the multinational firm operates. They find 
that if the corporate tax rate increases by 10%, the debt-to-asset ratio of an entirely domestic 
firm will increase by 1.8% (p. 81). However, the debt-to-asset ratio of a multinational firm is 
affected by both national and international taxes. Therefore, the debt-to-asset ratio of a 
multinational firm is more sensitive to corporate tax rates, and the firm is more willing to 
engage in debt shifting. The authors assume that the parent firm ensures credit guarantees for 
affiliates’ leverage, which implies that an increase in the total debt-to-asset ratio of the 
multinational corporation leads to a higher bankruptcy risk at the parent level. In order to 
mitigate the increased bankruptcy risk, the multinational firm shifts its external debt among 
affiliates in different countries in response to their tax rates. For example, if the tax rate in a 
country increases, it becomes more attractive to increase the amount of debt in affiliates that 
operate in the country. However, an increased use of leverage leads to a higher bankruptcy 
risk of the multinational corporation. Hence, the multinational firm has to decrease the use 
of debt in other subsidiaries worldwide in order to reduce the bankruptcy risk. 
Due to external debt shifting among affiliates worldwide, multinational firms are able 
to use debt tax shield to a greater extent than entirely domestic firms, while maintaining an 
acceptable bankruptcy risk. As an example, consider a multinational firm consisting of two 
affiliates of equal size that operate in different countries. A 10% higher tax rate in a country 
leads to a 2.4% higher debt-to-asset ratio of the affiliate in the specific country, while the 
debt-to-asset ratio of the other affiliate decreases by 0.6% (p. 81). This shows that affiliates’ 
capital structures are affected by the local corporate tax rate and tax rates of the parent firm 
and other affiliates of the multinational firm through the external debt shifting mechanism. 
The authors claim that if the external debt shifting mechanism is disregarded in the analysis, 
the total effect of corporate tax rates on affiliates’ financial structures is understated by 29% 
(p. 101). However, the results of the study can be biased due to omission of internal debt 
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shifting mechanism, which is likely to influence the total leverage of a multinational firm. 
The authors discuss the internal debt shifting mechanism and use a difference in tax rates 
between parent company and its affiliates in order to capture the effect. However, they 
conclude that the effect is insignificant and tax incentives to shift internal debt do not 
influence their results. As claimed by Møen et al. (2011, p. 8), such a conclusion can arise 
because the appropriate mechanism to account for internal debt shifting is a difference in tax 
rates between an affiliate and the lowest-taxed affiliate within the multinational corporation. 
Hence, Møen et al. (2011) try to reduce the omitted variable bias, which is likely to 
be present in the paper by Huizinga et al. (2008), by adding the internal debt shifting 
mechanism to the model. The authors are the first to examine a multinational firm’s choice 
between internal and external debt shifting. The results show that companies should 
undertake both internal and external debt shifting in order to reduce their global tax burden. 
By examining both debt shifting mechanisms, the study ensures that incentives for external 
debt shifting affect only external debt and do not influence internal debt, and vice versa for 
internal debt shifting. The authors use micro-level data on German multinational firms, which 
contains information on internal and external debt of parent companies and affiliates. The 
empirical results show that if a multinational firm consists of two affiliates of equal size and 
tax rate of the highest-taxed affiliate increases by 10 percentage points, affiliate’s total 
leverage ratio will increase by 4.6 percentage points, while the other affiliate’s leverage ratio 
will decrease by 1.4 percentage points (p. 4). If an affiliate has an average leverage ratio 
(0.62), then its total debt will increase by approximately 7.4% (p. 4). The standard debt tax 
shield explains approximately 40% of this increase, and 60% of the increase is explained by 
the international debt shifting, where internal and external debt shifting mechanisms are of 
approximately equal importance (p. 4). When the international debt shifting mechanisms are 
omitted from the specification and the host country corporate tax rate is the only tax variable 
that affects firms’ capital structures, the estimation bias for the standard debt tax shield 
mechanism is approximately 140% (p. 4). If the external debt shifting mechanism is omitted 
from the specification (as in Egger et al. (2010)), the effect of the standard debt tax shield on 
debt-to-asset ratio is overestimated by 100%, while the effect of internal debt shifting 
mechanism is biased upwards by 40% (p. 4). If the internal debt shifting mechanism is 
omitted from the specification (as in Huizinga et al. (2008)), the bias for the standard debt 
tax shield is 9%, while the bias for the external debt shifting mechanism is 4% (p. 4). 
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3.  Methodology 
3.1.  Theoretical background 
The methodology part of my paper follows the model specification proposed by Møen 
et al. (2011, pp. 8 – 14). By reproducing the model by Møen et al. (2011) and testing it on a 
data sample of European multinational firms, I examine whether predictions of the model are 
generally applicable to European companies. 
The model assumes that a multinational firm is a pure holding company operating in 
the parent country p, which has majority-owned affiliates located in 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 countries that 
are owned directly and without any ownership chains. Each affiliate owns fixed assets Ki, 
which is the necessary amount of capital to produce a homogenous good by the production 
function 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑖). Capital costs r are given exogenously, according to a small country 
assumption. Capital Ki is financed by parent firm’s equity investment Ei, external third-party 
debt 𝐷𝑖
𝐸 or parent (internal) debt 𝐷𝑖
𝐼. Therefore, an affiliate’s balance sheet identity can be 
expressed as 𝐾𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼, where each affiliate’s equity 𝐸𝑖 is fully owned by the 
parent. The parent’s balance sheet identity can be expressed as ∑ 𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑝 + 𝐷𝑝
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑝
𝐼𝑛
𝑖≠𝑝 . The 
multinational firm assures that all its affiliates obtain the necessary amount of equity in order 
to have an appropriate level of real capital and a tax-efficient capital structure (Huizinga et 
al., 2008, p. 94; Møen et al., 2011, p. 8). 
While deciding upon its capital structure, a multinational firm considers several 
factors, both related and unrelated to taxation. Usage of internal and external debt is 
characterized by different benefits and costs that an affiliate incurs, which, according to trade-
off theory, must be balanced while choosing the optimal capital structure (Robichek & 
Myers, 1966, pp. 19 – 20). Multinational firms take into consideration both reputational and 
financial costs because public information about a firm’s tax avoidance erodes its image and 
affects directly its profits. Bauweraerts and Vandernoot (2013, p. 3) emphasize the increasing 
attention paid to social responsibility and the harmful consequences that tax avoidance can 
cause to a firm. Furthermore, separation between firm’s ownership and management leads to 
another issue. The chief executive officer’s (CEO) performance is measured in terms of 
wealth created for firm’s shareholders, which encourages the CEO to avoid taxes, even 
though it can damage the firm’s reputation. Moreover, agency costs arise if the CEO uses tax 
savings resulting from tax avoidance to hide his rent extraction, for example, excessive salary 
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or perquisites. If shareholders become aware of that, the price of firm’s shares can 
substantially decrease (Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 2010, p. 60). 
To derive cost functions of internal and external debt, benefits and costs associated 
with both types of debt must be considered. A benefit of internal debt, as compared to equity, 
is that its interest expenses are tax deductible. Usage of internal debt provides a debt tax 
shield, while payments associated with equity, for example, dividends, are entirely 
appropriated from firms’ profits, which leads to a preference for debt financing (Kemsley & 
Nissim, 2002, p. 2047). 
However, costs of internal debt are associated with tax engineering expenses arising 
from willingness to avoid or lessen thin capitalization rules or controlled foreign company 
(CFC) rules (Simmler, 2014, pp. 7 – 8). Tax authorities are aware of profit shifting 
opportunities offered by internal debt and know that multinational firms have incentives to 
increase usage of internal debt in high-tax countries. Tax authorities are determined to levy 
taxes on the appropriate taxable income; therefore, many countries monitor multinational 
companies and have implemented anti-tax avoidance laws in order to limit profit shifting. 
Countries in the European Union have implemented thin capitalization rules that limit tax 
deductibility of interest (Ðukić, 2011; Webber, 2010). Many European countries have also 
implemented controlled foreign corporation rules that limit profit shifting to low-tax 
countries, as certain amounts of income earned by controlled foreign corporations must be 
included in the income of parent firms.2,3 Even though there exists a whole consultancy 
industry focusing on tax avoidance and exploitation of loopholes in anti-tax avoidance 
regulations, circumventing the rules is costly. Designing strategies to avoid anti-tax 
avoidance regulation and asking for specialized experts, lawyers and accountants’ advice for 
manipulating internal debt, hiding transactions or finding loopholes in the regulations highly 
increases the costs of internal debt (Ruf & Schindler, 2012, p. 7; Schindler & Schjelderup, 
2014, pp. 6, 12). 
Moreover, it is easier to avoid anti-tax avoidance rules, the smaller the share of 
internal debt in the firm’s total assets. The amount of advice by tax consultants that is 
                                                 
2 Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom are European countries that have implemented the 
controlled foreign company legislation, according to Deloitte (2014). 
3 The Court of Justice of the European Union made a Cadbury-Schweppes decision on September 12, 
2006, where it ruled that taxation based on controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation is an infringement to 
the freedom of establishment. Consequently, the CFC rules do not exert a substantial role in Europe since 2006. 
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necessary to be able to deduct interest expenses on internal debt from taxable income is likely 
to be convex in the level of internal debt (Fuest & Hemmelgarn, 2005, p. 513). Also, it is 
more expensive to conceal tax avoidance activities if a firm is highly indebted and has low 
taxable profits due to very high interest deductions. Affiliates that have low profits due to 
substantially higher leverage than other similar affiliates are more likely to be audited. In 
order to reduce the probability of an audit or avoid it at all, the firm must hire accountants 
and lawyers who are even more specialized. This implies that concealment costs of internal 
debt are likely to grow with the amount of profits shifted (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2014, p. 
7). 
Furthermore, a benefit of external debt is that it reduces information asymmetries 
between management and shareholders. Consequently, consistent with pecking order theory, 
firms that suffer from information asymmetries try not to issue equity due to large agency 
costs associated with equity, and issue more debt instead (Myers & Majluf, 1984, p. 215). 
External debt contracts usually demand that managers must report the relevant information 
to investors, who can control how well the managers follow agreements and assess whether 
they manage resources in the best interests of the firm (Healy & Palepu, 2001, p. 408 – 410). 
In addition, financial leverage helps to discipline otherwise overspending managers and align 
their interests more closely to those of the firm, as interest payments on debt reduce the free 
cash flow within the firm. Hence, management must work with due care, skip overspending 
on perks, implement profitable projects and be efficient in order to maintain firm’s 
profitability and ability to pay back its financial obligations by the due date to prevent 
bankruptcy. If managers are unable to ensure that, the company may become bankrupt and 
managers may lose their jobs. Thus, the more external debt the firm has, the less free cash 
flow is available for managers and the smaller the potential agency costs are between 
management and shareholders (Jensen, 1986, p. 324). 
Furthermore, companies are likely to have external debt if their ability to undertake 
potentially profitable investment opportunities is limited by owners’ resources. If the owner 
of the firm cannot raise capital for new investments, he encounters an opportunity loss equal 
to the value that he could obtain by undertaking the additional investment opportunities. 
Consequently, even though he suffers agency costs of debt, he is willing to incur them in 
order to obtain additional capital. The owner is likely to increase the amount of debt that the 
firm has as long as the marginal increase in wealth from the new investments projects is 
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larger than the marginal agency costs of debt, and these agency costs are smaller than costs 
caused by issuance of new equity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 52). 
However, there are three disadvantages that characterize firms with external leverage. 
Firstly, after debt has been supplied, equity holders tend to undertake very risky projects 
because they benefit from any profit growth, but their risk is limited. External lenders 
anticipate this and require high borrowing premium and loan covenants from the borrowing 
firms to reduce lenders’ risk, which increases costs of external debt (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976, p. 45). Secondly, large amounts of debt can induce management to act too risk-averse 
and skip profitable investment opportunities (underinvestment problem), as managers risk 
losing their salary and reputation. Avoiding value increasing but risky investments reflects 
managers’ job insurance, while contributing negatively to shareholders’ wealth (Cornell & 
Shapiro, 1988, p. 11). Finally, willingness to increase financial leverage can result in 
excessive borrowing and increased bankruptcy risk if a firm is unable to fulfil its debt 
obligations. For example, liquidation cost is one of the components of bankruptcy costs, 
characterizing the decrease in firm’s value due to liquidation of assets. An increased 
probability of liquidation implies that proceeds that lenders will obtain in case of firm’s 
default are smaller. Therefore, firms that are characterized by potential liquidation costs incur 
higher debt financing costs (Warner, 1977). 
To derive expressions for costs of internal and external debt, I assume, in line with 
Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 94) and Møen et al. (2011, p. 9), that the cost functions are separable, 
convex in leverage ratios and proportional to capital employed. Cost functions are separable 
because costs and benefits of internal and external debt are different. Internal debt can be 
seen as tax-favoured equity, as it neither affects bankruptcy risk nor reduces information 
asymmetries, nor restricts free cash flow of the firm. Moreover, the firm cannot benefit from 
monitoring by external creditors. Furthermore, capital market is assumed to be perfect, even 
though the model takes into consideration taxation and bankruptcy costs. This assumption in 
combination with the argumentation above implies that a firm’s total cost function is 
additively separable in external and internal debt (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2012, p. 638). 
Furthermore, convexity related to internal debt arises due to the additional effort that has to 
be exerted to hide tax avoidance from tax authorities, while convexity of external debt is 
related to the higher premium that must be paid due to asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2010, p. 7). 
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Hence, the expression for costs of internal debt is as following:  
𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) =

2
∙ (𝑏𝑖
𝐼)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 if 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 > 0, and 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼) = 0 if 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 ≤ 0, (1) 
where 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 =
𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝐾𝑖
 reflects the internal debt-to-asset ratio in affiliate i, and  is a positive 
constant. As observable from the expression, internal debt costs are positive and proportional 
to capital employed. Concealment costs increase with the amount of internal debt that the 
firm has and are equal to zero if the firm does not have any internal debt. 
Furthermore, the cost function of external debt is expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) =
𝜇
2
∙ (𝑏𝑖
𝐸 − 𝑏∗)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 −
𝜇
2
∙ (𝑏∗)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖, (2) 
where 𝑏𝐸
𝑖 =
𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝐾𝑖
 reflects the external debt-to-asset ratio in affiliate i, 𝜇 is a positive 
constant and  𝑏∗  reflects the optimal external debt-to-asset ratio in affiliate i in absence of 
taxation, based only on incentive considerations. Any deviations from the optimal external 
leverage ratio imply incentive-related agency costs for the firm. As observable from the 
expression, external debt costs are positive, proportional to capital employed and increase 
with the amount of external debt that the firm has. 
As discussed above, an increased use of external leverage increases the risk of 
potential bankruptcy costs. Huizinga et al. (2008) were the first to analyse bankruptcy costs 
together with the external debt shifting mechanism by assuming that the parent firm will bail 
out any affiliate, which is in the risk of becoming bankrupt. However, the concept that the 
parent company is willing to bail out its subsidiaries has been applied before (Luciano & 
Nicodano, 2014, p. 2741). For example, Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003, p. 744) show 
that entrepreneurs are willing to provide private funds to help their subsidiaries which are 
close to bankruptcy. Also Riyanto and Toolsema (2008, p. 2179) claim that, in order to 
explain the existence of pyramidal ownership structure, higher-level firms must bail out 
lower-level firms. Moreover, Keillor, Wilkinson and Kannan (2011, p. 73) claim that 
practical considerations require that the parent firm provides an implicit guarantee on 
affiliates’ debt. If there is no implicit guarantee, lenders require explicit guarantees from the 
parent firm before they lend their funds to the affiliate. In fact, a survey by Stobaugh (1970) 
shows that no medium or large multinational firms would allow their affiliates to default on 
debt, even if an affiliate did not have a parent firm guarantee. Furthermore, only 17% of small 
multinational firms would allow an affiliate to default on debt (pp. 51 – 52). This shows that 
27 
 
 
multinational firms have a moral obligation to guarantee for the debt of their affiliates, and 
that the guarantees do not necessarily have to be explicit, but can be implicit as well (Shapiro, 
1978, p. 218). For example, distress of an affiliate could badly impact parent firm’s 
reputation, or the affiliate might be relevant to other operations of the firm. This implies that 
leverage decisions of different affiliates within a multinational corporation become 
interdependent, and leverage of an affiliate depends on corporate tax rates of all other 
affiliates of the multinational group even if there exists no direct borrowing between them 
(Büttner & Wamser, 2013, p. 66). In line with these studies, I assume that the parent company 
ensures credit guarantees for affiliates’ leverage. 
Therefore, the bankruptcy risk of a multinational firm depends on its total external 
debt-to-asset ratio, expressed as 𝑏𝑓 =
∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝑖
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
. 𝑏𝑓 can also be written as asset-weighted average 
of affiliate-specific leverage ratios 𝑏𝑖
𝐸, or ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝐸𝜌𝑖𝑖 , where 𝜌𝑖 =
𝐾𝑖
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
 reflects the share of total 
assets of an affiliate i in the total assets of the multinational firm. Furthermore, following 
Huizinga et al. (2008), I denote 𝐶𝑓 to be the expected bankruptcy costs of the multinational 
corporation, which are quadratic in the corporation’s leverage ratio 𝑏𝑓 and proportional to its 
total assets. As only loss-making firms incur bankruptcy costs, the costs are assumed to be 
not tax deductible (Huizinga et al., 2008, p. 94). 
The bankruptcy costs of a multinational corporation are expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝑓 =
𝛾
2
∙ 𝑏𝑓
2 ∙ ∑ 𝐾𝑖 =
𝛾
2
∙
(∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸)𝑖
2
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
 𝑖 , (3) 
where 𝛾 is a positive constant. 
Considering the production function of an affiliate i and the cost functions of capital 
and debt that decrease the potential dividend payments, the economic profit of an affiliate i 
is expressed as follows: 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶
𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) − 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼). 
Furthermore, the taxable profit of an affiliate i can be found by considering tax 
deductibility of interest expenses. Following Møen et al. (2011, p. 10), I have assumed that 
the costs of equity are not tax deductible, which is a common practice worldwide. Another 
assumption, in line with Møen et al. (2011, p. 10), is that the costs of debt are not tax 
deductible from taxable income, which is a relevant assumption to specify the necessary 
equations for further empirical analysis. Costs of debt may be associated with asymmetric 
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information between investors and managers or with acts in violations of the tax code, which 
supports argumentation for their not tax deductibility (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2010, p. 9). 
Therefore, the taxable profit of an affiliate i is expressed as follows:  
𝜋𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ (𝐷𝑖
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼). 
In order to find expressions for profit after corporate tax of an affiliate i, I define 
values of an affiliate i in a country i: 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 for a leveraged affiliate and 𝑉𝑖
𝑈 for a non-leveraged 
affiliate. 
Then, the after-corporate tax profit of an affiliate i in country i is expressed as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝜋𝑖
𝑡
⏟      =
=𝑉𝑖
𝐿
 
= (1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ 𝑓(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖⏟              
=𝑉𝑖
𝑈
+ 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ (𝐷𝑖
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑖
𝐸) − 𝐶𝐼(𝑏𝑖
𝐼), (4) 
where 𝑡𝑖 is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate in country i. 
Furthermore, dividends 𝜋𝑖 that affiliates send back to the parent firm can be levied 
with a non-resident withholding tax, a parent tax on repatriated dividends and a corporate 
income tax 𝑡𝑖. If so, double tax relief may be provided for the already paid corporate income 
tax and the non-resident withholding tax. This implies that tax costs of equity depend on tax 
rates and double tax relief provisions of the parent country (Huizinga et al., 2008). However, 
European countries follow the exemption method, which implies that corporate shareholders 
are exempted from taxes on dividends and capital gains (Lang, Pistone, Schuch & Staringer, 
2013, pp. 67 – 69; Wendt, 2009, pp. 65 – 67). Therefore, withholding taxes do not matter in 
Europe and I have not accounted for them in the further analysis, which is in line with Møen 
et al. (2011, p. 11).4 Consequently, the total after-corporate tax profit or the value of the 
multinational corporation equals the sum of profits of all its affiliates. 
The total value of a multinational corporation is expressed as follows:  
𝜋𝑃 = 𝑉
𝐿 = ∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿
𝑖 − 𝐶𝑓 = ∑ 𝜋𝑖 − 𝐶𝑓𝑖 . (5) 
 
                                                 
4 Huizinga et al. (2008) present a detailed information on the international tax system, including 
corporate taxation and double tax relief systems, bilateral withholding taxes and bilateral tax treaties between 
European countries (p. 83 - 93). 
29 
 
 
Specifically, the relation between 𝑉𝐿 and 𝑉𝑈 is the following: 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + ∑ 𝑡𝑖(𝐷𝑖
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼)𝑖 − 𝐶𝑓 − ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝐸
𝑖 − ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝐼
𝑖 . 
Values of an unleveraged firm and a leveraged firm are different due to tax benefits 
and non-tax costs of debt, which are incurred by the leveraged firm. The aim of a 
multinational firm is to maximize its leveraged value 𝑉𝐿 by choosing the optimal level of 
internal and external leverage in each affiliate. To set up profit maximization problem of a 
multinational corporation after corporate taxation of affiliates worldwide, I use equations (1) 
to (4). The objective function must be maximized by considering that the total sum of lending 
and borrowing among affiliates belonging to the multinational corporation must be equal to 
zero. 
The maximization problem of a multinational corporation is expressed as follows:  
max
𝐷𝑖
𝐸, 𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝜋𝑃 =∑{(
𝑖
1 − 𝑡𝑖) ∙ 𝑓(𝐾𝑖) − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ (𝐷𝑖
𝐸 + 𝐷𝑖
𝐼) 
−
𝜇
2
∙ (
𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝐾𝑖
− 𝑏∗)
2
∙ 𝐾𝑖 −
𝜇
2
∙ (𝑏∗)2 ∙ 𝐾𝑖 −

2
∙ (
𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝐾𝑖
)
2
∙ 𝐾𝑖} −
𝛾
2
∙
(∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝑖 )
2
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
  
𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝑟 ∙ 𝐷𝑖
𝐼 = 0𝑖 . 
Then, the first order conditions with respect to external and internal debt, are 
expressed as follows: 
𝐷𝑖
𝐸: 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − 𝜇 ∙ (
𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝐾𝑖
− 𝑏∗) − 𝛾
∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸
𝑖
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
= 0, (6) 
𝐷𝑖
𝐼: 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 −  ∙
𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝐾𝑖
−𝑚 ∙ 𝑟 = 0, (7) 
where 𝑚 is the Lagrangian multiplier, which reflects shadow cost of shifted interest 
expenses. The optimal solution to minimize these expenses and maximize internal debt tax 
shield is when 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖. This implies that the affiliate facing the lowest corporate tax rate 
should operate as the internal financial coordination centre of the multinational corporation 
and lend internally to other affiliates. Hence, this function can be assumed by any affiliate, 
not only the parent firm. Moreover, this shows that the optimal solution for a profit-
maximizing multinational company is to use internal debt. Thus, an analysis that does not 
account for internal debt does not reflect the optimal capital structure of a multinational firm 
and is therefore biased. 
30 
 
 
Mintz and Smart (2004) were the first to claim that internal bank should be located in 
a tax haven country, and affiliates located in high-tax countries should borrow and declare 
their interest income in the internal bank to increase firm’s after-tax profits (pp. 1152 – 
1153).5 This mechanism helps to explain the abundance of internal banks of multinational 
corporations in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As these countries offer very low 
effective tax rates due to specific tax systems and as dividends are not taxed when shifted 
among European affiliates, multinational firms can benefit from preferential taxation systems 
by locating their internal banks in these countries.6 
Following Møen et al. (2011, p. 12), I number the countries and assume that country 
1 faces the lowest corporate tax rate of the multinational corporation. Then, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖 = 𝑡1. The 
net tax advantage variable (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡1) that Mintz and Smart (2004) use in their study is referred 
to as maximum tax difference by Møen et al. (2011), and I use the same definition in my paper 
for the internal debt shifting mechanism. 
By reordering elements of the first order condition for internal debt (equation (7)), 
the optimal internal debt-to-asset ratio is expressed as follows:  
𝑏𝑖
𝐼 =
𝑟

∙ (𝑡𝑖 −𝑚) =
𝑟

∙ (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡1) > 0, ∀ 𝑖 > 1, and 𝑏𝑖
𝐼 = 0 if 𝑖 = 1. (8) 
Internal debt-to-asset ratio is zero for an internal bank (𝑖 = 1), as it only lends internal 
debt to other subsidiaries of the multinational corporation. The amount of internal debt 𝐿1 
that the internal bank lends to other affiliates is expressed as follows: 
𝐿1 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝑖>1 . (9) 
By reordering elements of the first order condition for external debt (equation (6)) 
(details in Appendix A), the optimal external debt-to-asset ratio is expressed as follows:  
𝑏𝑖
𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖 , (10) 
where 𝛽0 =
𝜇𝑏∗
𝜇+𝛾
, 𝛽1 =
𝑟
𝜇+𝛾
, 𝛽2 =
𝛾𝑟
(𝜇+𝛾)𝜇
 and 𝜌𝑗 =
𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗
, which reflects the share of 
total assets of an affiliate j in the total assets of the multinational corporation. 𝛽0, by 
                                                 
5 Formula One uses this strategy to reduce its global taxation. Several highly leveraged firms that 
belong to Delta Topco Holding pay 15% interest on their internal debt, while internal bank of the corporation 
is located on the Channel Island Jersey, which is a tax haven (Møen et al., 2011, p. 3; Sylt & Reid, 2011, pp. 17 
– 36). 
6 As an example, Statoil and Statkraft have established their financial coordination centres in Belgium 
in order to benefit from the low effective corporate tax rates on interest income. The actual tax rates that the 
firms paid in 2012 were 8.4% for Statoil and 12.4% for Statkraft, even though the statutory corporate tax rate 
in Belgium was 34% (Bjørnestad, 2013). 
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incorporating term 𝑏∗, balances bankruptcy costs of external leverage against incentive-
related agency costs of choosing a different amount of leverage than the optimal external 
debt-to-asset ratio based on incentive considerations. Furthermore, the optimal external 
leverage ratio consists of two tax mechanisms. Firstly, the standard debt tax shield 
mechanism is represented by the statutory corporate tax rate in the host country of an affiliate 
i (𝑡𝑖). Huizinga et al. (2008) refer to the mechanism as the domestic effect of taxation on the 
optimal leverage, as the standard debt tax shield can be utilized by purely domestic firms 
located in country i as well. The mechanism implies that a higher corporate tax rate in country 
i is associated with a higher external debt tax shield; therefore, a higher 𝑏𝑖
𝐸. 
The other tax mechanism in equation (10) reflects the impact of international tax 
differences among affiliates of a multinational corporation on an affiliate’s optimal external 
leverage in country i. This mechanism is referred to as the international or debt-shifting 
mechanism by Huizinga et al. (2008) and as the weighted tax difference by Møen et al. (2011) 
as the term weights international tax differences (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗) by affiliates’ asset shares 𝜌𝑗. The 
external debt shifting mechanism implies that for a level of overall bankruptcy costs 𝐶𝑓, 
external debt should be located in affiliates that face the highest corporate tax rates in order 
to maximize firm’s tax savings. If the statutory corporate tax rate increases in a country where 
an affiliate i operates, it is optimal for the multinational firm to allocate more debt to this 
affiliate and reduce the amount of debt in other affiliates in order to keep the overall 
bankruptcy costs under control. Therefore, the optimal external debt-to-asset ratio in country 
i is negatively related to the statutory corporate tax rate in country j. Furthermore, a change 
in tax rate leads to a larger change in the weighted tax difference variable for a relatively 
small affiliate because the variable sums up the asset shares of all other affiliates that belong 
to the multinational firm (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖). Hence, in case of debt shifting between affiliates of different 
sizes, the smaller affiliate will experience a bigger change in its leverage ratio. 
Finally, by summing up the expressions for internal and external debt, the total debt-
to-asset ratio of an affiliate i is expressed as follows: 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡𝑖⏟  
(𝑖)
+ 𝛽2 ∙ ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖⏟            
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝛽3 ∙ (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡1)⏟        
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
, ∀ 𝑖 > 1, (11) 
where 𝛽3 =
𝑟

, and 
𝑏1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡1⏟  
(𝑖)
+ 𝛽2 ∙ ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡1 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠1⏟            
(𝑖𝑖)
 if 𝑖 = 1,  (12) 
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since 𝑏1 = 𝑏1
𝐸 + 𝑏1
𝐼 = 𝑏1
𝐸, as 𝑏1
𝐼 = 0.  
The specification (11) shows that the total debt-to-asset ratio of an affiliate i increases 
with: 
(i) the domestic corporate tax rate 𝑡𝑖 due to the standard debt tax shield mechanism, 
(ii) the weighted tax difference ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖  due to overall bankruptcy costs and the 
external debt shifting mechanism, 
(iii) the maximum tax difference (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡1) due to the internal debt shifting mechanism. 
However, if the parent company does not guarantee for affiliates’ debt and does not 
bail out affiliates facing bankruptcy, then the external debt shifting mechanism is not active, 
and the internal debt shifting mechanism is the only component of international debt shifting 
(Møen et al., 2011, p. 14). 
3.2. Theoretical predictions of the model 
There are three main theoretical predictions of the model. Firstly, a value-maximizing 
multinational firm engages in both internal and external debt shifting, motivated by 
differences in statutory corporate tax rates of its affiliates worldwide. This implies that the 
three tax mechanisms are correlated, as they all depend on the host country statutory 
corporate tax rate. Hence, the previous empirical studies which omit any of the debt shifting 
mechanisms suffer from an omitted variable bias and do not accurately depict the profit-
maximizing behaviour of multinational companies. The individual contributions on 
affiliates’ leverage of the tax mechanisms that are included in the specification are biased in 
these studies (Møen et al., 2011, p. 3). 
Another prediction of the model is that the internal financial coordination centre, 
which undertakes internal lending activities within a multinational firm, should reside in the 
country with the lowest effective corporate tax rate in order to maximize worldwide profits. 
This structure has been indicated by Mintz and Smart (2004, pp. 1152 – 1153) as the optimal 
mechanism to ensure that interest income is taxed at the lowest tax rate possible and interest 
expenses are deducted from taxable income in higher-taxed affiliates. 
Furthermore, the model predicts that multinational companies should balance their 
external debt across affiliates worldwide in order to maximize the external debt tax shield. If 
the corporate tax rate increases in a country, it becomes profitable to rebalance the firm’s 
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capital structure and increase the amount of debt in affiliates that operate in this country. 
However, higher external leverage increases bankruptcy risk of the multinational firm, which 
is mitigated by decreasing the amount of debt in lower-taxed affiliates. Hence, changes in tax 
policy in one country lead to changes in capital structures of all affiliates of the multinational 
firm worldwide. The external debt shifting mechanism constitutes an advantage to a 
multinational firm, as it can exploit the debt tax shield to a greater extent than domestic firms 
and still maintain the overall risk of bankruptcy low. 
3.3.  Empirical strategy 
The theoretical equations (11) and (12) can be expressed as the following regression 
specification: 
𝑏𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ ∑ 𝜌𝑝𝑗𝑡(𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3 ∙ (𝑗≠𝑖 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝1𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿𝑡 + 𝜎𝐼 + 𝛼𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝𝑖𝑡. (13) 
The dependent variable 𝑏𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the total debt-to-asset ratio of an affiliate i, which 
belongs to a multinational corporation p in year t. The optimal ratio consists of both optimal 
external and internal leverage ratios; therefore, it is affected by all three previously discussed 
tax mechanisms. The right hand side of the regression consists of several independent 
variables. 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the host country corporate tax rate, which has an effect on the optimal level 
of external leverage. ∑ 𝜌𝑝𝑗𝑡(𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖  is the weighted tax difference variable, which 
reflects external debt shifting and also has an effect on the optimal level of external leverage. 
(𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝1𝑡) is the maximum tax difference variable, which reflects internal debt shifting and 
has an effect on the optimal level of internal leverage. Furthermore, 𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm-
level and country-level control variables, 𝛿𝑡 is a vector of time dummies, 𝜎𝐼 and 𝛼𝑝 are 
industry and parent fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an error term.
7 The affiliate-specific control 
variables and year, industry and parent (group) fixed effects have been added to the 
regression specification in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Year 
fixed effects capture aggregate shocks occurring over the sample period, while affiliate-
specific control variables capture heterogeneity characterizing affiliates’ financing costs. As 
borrowing costs tend to vary across industries, industry fixed effects are also added to the 
                                                 
7 Control variables are discussed in a greater detail in section 4.4. 
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specification. Finally, parent fixed effects capture the group-specific risk that can influence 
affiliates’ borrowing costs. Moreover, parent fixed effects control for the international 
location structure of a multinational group.8 As I want to examine the effect that the three tax 
mechanisms have on the optimal total leverage, then 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are the main coefficients 
that I am interested in. 
  
                                                 
8 Discussion on the importance of inclusion of group fixed effects is provided in section 5. 
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4.  Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1.  Data sources and sample restrictions 
I use the firm-level Orbis database provided by Bureau van Dijk in order to obtain 
historical ownership data on European firms. The ownership database consists of owner and 
subsidiary links worldwide on more than 40 million companies, while the archived data on 
ownership structures is available since January 2003. The database provides information on 
full ownership structures, allowing also for indirect ownership. After obtaining ownership 
data on majority-owned affiliates of European parent firms for a time period of 12 years 
(2003 – 2014), I use the firm-level Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk in order 
to find financial data on these European parent firms and their majority-owned 
subsidiaries.9,10 It is necessary to initially obtain the historical ownership information through 
the Orbis database as the Amadeus database does not provide historical ownership data. 
Information on ownership structure is available only for the last reported date.11 An 
assumption about a constant ownership structure would lead to misclassified subsidiary-
parent relations as ownership structures tend to change over time.12 Therefore, the Orbis 
database is used initially in order to eliminate such misclassifications. 
The Amadeus database provides financial information on approximately 21 million 
private and public companies in Europe (Bureau van Dijk, n.d.). The data is presented in a 
universal and standardized format in order to increase its comparability across countries. 
Even though harmonization in accounting standards and practices within the European Union 
has made it easier to compare accounting formats across European countries, there still exist 
differences in accounting practices. Hence, cross-country studies that compare behaviour of 
heterogeneous firms using standardized accounts based on different accounting conventions 
are associated with a bit of caution (Klapper, Laeven & Rajan, 2004, p. 8). However, after 
                                                 
9 A detailed description of how to obtain historical ownership data in the Orbis database and financial 
data in the Amadeus database is provided in Appendix E. 
10 Financial data for year 2014 is not available for all multinational firms in the Amadeus database yet. 
Consequently, only approximately 0.2% of the final data sample consists of financial data from 2014. 
11 Historical ownership data is available on Amadeus DVDs; however, the library does not provide 
access to this data. 
12 The assumption about a constant historical ownership structure is tested in robustness checks. See 
section 7.4. 
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applying inclusion criteria and data trimming procedures, any biases characterizing the data 
should have substantially decreased.13 
As the Amadeus database only has information on European subsidiaries, I cannot 
examine how tax differences between affiliates located in Europe and affiliates located in 
other world countries influence leverage choices of European multinational firms.14 
However, as European multinational firms usually create the largest part of their revenues 
from operations in Europe, this limitation cannot be considered as a major concern. Also, it 
is likely that other factors and country characteristics are highly important for financial 
structures of non-European affiliates; for example, development of financial markets, 
financial stability and corruption in the country (Møen et al., 2011, p. 15).15 
In my analysis, a firm is considered to be a subsidiary if at least 50% of its shares 
belong to another firm (the parent firm). A multinational firm is defined as a parent firm 
which owns at least one foreign subsidiary. Furthermore, most multinational firms publish 
both consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements. While consolidated financial 
statements describe activities within the parent firm and its subsidiaries, non-consolidated 
financial statements directly show the local activities occurring within the parent firm and 
within each of its subsidiaries. Therefore, in line with Huizinga et al. (2008, pp. 95 – 96), I 
use only unconsolidated statements in my analysis. The use of unconsolidated statements 
helps to avoid double counting of firms and subsidiaries and makes the data more comparable 
as not all European countries require consolidation of firms’ financial accounts (Klapper et 
al., 2004, p. 9). As the financial data is provided in the local currency of a subsidiary, I convert 
all accounting data into euros, according to the exchange rate from local currency to euros at 
the financial reporting date. 
The main data sample consists of 1,039,827 affiliate-year observations of European 
multinational firms, operating in 39 countries. However, the number of observations does not 
reflect all the majority-owned European subsidiaries of European parent firms whose Bureau 
van Dijk ID codes (BvD ID codes) were initially found by the Orbis database. Data trimming 
                                                 
13 Inclusion criteria and data trimming procedures are discussed in Table 1. 
14 I control for majority-owned non-European affiliates that belong to European multinational 
corporations in robustness tests. See section 7.5. 
15 Lehmann, Sayek and Kang (2004), examining leverage choices of U.S. majority-owned foreign 
affiliates in 53 countries, find that their financial leverage increases with exchange rate variation and financial 
development. Desai et al. (2004), using data on 3,700 U.S. multinational firms that have foreign affiliates 
located in more than 150 countries, find that foreign affiliates borrow less external debt in countries 
characterized by undeveloped capital markets or poor creditor rights due to higher local borrowing costs. 
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procedures and selection criteria used in order to obtain the main sample are shown in Table 
1. Firstly, the Amadeus database did not find affiliate-year financial data on several affiliates 
based on their BvD ID codes (12% of the initial sample); thus, these affiliate-year 
observations are subsequently excluded from the main data sample. Furthermore, the number 
of observations decreased as I dropped consolidated accounts from the sample. As discussed 
above, non-consolidated accounts are used in the study because they directly reflect the local 
activities occurring within the parent firm and within each of its subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
the number of observations decreased as I dropped purely domestic firms from the data 
sample.16 For purely domestic firms, the weighted tax difference and the maximum tax 
difference variables are equal to zero, as all affiliates and the parent firm are located in the 
same country. As I am willing to examine how tax affects debt structures of multinational 
firms exclusively, I dropped purely domestic firms from the main sample.17 Furthermore, I 
dropped the affiliate-year observations that entered the data sample more than once per same 
parent and per same year in order to avoid double counting of some affiliate-year 
observations. Finally, I dropped the affiliate-year observations with extreme total debt-to-
asset ratios which were outside [0;1] interval, and the affiliate-year observations with missing 
firm-level or country-level control variables.18  
  
                                                 
16 This approach is in line with the data sample choice by Møen et al. (2011), who also examine only 
multinational firms in their analysis. Huizinga et al. (2008) use data on all European firms; thus, they include 
also purely domestic firms in the main analysis (p. 81). The sample is reduced to multinational firms in 
robustness tests (pp. 102 – 104), which does not change the estimated coefficients on tax variables significantly. 
17 Purely domestic firms are included in the data sample in robustness tests. See section 7.3. 
18 Firm-level and country-level control variables are discussed in section 4.4. 
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Table 1: Data trimming procedures 
The table shows data selection criteria and trimming procedures used in order to obtain the main sample. The 
main sample consists of majority-owned European affiliates of European multinational firms, whose historical 
ownership data has been obtained from the Orbis database and financial data has been obtained from the 
Amadeus database. Units of observation are affiliates of European firms. The restriction (4) is relaxed in a 
robustness test in section 7.3. Summary statistics and descriptions of the variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage 
(1) All affiliate-year historical ownership observations of 
European firms from Orbis (2003 – 2014) 
12,099,264 100% 
(2) All affiliate-year financial data observations of European 
firms found by Amadeus, based on Orbis BvD ID codes 
10,647,352 88% 
(3) Dropped affiliate-year observations with consolidated 
accounts 
8,783,747 73% 
(4) Dropped purely domestic firms 2,748,379 23% 
(5) Dropped affiliate-year observations occurring more than 
once per same parent 
1,996,373 16% 
(6) Dropped affiliate-year observations with extreme total 
debt-to-asset ratios 
1,605,336 13% 
(7) Dropped affiliate-year observations with missing firm-
level or country-level control variables 
1,039,827 9% 
Final sample 1,039,827 9% 
4.2.  Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio, defined as 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Total liabilities are calculated as the sum of non-current 
liabilities and current liabilities. Non-current liabilities consist of long-term debt and other 
non-current liabilities, for example, bonds payable, long-term lease obligations and product 
warranties. Current liabilities consist of loans, creditors and other current liabilities, for 
example, short-term notes payable. 
4.3.  Tax mechanisms 
The first tax mechanism – the standard debt tax shield mechanism – is the host 
country statutory corporate tax rate 𝑡𝑖. Data on statutory corporate tax rates in Europe was 
obtained from KPMG’s corporate tax rates table and corporate and indirect tax rate survey 
(KPMG, n.d.; KPMG, 2009), and the OECD’s corporate income tax rates table and economic 
surveys (OECD, n.d.b.; OECD, 2013b). The model predicts that the statutory corporate tax 
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rate should have a positive effect on affiliates’ external leverage due to tax deductibility of 
interest expenses. 
Furthermore, the second tax mechanism – the external debt shifting mechanism – is 
captured by the weighted tax difference term ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖 , referred to as tax incentive to 
shift debt by Huizinga et al. (2008). The variable is expressed as the weighted sum of 
differences between the corporate tax rate faced by an affiliate i and tax rates faced by the 
parent firm and all other affiliates that belong to the multinational corporation. The weight 
of each affiliate is calculated as the share of affiliate’s total assets in the total assets of the 
multinational corporation. The model predicts that the weighted tax difference variable 
should have a positive effect on affiliates’ external leverage through the external debt shifting 
mechanism. This implies that the higher the weighted tax difference variable of an affiliate i 
due to a higher tax rate of this affiliate or due to a reduction in tax rates of other affiliates, the 
more external debt this affiliate will borrow. 
Finally, the third tax mechanism – the internal debt shifting mechanism – is captured 
by the maximum tax difference term (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡1). The variable is expressed as the difference 
between the tax rate of an affiliate i and the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate within the 
multinational corporation. The model predicts that the maximum tax difference variable 
should have a positive effect on affiliates’ internal leverage through the internal debt shifting 
mechanism. This implies that the higher the maximum tax difference variable of an affiliate 
i due to a higher tax rate of this affiliate or due to a reduction in tax rate of the lowest-taxed 
affiliate within the multinational group, the more internal debt this affiliate will borrow from 
the lowest-taxed affiliate. 
4.4.  Control variables 
My analysis focuses on the effect of different tax mechanisms on the optimal leverage 
of a multinational corporation. However, firm’s optimal leverage can be affected also by 
other factors, not accounted for by the model. Therefore, to reduce the potential omitted 
variable bias, I include four firm-level and four country-level control variables in the analysis, 
following Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen et al. (2011). Furthermore, regressions include 
time dummy variables (not reported in result tables) and parent (group) and industry fixed 
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effects.19 The fixed effects help to remove the effect of time-invariant characteristics and 
account for the unobserved heterogeneity in debt policies among multinational corporations, 
industries and time periods. 
4.4.1. Firm-level control variables 
Fixed asset ratio (tangibility) 
Fixed asset ratio (tangibility) of an affiliate i is expressed as a ratio of affiliate’s fixed 
assets to total assets. Different studies have shown that the type of assets owned by a firm 
influence its capital decisions; however, direction of the effect that the fixed asset ratio has 
on firm’s leverage is not entirely clear. 
Tangible assets, such as property, plant and equipment, are easier to value than 
intangible assets, such as value of goodwill from an acquisition. Consequently, if a firm has 
a high proportion of tangible assets, it is able to use them as a collateral and can easily borrow 
externally. Moreover, tangible assets decrease creditors’ risk because creditors can more 
easily reclaim a bankrupt firm’s tangible assets. Tangible assets retain more value in 
liquidation, which implies that creditors have a better guarantee of repayment and the 
expected distress costs are lower (Drobetz & Fix, 2005, p. 88; Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 
1451; Titman & Wessels, 1988, p. 3). The lower creditors’ risk increases their willingness to 
supply loans, which shows a positive effect of tangibility on firm’s leverage. The positive 
effect has been found by several authors; for example, Sibilkov (2009) who claims that costs 
of issuing debt are lower for a firm with high asset tangibility (p. 1194), and Campello and 
Giambona (2013), Çekrezi (2013) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) who find a strong positive 
relation between asset tangibility and firm’s leverage. 
Nevertheless, tangible assets can be illiquid and problematic to redeploy, which 
implies that their value can substantially decrease after a liquidation or reallocation 
(Campello & Giambona, 2013, p. 1363). Furthermore, pecking order theory shows that costs 
of issuing equity are lower for a firm with a high proportion of fixed assets due to the lower 
information asymmetry associated with fixed assets. Hence, the pecking order theory predicts 
a lower leverage ratio for a firm with more tangible assets (Frank & Goyal, 2009, p. 19). 
Tangible assets are also associated with depreciation deductions, which constitute a non-debt 
tax shield and act as a substitute for debt in tax minimization strategies. The depreciation tax 
                                                 
19 Specifications with subsidiary fixed effects and no subsidiary or parent fixed effects are tested in 
robustness checks. See section 7.9. 
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shield is an alternative and less costly approach to reduce tax expenses, which decreases 
benefits of the debt tax shields. Therefore, the use of debt becomes less attractive, which 
shows a negative relation between the optimal level of debt and fixed assets (Cloyd, Limberg 
& Robinson, 1997, p. 264; de Mooij, 2011, p. 4). 
Firm size 
Firm size variable is measured by an affiliate’s sales and is expressed as a logarithm 
of sales.20 Size has been empirically found to be strongly related to firm’s capital structure; 
however, the effect of size on equilibrium leverage is ambiguous. Findings of studies that use 
international data show that firms’ indebtedness and size have a positive relation in most 
countries (Booth et al., 2001, p. 105). For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that 
indebtedness is positively related to size in all major industrialized countries except Germany 
(p. 1422). 
Firm’s size is an important determinant of its leverage for several reasons. Large firms 
are able to borrow at more favourable financing terms because higher sales have a positive 
effect on firms’ cash flows and large firms also tend to diversify their financing sources. 
Consequently, their greater and cheaper access to external funds through debt markets can 
lead to an increased indebtedness of large firms (Booth et al., 2001). Furthermore, firm’s size 
reflects its default probability, as it is harder to liquidate large firms, and recovery rate is 
higher for large firms in case of financial distress (Kurshev & Strebulaev, 2007, p. 1). Also, 
as implied by trade-off theory, large firms tend to have lower bankruptcy risks and therefore 
incur lower cost monitoring and smaller agency costs (Booth et al., 2001, pp. 100 – 101). For 
example, Warner (1977) finds that large firms have a lower ratio of bankruptcy costs to the 
firm’s market value (p. 337). Size may also reflect volatility of firm’s assets, as small firms 
often operate in developing and volatile industries. Fama and French (2002) test the volatility 
prediction using trade-off and pecking-order theories. The trade-off model predicts that firms 
with less variable earnings have more leverage because they are less likely to default. 
Similarly, the pecking order model also predicts a negative relation between volatility of net 
cash flows and leverage. The authors hypothesize that large firms have less volatile earnings 
and find a positive relation between size and leverage. 
                                                 
20 The Amadeus database did not report sales data on any firms located in Denmark, Ireland, Russia 
and the United Kingdome. To avoid excluding firms located in these countries from the main data sample as a 
result of data trimming procedures, I use firms’ operating revenue (turnover) as a variable for firm size in these 
countries. 
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Furthermore, costs of issuing debt and equity are also related to firm’s size as size 
can characterize the information that is available to outside investors. Information asymmetry 
between firm and investors is lower for large firms, as such firms are continuously monitored 
by investors. As equity is more sensitive towards information asymmetry than debt, large 
firms should be more capable of issuing equity than small firms, which should result in a 
higher preference for equity relative to debt in large firms (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1457). 
Moreover, as implied by the pecking order theory, large firms are survivors and tend to have 
more equity financing (Booth et al., 2001). Smith (1977) claims that small firms pay much 
more than large firms to issue new equity and also slightly more to issue long-term debt. He 
finds that, the smaller the firm, the larger the underwriting commissions; therefore, small 
firms are likely to be more indebted than large firms. However, examination of equity 
issuances data in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States shows that large 
firms tend to have smaller net equity issuances than small firms (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 
1457). 
Loss carry-forward 
Loss carry-forward variable is expressed as a dummy variable equal to 1 if an affiliate 
has losses that it can carry forward, and 0 otherwise. As revealed by the previous research, 
the effect of firm’s loss carry-forwards on its financial leverage is ambiguous. 
Loss carry-forwards reduce firm’s future tax payments, which implies that they act as 
non-debt tax shields and can lead to a lower demand for debt tax shields (Dwenger & Steiner, 
2012, p. 23; Givoly, Hayn, Ofer & Sarig, 1992, p. 352). MacKie-Mason (1990) claims that 
if a U.S. firm has a loss carry-forward, the firm is less likely to issue debt due to an already 
high tax shield (p. 1472). The effective tax reduction resulting from an increased use of debt 
is likely to be zero. As empirically shown by Auerbach (1985), a firm with a loss carry-
forward is likely to issue less debt than a firm without any losses to be carried forward. For 
example, if a firm with a substantial loss carry-forward wants to undertake an investment 
project, it is likely that the firm has to borrow short-term due to lack of retained earnings. 
Any long-term borrowing is smaller than for a firm without a loss carry-forward (p. 307). 
However, loss carry-forwards from previous periods may explain other firm’s 
characteristics, for example, its expected performance, which may indicate a positive relation 
between firm’s loss carry-forwards and its financial leverage. In addition, affiliates 
experiencing financial difficulties may be unable to retain profits and consequently should 
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have less equity capital. Therefore, they might undertake more debt to finance their activities 
(Gopalan, Nanda & Seru, 2007, p. 766). 
Profitability 
Profitability variable is expressed as a ratio of affiliate’s earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets.21 Effect of profitability on firm’s 
optimal leverage ratio is ambiguous and can be explained by two theories: static trade-off 
theory and pecking order theory. 
Firstly, according to the static trade-off theory, a firm follows a target debt-to-equity 
ratio, determined by benefits and costs associated with debt (debt tax shield, financial distress 
costs and agency costs). The theory suggests a positive relationship between profitability and 
leverage as higher profits lead to more income to use for debt service payments and more 
taxable profits to protect from taxation. Moreover, profitable firms may be perceived as 
relatively riskless, which increases their ability to obtain credit (Myers, 1993, p. 84). 
Secondly, the pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy of financial 
decisions when determining their capital structures. Initially, firms want to finance their 
investments entirely by internal debt or retained earnings. If they need also external financing 
to finance a project, they first apply for a bank loan, then for public debt, and finally issue 
equity. Therefore, the pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage, as profitable firms generate high earnings and can use their profits 
to pay down debt obligations or simply finance investments through retained earnings instead 
of debt (Chiang, Chan & Hui, 2002, p. 434; Mendell, Sydor & Mishra, 2006). For example, 
Graham (2000) finds that profitable firms use debt conservatively, using Boeing and Intel as 
examples of profitable firms. His findings show that if the firms have faced an unprofitable 
period and return to the profitable state again, their leverage decreases to or below the debt 
level which they had during the unprofitable period. This implies that the firms become less 
indebted as soon as they are profitable enough (p. 1924).  This result is in line with the finding 
by Myers (1993), who claims that the most significant evidence against implications of the 
trade-off theory is the significant inverse relation between debt and profitability (pp. 83 – 
84). The author explains this negative relation by slow adjustments to firms’ optimal debt 
ratios. For example, if sudden unexpectedly high profits push a firm’s actual debt ratio below 
                                                 
21 The Amadeus database did not report EBITDA data on any firms located in Russia. To avoid 
excluding firms located in Russia from the main data sample as a result of data trimming procedures, I use 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) as a variable for firm profitability in Russia. 
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the target and there exist transaction costs characterizing adjustments back to the optimal 
debt ratio, there seems to be a negative relation between profitability and leverage. 
Furthermore, if firms invest to keep up with industry growth, then the rates of real investment 
are similar within an industry. The least profitable firms are likely to have less internal funds 
or retained earnings for implementation of new projects than profitable firms; therefore, they 
are likely to borrow more externally (p. 85). 
4.4.2. Country-level control variables 
Inflation 
Inflation variable is expressed as the annual percentage change in consumer price 
index, as reported by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (n.d.b), the World 
Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund (2014) and the Consumer 
Prices Database of the OECD (2015). As debt contracts are written in nominal terms, changes 
in inflation always tend to have real effects (Gomes, Jermann & Schmid, 2014, p. 3). 
However, the direction of the effect that inflation has on firm’s leverage is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, inflation can lead to higher risk premiums and higher nominal 
interest rates, which decrease the attractiveness of debt. Inflation can also reduce the tax 
advantage of debt by decreasing the real value of deductible interest payments if the payments 
depend on the historical value of debt and if interest rates are fixed (Huizinga et al., 2008, p. 
100). 
On the other hand, the trade-off theory states that leverage is positively related to 
expected inflation (Frank & Goyal, 2009, p. 19; Taggart, 1985, p. 40). Several studies that 
examine the effect of inflation on firm’s capital structure conclude that inflation enhances 
debt financing as it decreases the real value of currently outstanding corporate debt, improves 
firm’s balance sheet and decreases its default risk (Hochman & Palmon, 1985; Modigliani, 
1982). Furthermore, nominal interest payments consist of the actual interest payments and a 
compensation for reduction in the real value of the principal. Firms are allowed to deduct 
their entire nominal interest expense for the corporate income tax, which implies that an 
increase in the nominal interest rate induced by inflation increases the tax advantage of debt 
(Gu, de Mooij & Poghosyan, 2015, pp. 184, 198; Jaffe, 1978, pp. 1442 – 1443). Hence, the 
share of pre-tax operating income paid in taxes declines with the rate of inflation and debt 
financing becomes more attractive (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010, p. 132; Modigliani & 
Cohn, 1979, p. 27). 
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Corruption 
Corruption variable is expressed as a logarithm of annual corruption index in each 
country, as reported by the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank (n.d.a). The 
variable shows the extent to which public power is used to obtain private benefits and 
captures the risk of investors’ expropriation by firm’s management or by public officials and 
politicians. The index shows the country's score in a range from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 
indicating a country with a very low level of corruption.22 Thus, the higher the index, the less 
corrupt the country. As revealed by the previous research, the effect of corruption on firm’s 
leverage is ambiguous. 
Several authors find that corrupt countries have more indebted firms, which can be 
explained by two reasons. Firstly, as debt obligations are contractual and legally binding, 
debt provides a higher degree of monitoring ability and enforcement by investors than equity. 
More indebted firms tend to be more protected from expropriation by managers or 
bureaucrats, which increases the attractiveness of leverage in corrupt countries (Fan, Rui & 
Zhao, 2008, p. 346; Venanzi, Naccarato & Abate, 2014, p. 24). Also, as found by Han, Titman 
and Twite (2012), firms that operate in countries characterized by weak laws and high public 
sector corruption tend to have high leverage and borrow more short-term debt, as short-term 
debt is harder to expropriate (p. 29). Secondly, it may be easier for a corrupt bureaucrat to 
channel funds to connected firms as loans through a bank that he controls, rather than through 
equity market that he cannot influence to such an extent (La Porta, De Silanes & Shleifer, 
2002; Sapienza, 2004). 
However, the effect of corruption on firm’s leverage can be negative, as it may be 
harder to obtain credit in countries characterized by high corruption. Also, interest rates are 
likely to be higher in countries with weak legal efficiency, where creditors are exposed to a 
high risk and low negotiation power in the event of borrower’s default (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 
2008, p. 416). Moreover, firms may consider it risky to borrow in countries characterized by 
a highly corrupt public sector. 
Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities variable is expressed as the median annual growth in sales per 
industry and country, following Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 100) and Møen et al. (2011, p. 18). 
                                                 
22 I have adjusted the range of corruption index to be within [0;10] interval, where 10 indicates a 
country with a very low level of corruption. The logarithm is taken from these adjusted values. 
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As revealed by the previous research, the impact of growth opportunities on firm’s leverage 
is ambiguous. 
As revealed by the existing literature on agency problems, firm’s stockholders tend 
to make sub-optimal investments in order to extract wealth from debtholders and maximize 
equity value rather than the total firm value. Increased growth opportunities enhance this 
conflict as there is more flexibility regarding firm’s future investments. Firstly, managers 
may have incentives to underinvest in future growth opportunities, which is described as the 
underinvestment problem (Johnson, 2003, p. 209; Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1456). The 
reason is that a portion of benefit from investments in growth opportunities belongs to 
debtholders, which implies that the net present value accruing to stockholders can be even 
negative. Furthermore, managers may be willing to overinvest in future growth opportunities 
if these investments are substantially more risky than the firm’s current assets. Moreover, 
managers may undertake risky negative net present value projects, which increase the value 
of equity and decrease the value of risky debt even more (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Reduction in firm’s value due to less efficient investment decisions is an important 
component of agency costs of debt. If bondholders are rational, they anticipate these 
stockholder incentives and require a higher cost of debt (Billett, King & Mauer, 2007, p. 
700). Therefore, it is in the firm’s and stockholders’ interests to reduce the potential conflicts 
regarding future growth opportunities. This can be done through reducing firm’s debt, 
including restrictive debt covenants in agreements, or decreasing debt maturity (Barclay, 
Marx & Smith, 2003, pp. 150, 154, 161; Barclay & Smith, 1995, p. 610; Myers, 1977, p. 
161). 
Furthermore, Titman and Wessels (1998) claim that growth opportunities can be 
considered as assets that increase firm’s value, but do not act as a collateral nor create any 
current taxable income (p. 4). Hence, borrowing can be difficult for firms which have low 
current income or low tangible assets, even though their growth opportunities are high. 
Therefore, debt and growth opportunities are likely to be negatively related. 
However, several studies find a positive relation between growth opportunities and 
leverage. If owners of a rapidly growing firm consider growth opportunities unsustainable 
and risky, they are willing to pass on the higher risk to debtholders. Also, if a substantial new 
growth opportunity is discovered, the owners of the firm might be unwilling to issue equity, 
as the price might not be high enough to reflect the firm’s actual value. The owners may 
prefer to finance the new investment initially with debt, and when the project becomes 
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profitable, the firm may pay back its debt by issuing equity at a much higher price or through 
retained earnings. Moreover, the economic and political networks of owners of rapidly 
growing firms may provide them with an easy access to the credit market. It has also been 
observed that the credit market is more likely to finance firms with better future growth 
expectations (Awan, Bhatti, Ali & Qureshi, 2010, p. 96). Another explanation for the positive 
relation between growth opportunities and leverage is that firms with rapidly growing sales 
often need to expand their fixed assets (Gupta, 1969, pp. 524, 528). These firms have a greater 
future need for funds and also retain more earnings. Therefore, according to the trade-off 
theory, high-growth firms are willing to issue more debt in order to maintain their target debt-
to-asset ratios, which shows a positive relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities (Awan et al., 2010, p. 91). 
Creditor rights 
Creditor rights variable is expressed as a logarithm of annual strength of legal rights 
index as reported by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (n.d.c). The index 
describes how well collateral and bankruptcy regulations protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders, thereby promoting borrowing and lending within a country. The index ranges from 
0 to 12, with higher values indicating that the regulations protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders and increase access to credit.23 As revealed by the previous literature, the impact of 
creditor rights on firm’s leverage is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the supply side view, which focuses on the supply side of the 
financial market or investors, suggests that strong creditor protection induces lenders to 
provide credit at more favourable terms, promotes finance and growth and leads to a higher 
corporate leverage (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998, p. 2122; La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, p. 1149; Qian & Strahan, 2007, p. 2821). Moreover, strong 
creditor rights lead to a better allocation of resources (Vig, 2013, p. 924). As claimed by 
González and González (2008), when creditor rights are weak, firms with high agency costs 
of debt find it hard to borrow because financial institutions expect underinvestment and other 
issues (p. 365). Thus, lenders in countries characterized by weak creditor protection tend to 
require high levels of collateral and demand collateral forms that have a small dilution risk 
(Davydenko & Franks, 2008, p. 601). Also, lenders require increased control rights via 
specific agreements; for example, restrictive covenants that demand low dividend payments 
                                                 
23 I have adjusted the range of creditor rights index to be within [0;10] interval, where 10 indicates a 
country with a very high creditor protection. The logarithm is taken from these adjusted values. 
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of debtor firms (Brockman & Unlu, 2009, p. 276; Miller & Reisel, 2012, p. 7; Nini, Smith & 
Sufi, 2009, p. 401). Lenders may also be willing to lend short-term in order to control 
borrowers’ opportunistic behaviour by threatening of not renewing the loan. Higher creditor 
protection reduces these issues and increases firms’ access to credit. Credit access is 
especially improved for firms with substantial proportion of intangible assets (assets that 
cannot be used as collateral, such as R&D and advertising), with low profitability, high 
growth opportunities and highly volatile returns. Giannetti (2003) finds that in the U.K., 
which has very strong creditor rights, firms with highly volatile returns are still able to borrow 
long-term. Strengthened creditor rights make the use of debt maturity to control borrowers 
inessential. Therefore, lenders are willing to increase debt maturity for firms with volatile 
returns, which increases survival of temporarily illiquid firms (p. 200). 
On the other hand, the demand side view, which focuses on the demand side of the 
financial market or corporations, suggests that strong creditor protection makes firms 
unwilling to make long-term cash flow commitments to repay debt. In countries characterized 
by strong creditor rights, management can be easily laid off upon default and replaced by 
creditors or neutral third-party trustees. As managers do not want to lose job and control upon 
financial distress, they tend to issue less leverage in countries characterized by strong creditor 
rights (Cho, Ghoul, Guedhami & Suh, 2014, p. 41; Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1444). 
4.5.  Descriptive statistics 
4.5.1. Parent firms and subsidiaries by country 
Information on the number of parent firms and subsidiaries by country is provided in 
Panel A of Table 2. As discussed previously, the Amadeus database only provides financial 
data on firms located in Europe. The total number of parent firms is 143,405 over the sample 
period of 12 years, while the total number of subsidiaries is 229,703. The number of parent 
firms that are included in the main data sample as affiliates is 31,414; hence, the total number 
of affiliates in the main data sample is 261,117. The data sample does not include data on all 
the parent firms over the sample period (143,405 firms) due to data trimming procedures and 
removal of parent firm-year observations with missing or extreme data from the main data 
sample. Overall, there are 1,039,827 affiliate-year observations in the main data sample, 
representing 108,135 parent firm-year observations and 931,692 subsidiary-year 
observations. There are on average 7 observations per affiliate and 119 observations per 
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corporate group. The number of affiliate-year observations per corporate group varies with 
the number of subsidiaries per multinational firm. The number of subsidiaries per 
multinational group vary substantially as well – the smallest corporate groups have only 1 
subsidiary, while the largest group has 1,812 subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, the table lists the number of parent firms by home country and the 
number of subsidiaries by home country and host country. For each subsidiary of a 
multinational corporation, the home country is specified as the country where its parent firm 
is located, and the host country is specified as the country where the subsidiary operates itself. 
This means that home country and host country are equal for a domestic subsidiary, as it 
operates in the same country as the parent firm. As an example, consider Austria. There are 
5,402 subsidiaries that are located in Austria (Austria is their host country). Furthermore, 
there are 10,789 subsidiaries whose parent firms are located in Austria (Austria is their home 
country). Finally, 6,377 parent firms are located in Austria (Austria is their home country), 
out of which 1,640 parent firm enter the main data sample as affiliates themselves. As 
observable in the table, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are home 
countries for more than 10,000 parent firms each in the data sample. Furthermore, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are home countries for more than 
20,000 subsidiaries each in the data sample. This implies that there are relatively many 
subsidiaries whose parent firms are located in one of these countries. Furthermore, France, 
Germany, Italy and Romania are host countries for more than 20,000 subsidiaries each in the 
data sample. This implies that relatively many subsidiaries are located in these countries. 
Finally, there are no subsidiaries located in Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Gibraltar, Kosovo, 
Monaco, San Marino and Turkey in the main data sample, as a result of data trimming 
procedures. 
Number of subsidiaries by host country represents only subsidiaries and excludes the 
number of parent firms from the main data sample. Number of parent firms represents all the 
parent firms of multinational groups that own subsidiaries in the main data sample. Hence, 
the total number of parent firms is 143,405, even though only 31,414 parent firms enter the 
main data sample as affiliates themselves as a result of data trimming procedures. As an 
example, consider a multinational corporation consisting of 3 entities – a parent firm and two 
subsidiaries. The parent firm is located in Albania, while its subsidiaries are located in 
Austria. If no financial data on the parent firm is found in the Amadeus database, the parent 
firm-observation does not enter the main data sample due to data trimming procedures. 
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However, the historical ownership data from the Orbis database still shows that the parent 
firm owns the two subsidiaries. Hence, the parent firm will be counted in the number of 
parent firms by home country in Albania, and the two subsidiaries will be counted in the 
number of subsidiaries by home country in Albania and number of subsidiaries by host 
country in Austria. Accordingly, even though Panel A shows that there exist 208 parent firms 
by home country in Albania, there are no financial coordination centres or other affiliates 
located in Albania in the main data sample (as observable in Panel B) due to lack of financial 
data on these parent firms and a subsequent removal from the main data sample. 
Huizinga et al. (2008) discuss the number of parent firms and subsidiaries in their 
data sample as well (p. 97). Two differences arise, when compared to my data sample. Firstly, 
the total number of subsidiaries is not equal by home and host countries in my data sample, 
while it is equal in the data sample of Huizinga et al. (2008). This occurs because my data 
sample is adjusted for ownership changes over the sample period, while the empirical results 
and descriptive statistics presented by Huizinga et al. (2008) show that the authors assume a 
constant ownership structure over their sample period of 10 years.24 Due to this assumption, 
subsidiaries are owned by the same parents over the sample period and the number of 
subsidiaries by home and host countries are the same. However, the number of subsidiaries 
by home country is higher than the number of subsidiaries by host country in my data sample 
due to the changing historical ownership structure. The home country (country of the parent 
firm) is likely to change over time, which results in more home country observations per 
subsidiary than host country observations. 
Another difference can be observed while comparing the number of parent firms by 
home country and the number of subsidiaries by home country. In the data sample of 
Huizinga et al. (2008), the number of parent firms by home country is always smaller than 
the number of subsidiaries by home country, while such a relation cannot be observed in my 
data sample. Also this difference arises due to the changing ownership structure in my data 
sample and the assumption about a stable historical ownership structure in the data sample 
of Huizinga et al. (2008). In the study by Huizinga et al. (2008), subsidiaries are owned by 
the same parent firms over the sample period of 10 years. As each parent firm owns at least 
one subsidiary, there are fewer parent firms by home country than subsidiaries by home 
                                                 
24 Even though the authors do not explicitly state such an assumption, they also do not state that the 
ownership structure is adjusted for historical ownership changes. Based on their empirical results and 
descriptive statistics, it seems that the authors have assumed a constant historical ownership structure. 
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country. However, subsidiaries can be owned by several parents over the sample period in 
my data sample. If the new parent firm operates in the same home country as the previous 
parent firm, the number of parent firms by home country increases, while the number of 
subsidiaries by home country does not change. Consequently, the changing ownership 
structure leads to more parent firms by home country than subsidiaries by home country in 
some countries.25 
4.5.2. Financial coordination centres and other affiliates by 
country 
Information on the number of potential financial coordination centres and the number 
of other affiliates (all affiliates except the potential financial coordination centres) by home 
and host countries is provided in Panel B of Table 2. According to the model, I have assumed 
that the potential financial coordination centre of a multinational corporation is the lowest-
taxed affiliate within the corporate group. Even though locating the financial coordination 
centre in the lowest-taxed affiliate is the optimal choice according to tax-efficient financing 
structure, not all multinational firms act accordingly. Hence, the financial coordination 
centres observable in the table do not necessarily reflect the actual financial coordination 
centres of European multinational firms. 
As observable in the table, the most financial coordination centres are located in 
Romania, Italy and the United Kingdom. Location of financial coordination centres in 
Romania can be explained by its relatively low corporate tax rate (on average, 17%). 
Furthermore, location of financial coordination centres in Italy and the United Kingdom can 
be explained by the relative abundance of subsidiaries located in these countries, as 
observable in Panel A of Table 2, and the relatively lower statutory corporate tax rates in 
these countries, compared to other countries which host relatively many subsidiaries.26 
Therefore, it is likely that many subsidiaries that are located in Italy and the United Kingdom 
are classified as financial coordination centres in the data sample. Furthermore, France, 
                                                 
25 As observable in Panel A of Table 2, number of parent firms by home country exceeds the number 
of subsidiaries by home country in Albania, Belarus, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Turkey and 
Ukraine. 
26 Italy is host country for more than 20,000 subsidiaries, while the United Kingdom is host country 
for more than 17,000 subsidiaries in the data sample. As compared to France, which is host country for more 
than 20,000 subsidiaries as well, Italy’s and the United Kingdom’s average corporate tax rates are 
approximately 7 percentage points lower (average corporate tax rate in France – approximately 34%, average 
corporate tax rates in Italy and the United Kingdom – approximately 28% and 27%, respectively). 
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Germany and Italy are host countries for most affiliates which do not act as financial 
coordination centres in the data sample. This can be explained by the relatively many 
affiliates which are located in these countries, as observable in Panel A of Table 2.27 
Finally, the total number of potential financial coordination centres is larger than the 
total number of other affiliates in the main data sample, which reflects the tendency of 
multinational firms to establish several affiliates in the lowest-taxed country. As all affiliates 
which operate in the lowest-taxed country are automatically labelled as potential financial 
coordination centres, the total number of financial coordination centres is likely to be large. 
As an example, consider a multinational firm that consists of the parent firm, located in 
Norway, and three subsidiaries, located in Latvia. As the statutory corporate tax rate is lower 
in Latvia, compared to Norway, the three subsidiaries are counted as potential financial 
coordination centres, while the parent firm is counted as other affiliate. Also, the high total 
number of financial coordination centres reflects the abundance of multinational firms which 
have only one or two subsidiaries (44% of multinational firms in the data sample have less 
than 3 subsidiaries). As one or two of these subsidiaries are likely to be labelled as the lowest-
taxed affiliates of the multinational group, the relative number of potential financial 
coordination centres is likely to be high. Finally, the same affiliate can be counted twice as 
both financial coordination centre and other affiliate in different years, based on the minimum 
tax rate within the multinational group. This also contributes to a relatively high number of 
potential financial coordination centres, compared to other affiliates. However, a higher 
number of financial centres than other affiliates is not realistic, as it is rather unlikely that 
multinational firms own more financial coordination centres than other affiliates on 
average.28 
  
                                                 
27 France, Germany and Italy are host countries for more than 20,000 subsidiaries each in the data 
sample. 
28 The total number of affiliates in Panel B of Table 2 (300,917) is not equal to the total number of 
affiliates in Panel A of Table 2 (261,117) due to the changing ownership structure over time. As ownership 
links change and affiliates are bought and sold among multinational firms, the classification of affiliates as 
financial coordination centres or as other affiliates (all affiliates except financial coordination centres) changes 
over the sample period, responding to changes in tax rates of affiliates within the multinational corporation. 
Thus, the total number of affiliates in Panel B is higher than the total number of affiliates in Panel A, as some 
affiliates are classified as both financial coordination centres and other affiliates in different years due to the 
changing ownership structure and changes in the minimum tax rate of the corporate group. 
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4.5.3. Financial leverage and tax mechanisms by country 
Panel C of Table 2 displays summary statistics of financial leverage and the three tax 
mechanisms by countries in the data sample. Firstly, financial leverage is defined as the total 
debt-to-asset ratio.29 As observable in the table, the average affiliate leverage is 0.591, 
ranging from 0.35 in Macedonia to 0.79 in Liechtenstein. The average host country corporate 
tax rate ranges from 0.06 in Moldova to 0.35 in Malta. Furthermore, the weighted tax 
difference variable reflects the weighted sum of differences between the corporate tax rate 
faced by an affiliate and the tax rates faced by all other affiliates that belong to the 
multinational corporation. A positive weighted tax difference variable implies that the 
multinational firm is willing to shift external debt to affiliates located in the particular 
country, while a negative weighted tax difference variable implies that the multinational firm 
is willing to shift external debt out of affiliates located in the particular country. As 
observable in the table, affiliates located in Moldova and Liechtenstein are likely to attract 
least external debt, while affiliates located in Malta and France are likely to attract most 
external debt. 
As a hypothetical example for calculation of the weighted tax difference variable, 
consider a multinational corporation that consists of two subsidiaries A and B and parent firm 
C. All the three entities are of equal size. The weighted tax difference of subsidiary A is the 
asset-weighted sum of differences between the corporate tax rate faced by the subsidiary A 
(𝑡𝐴) and the tax rates faced by the parent firm C (𝑡𝐶) and the subsidiary B (𝑡𝐵). The weighted 
tax difference of subsidiary A is calculated as ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖 = ∑ 𝜌𝑗(𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝑗)𝑗≠𝐴 =
1
3
(𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝐵) +
1
3
(𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝐶). If the corporate tax rate faced by subsidiary A exceeds the 
corporate tax rates faced by parent firm C and subsidiary B, then the weighted tax difference 
variable is positive and the multinational corporation is willing to shift external debt away 
from subsidiary B and parent firm C to subsidiary A.30 
Finally, the maximum tax difference variable reflects the difference between the 
corporate tax rate faced by an affiliate and the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate within the 
multinational corporation. Maximum tax difference variable equals zero for financial 
coordination centres, as they are the lowest-taxed affiliates within multinational firms. For 
                                                 
29 See Appendix C for variable definitions and data sources. 
30 As an example, if 𝑡𝐴 is 0.3, while 𝑡𝐵 is 0.1 and 𝑡𝐶 is 0.05, then the weighted tax difference of 
subsidiary A equals 0.15. 
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other affiliates, the maximum tax difference variable is always positive, and an increase in 
the maximum tax difference enhances the multinational firm’s incentives to shift more 
internal debt to the affiliate facing the increase.31 As observable in Panel C of Table 2, 
affiliates located in Cyprus, Montenegro and Macedonia are likely to attract least internal 
debt, while affiliates located in Malta and France are likely to attract most internal debt. 
Table D1 in Appendix D shows the year-by-year summary statistics of the total debt-
to-asset ratio and the three tax mechanisms. As observable in the table, the average total debt-
to-asset ratio has a tendency to decrease over time from 0.62 in 2003 to 0.54 in 2014. The 
variation in the leverage ratio has been approximately constant, with a slight tendency to 
increase over time. Also the average statutory corporate tax rate has decreased during the 
sample period from 0.31 in 2003 to 0.25 in 2014, while its variation has slightly increased. 
The average weighted tax difference variable has been relatively constant over time, ranging 
from -0.007 to -0.001, while its variation has slightly decreased in the latest years. Finally, 
the maximum tax difference variable has also been relatively constant over time, ranging 
from 0.024 to 0.067, with a slight tendency to decrease in the latest years. The variation in 
the maximum tax difference variable has slightly decreased over time from 0.068 in 2003 to 
0.041 in 2014. Decreased variation in the weighted tax difference and maximum tax 
difference variables reflects the overall decrease in statutory corporate tax rates and 
convergence in European statutory corporate tax rates over time. 
4.5.4. Dependent and independent variables 
Summary statistics for the lowest-taxed affiliates and other affiliates 
Panel D of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the dependent variable and 
independent variables used in the analysis, distinguishing between the lowest-taxed affiliates 
within a multinational corporation and other affiliates (all affiliates except lowest-taxed 
affiliates). As observable in the table, the lowest-taxed affiliates constitute 45% of the data 
sample, which is a relatively large proportion.32 The lowest-taxed affiliates are assumed to 
act as financial coordination centres that lend money to all other affiliates within the 
multinational corporation. By comparing characteristics of the lowest-taxed affiliates and 
                                                 
31 Maximum tax difference variable can increase due to two reasons – due to an increase in the 
corporate tax rate of the affiliate or due to a decrease in the corporate tax rate of the financial coordination centre 
of the multinational corporation. 
32 Explanations behind the relatively large number of the lowest-taxed affiliates within multinational 
firms are discussed in section 4.5.2. 
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other affiliates, I examine whether the model’s predictions hold for the data sample. As 
observable in the table, the lowest-taxed affiliates are smaller than other affiliates in terms of 
sales and total assets. According to total assets, other affiliates are 2.7 times larger than the 
lowest-taxed affiliates, which shows that financial coordination centres mainly lend money 
to other affiliates within the corporate group and are less likely to engage in production 
activities. Furthermore, when comparing leverage ratios, long-term and short-term debt, 
financial expenses and interest paid, the lowest-taxed affiliates tend to borrow less and pay 
less interest than other affiliates. This observation supports the model’s prediction that the 
lowest-taxed affiliates are less leveraged than other affiliates. However, according to net 
lending, calculated as debtors minus creditors, the lowest-taxed affiliates seem to have 
smaller net lending than other affiliates. Moreover, it seems that affiliates in the data sample 
have no net debt on average, as the average net lending variable is positive. 66% of affiliates 
in the data sample have positive net lending, and, out of these, 45% are the lowest-taxed 
affiliates. The affiliates that have positive net lending face slightly lower tax rates than other 
affiliates (26%, compared to 27%). Hence, the model’s prediction that the lowest-taxed 
affiliates are net lenders is not supported by the data. 
Furthermore, the average statutory corporate tax rate in the data sample is 0.27, with 
a standard deviation of 0.07. The lowest-taxed affiliates have a lower average statutory 
corporate tax rate by definition, which is 0.23. When compared to other affiliates, the average 
statutory tax rate is approximately 6 percentage points higher for the other affiliates. This 
suggests that the corporate tax rates in Europe are not highly dispersed. Furthermore, the 
average weighted tax difference in the sample is -0.005, while the average maximum tax 
difference is 0.05. The average weighted tax difference is negative for the lowest-taxed 
affiliates, while it is positive for other affiliates, which can be explained by the lower statutory 
corporate tax rates of the lowest-taxed affiliates. The average maximum tax difference equals 
0 for the lowest-taxed affiliates, while it is positive for other affiliates, which can also be 
explained by the lower corporate tax rates of the lowest-taxed affiliates. 
Summary statistics for actual financial coordination centres and other affiliates 
Panel E of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the dependent variable and 
independent variables used in the analysis, distinguishing between the actual financial 
coordination centres and other affiliates (all affiliates except the actual financial coordination 
centres). I find the actual financial coordination centres of multinational firms in the main 
data sample by searching for “coordination centre”, “coordination center”, “treasury centre” 
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and “treasury center” in company names. As a result, I find 27 financial coordination centres 
that belong to 36 parent firms over the 12 year sample period. As ownership relations change 
over time, the same financial coordination centre can be owned by different parent firms, 
which explains the larger number of parent firms than financial coordination centres. The 
average total debt-to-asset ratio of financial coordination centres is 11 percentage points 
lower than the average total leverage ratio of other affiliates, which is in line with the model’s 
prediction that financial coordination centres tend to be less leveraged than other affiliates. 
Furthermore, total assets, total debt, financial expenses and interest paid of the financial 
coordination centres are substantially higher, compared to other affiliates. Also the average 
net lending of financial coordination centres is much larger than net lending of other 
affiliates, which is in line with the model’s prediction that internal banks act as net lenders. 
Finally, the average statutory corporate tax rate of financial coordination centres is 7 
percentage points higher than tax rate of other affiliates, despite the relatively lower total 
debt-to-asset ratio of financial coordination centres. However, 24 out of 27 coordination 
centres are located in Belgium, which has a preferential tax regime. Hence, the effective tax 
rate actually faced by the financial coordination centres is much lower. I calculate the average 
actual tax rate that these financial coordination centres pay in Belgium based on their profit 
and loss statements. The results show that the actual tax rate paid is only 5.1%, calculated by 
dividing the actual tax expenses by profit and loss before tax. This implies that using statutory 
corporate tax rates while trying to find the financial coordination centres in the main analysis 
might not capture the actual financial coordination centres, as the statutory corporate tax rate 
in Belgium is rather high.33 
Panel F of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the dependent variable and 
independent variables used in the analysis only for those multinational groups whose actual 
financial coordination centres were found in the data sample. The table distinguishes between 
the actual financial coordination centres, parent firms and other affiliates (all affiliates except 
the actual financial coordination centres and parent firms). As observable in the table, 
financial coordination centres have a smaller average leverage ratio than parent firms and 
other affiliates within the multinational group. Furthermore, even though the average 
corporate tax rate of financial coordination centres is larger than the average tax rate of parent 
firms and other affiliates, the effective corporate tax rate of financial coordination centres is 
                                                 
33 See section 7.2. for a discussion on the preferential tax regime in Belgium, and a robustness test 
which adjusts the statutory corporate tax rates for preferential tax regimes in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. 
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significantly lower. The actual financial coordination centres are larger than parent firms and 
other affiliates in terms of total assets, and also have more total debt. Finally, coordination 
centres have a substantially higher net lending than parent firms and other affiliates within 
the multinational group. 
Overall, the obtained summary statistics show that the actual financial coordination 
centres of multinational firms behave according to the model’s predictions – financial 
coordination centres are net lenders, they have lower total leverage ratios than other affiliates 
that belong to the multinational group, and they are located in the lowest-taxed countries or 
face preferential tax regimes. 
Summary statistics for parent firms and other affiliates 
Panel G of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the dependent variable and 
independent variables used in the analysis, distinguishing between parent firms and other 
affiliates (all affiliates except parent firms). As observable in the table, the number of parent 
firms whose financial data was found by the Amadeus database is 31,414, which represents 
approximately 10% of all affiliate-year observations in the main data sample or 22% of all 
parent firms in the main data sample. Parent firms are approximately 3 times larger than other 
affiliates and have 4 times more debt. Accordingly, their financial expenses and interest paid 
are also much higher. The total debt-to-asset ratio is slightly lower for parent firms, compared 
to other affiliates. Moreover, even though parent firms represent only 10% of affiliates that 
have positive net lending, their net lending is substantially larger than net lending of other 
affiliates, despite their larger average statutory corporate tax rate. Hence, even though parent 
firms are not likely to be the lowest-taxed affiliates – only 38% of parent firms are located in 
the lowest-taxed country of the multinational group – there exists substantial lending from 
parent firms in the data sample. 
This implies that parent firms tend to lend out more than predicted by the model, 
which appears sub-optimal based on the theory for tax-efficient financing structures. The 
finding that parent firms are more indebted than subsidiaries and also act as net lenders can 
be explained by cheaper borrowing of external debt at the headquarters’ level of the 
multinational firm. If the parent firm is able to centrally borrow external debt at a lower cost 
than subsidiaries, it can transfer these funds as internal debt to these subsidiaries, substituting 
their need for external debt. As an example, if subsidiaries have specific unfavourable 
characteristics or face an adverse institutional environment, they might incur high external 
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debt costs. As observable in the table, parent firms are located in less corrupt countries than 
other affiliates, which might increase their access to external financing. Furthermore, 
centralized external borrowing at the headquarters’ level might result in scale economies and 
benefit the whole multinational group. Moreover, if internal debt can be used as a 
commitment device to mitigate the adverse characteristics of subsidiaries within the 
multinational group, external debt at the subsidiary level can become affordable as a result. 
Finally, substantial net lending at the parent level can occur if small multinational firms have 
small financial resources and knowledge to set up an internal bank in the lowest-taxed 
country (Niesten-Dietrich, 2014). Hence, small multinational firms may use the parent firm 
for lending purposes. However, a deeper analysis of net lending at the parent level requires 
data for internal and external debt, which is unavailable in the Amadeus database. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A shows the number of parent firms and subsidiaries by home and host countries in the main data sample. 
“Number of parent firms as affiliates in the data sample” shows only those parent firms that enter the main data 
sample as affiliates. “Number of subsidiaries by host country” represents only subsidiaries and excludes the 
number of parent firms from the main data sample. Panel B shows the number of potential financial coordination 
centres (the lowest-taxed affiliates) and other affiliates (all affiliates except the lowest-taxed affiliates) by host 
countries. Panel C shows the sample averages of total debt-to-asset ratio and the three tax mechanisms by host 
countries. In all panels, “-” implies that there are no observations from the specific country in the data set. Panel 
D shows the summary statistics for dependent variable and independent variables, distinguishing between the 
lowest-taxed affiliates and other affiliates. Panel E shows the summary statistics for dependent variable and 
independent variables, distinguishing between the actual financial coordination centres and other affiliates. 
Panel F shows the summary statistics for dependent variable and independent variables of the multinational 
groups with the actual financial coordination centres, distinguishing between the actual financial coordination 
centres, parent firms and other affiliates. Panel G shows the summary statistics for dependent variable and 
independent variables, distinguishing between parent firms and other affiliates. The dependent variable is the 
total debt-to-asset ratio, which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The independent variables that I am 
most interested in are the three tax mechanisms: (1) the statutory corporate tax rate of the host country from 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates table and corporate and indirect tax rate survey, and OECD’s corporate income tax 
rates table and economic surveys; (2) the weighted tax difference,  expressed as the weighted sum of differences 
between the corporate tax rate faced by an affiliate and the tax rates faced by all other affiliates that belong to 
the multinational firm; (3) the maximum tax difference, expressed as the difference between the tax rate of an 
affiliate’s host country and the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate of the multinational corporation. The firm-
level control variables are: (1) fixed asset ratio (tangibility), measured as a ratio of affiliate’s fixed assets to 
total assets; (2) firm size, expressed as a logarithm of affiliate’s sales; (3) loss carry-forward, expressed as a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 if a subsidiary has losses to carry forward, and 0 otherwise; (4) profitability, 
expressed as a ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. 
Furthermore, the country-level control variables are: (1) inflation, expressed as the annual percentage change 
in the consumer price index, reported by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, World 
Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund and the Consumer Prices Database of the 
OECD; (2) corruption, expressed as a logarithm of annual corruption index in each country, reported by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank; higher index indicates lower level of corruption; (3) 
growth opportunities, expressed as the median annual growth in sales per industry and country; (4) creditor 
rights, expressed as a logarithm of annual strength of legal rights index, reported by the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank; higher index indicates higher creditor rights. Finally, several variables (expressed 
in millions of euros) have been included to test the model’s predictions about the lowest-taxed affiliates: (1) 
total assets; (2) long-term debt; (3) short-term debt; (4) financial expenses; (5) interest paid; (6) net lending, 
measured as debtors minus creditors. The summary statistics cover the main sample of European multinational 
parent firms and their subsidiaries, based on up to 12 years of data (2003 – 2014) for each parent firm and 
subsidiary. 
Panel A: Number of parent firms and subsidiaries 
Country 
Number of 
parent firms 
Number of parent 
firms as affiliates in 
the data sample 
Number of subsidiaries 
 
By home 
country 
By home country 
By home 
country 
By host 
country 
Albania 208 - 202 - 
Andorra 25 - 26 - 
Austria 6,377 1,640 10,789 5,402 
Belarus 824 - 716 - 
Belgium 5,230 2,175 11,293 8,953 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 339 86 429 998 
Bulgaria 696 167 774 2,089 
Croatia 863 344 1,278 2,222 
Cyprus 6,531 16 7,073 5 
Czech Republic 2,781 885 3,288 11,481 
60 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Panel A: Number of parent firms and subsidiaries 
Country 
Number of 
parent firms 
Number of parent 
firms as affiliates in 
the data sample 
Number of subsidiaries 
 
By home 
country 
By home country 
By home 
country 
By host 
country 
Denmark 3,805 686 6,497 1,836 
Estonia 942 598 1,476 4,047 
Finland 2,654 678 5,358 3,285 
France 8,589 3,394 26,345 23,485 
Germany 18,056 3,529 31,594 20,026 
Gibraltar 243 - 270 - 
Greece 1,682 118 1,921 1,427 
Hungary 4,485 457 4,087 1,630 
Iceland 186 18 294 133 
Ireland 1,870 265 3,494 2,590 
Italy 13,597 3,876 23,302 21,676 
Kosovo 3 - 6 - 
Latvia 452 150 557 5,165 
Liechtenstein 601 - 671 1 
Lithuania 1,024 171 1,173 919 
Luxembourg 4,724 736 7,644 2,128 
Macedonia 172 5 160 11 
Malta 367 53 444 141 
Moldova 529 4 490 15 
Monaco 164 - 168 - 
Montenegro 119 12 116 31 
Netherlands 11,382 1,062 20,136 3,273 
Norway 1,960 855 4,482 4,907 
Poland 1,400 299 2,150 8,943 
Portugal 1,087 523 2,400 4,414 
Romania 520 123 637 22,986 
Russia 5,040 87 8,487 11,482 
San Marino 32 - 33 - 
Serbia 483 167 695 3,775 
Slovakia 1,103 567 1,254 7,577 
Slovenia 1,146 362 1,640 1,504 
Spain 4,691 2,473 11,858 13,471 
Sweden 5,139 2,307 12,193 8,010 
Switzerland 6,705 10 10,644 23 
Turkey 3,011 45 2,592 - 
Ukraine 1,500 27 1,457 2,036 
United Kingdom 10,068 2,444 20,487 17,606 
Total 143,405 31,414 253,080 229,703 
 
61 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Number of financial coordination centres and other affiliates 
Country 
Number of potential financial 
coordination centres 
Number of other affiliates 
 By host country By host country 
Austria 4,343 3,682 
Belgium 4,846 8,283 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,051 34 
Bulgaria 2,221 104 
Croatia 1,695 1,283 
Cyprus 21 - 
Czech Republic 10,994 3,017 
Denmark 1,505 1,458 
Estonia 3,325 1,736 
Finland 1,888 3,142 
France 7,613 22,090 
Germany 9,458 16,237 
Greece 998 996 
Hungary 1,259 1,384 
Iceland 129 34 
Ireland 2,713 192 
Italy 14,813 15,001 
Latvia 5,241 213 
Liechtenstein 1 1 
Lithuania 1,006 305 
Luxembourg 1,995 1,013 
Macedonia 16 - 
Malta 31 168 
Moldova 19 3 
Montenegro 41 - 
Netherlands 2,653 2,504 
Norway 2,598 4,610 
Poland 8,139 2,767 
Portugal 3,263 3,536 
Romania 22,643 1,352 
Russia 8,336 4,543 
Serbia 3,846 607 
Slovakia 7,127 1,689 
Slovenia 1,217 953 
Spain 7,058 12,415 
Sweden 6,637 6,911 
Switzerland 30 7 
Turkey 32 13 
Ukraine 1,484 763 
United Kingdom 12,542 13,044 
Total 164,827 136,090 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Financial leverage (total debt-to-asset ratio) and tax mechanisms 
Country 
Total debt-
to-asset ratio 
Statutory corporate 
tax rate 
Weighted tax 
difference 
Maximum tax 
difference 
Austria 0.615 0.251 -0.010 0.051 
Belgium 0.587 0.340 0.013 0.100 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.602 0.104 -0.040 0.001 
Bulgaria 0.520 0.114 -0.052 0.001 
Croatia 0.602 0.200 -0.020 0.039 
Cyprus 0.468 0.100 -0.016 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.514 0.201 -0.024 0.020 
Denmark 0.560 0.250 -0.006 0.040 
Estonia 0.452 0.213 -0.008 0.020 
Finland 0.578 0.257 -0.008 0.051 
France 0.635 0.345 0.015 0.103 
Germany 0.632 0.321 0.011 0.071 
Greece 0.643 0.255 -0.015 0.063 
Hungary 0.585 0.188 -0.064 0.040 
Iceland 0.523 0.185 -0.019 0.009 
Ireland 0.543 0.125 -0.067 0.001 
Italy 0.689 0.284 -0.002 0.055 
Latvia 0.586 0.150 -0.019 0.002 
Liechtenstein 0.787 0.125 -0.075 0.013 
Lithuania 0.568 0.155 -0.038 0.007 
Luxembourg 0.537 0.291 -0.007 0.042 
Macedonia 0.354 0.100 -0.028 0.000 
Malta 0.496 0.350 0.028 0.125 
Moldova 0.373 0.063 -0.118 0.003 
Montenegro 0.362 0.090 -0.030 0.000 
Netherlands 0.563 0.264 -0.017 0.053 
Norway 0.651 0.280 0.002 0.051 
Poland 0.531 0.191 -0.040 0.016 
Portugal 0.592 0.280 -0.010 0.052 
Romania 0.569 0.167 -0.013 0.003 
Russia 0.568 0.207 -0.010 0.020 
Serbia 0.634 0.113 -0.033 0.002 
Slovakia 0.557 0.213 -0.024 0.019 
Slovenia 0.584 0.202 -0.019 0.039 
Spain 0.596 0.312 0.005 0.072 
Sweden 0.645 0.261 -0.008 0.049 
Switzerland 0.548 0.214 -0.051 0.015 
Turkey 0.594 0.208 -0.001 0.026 
Ukraine 0.494 0.241 0.000 0.039 
United Kingdom 0.564 0.272 -0.007 0.056 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Financial leverage (total debt-to-asset ratio) and tax mechanisms 
Country 
Total debt-
to-asset ratio 
Statutory corporate 
tax rate 
Weighted tax 
difference 
Maximum tax 
difference 
Total 0.591 0.266 -0.005 0.053 
     
Panel D: Summary statistics for the lowest-taxed affiliates and other affiliates 
Variable Full sample Lowest-taxed affiliates Other affiliates 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Total debt-to-asset-ratio 0.591 0.281 0.577 0.292 0.603 0.271 
Statutory tax rate 0.266 0.066 0.231 0.067 0.294 0.050 
Weighted tax difference -0.005 0.037 -0.016 0.037 0.003 0.038 
Maximum tax difference 0.053 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.063 
Fixed asset ratio 0.319 0.312 0.322 0.317 0.316 0.307 
Log (Sales) 15.157 2.742 14.295 2.823 15.856 2.462 
Loss carry-forward 0.229 0.420 0.234 0.424 0.225 0.418 
Profitability 0.149 0.266 0.166 0.292 0.135 0.241 
Inflation 2.768 2.329 3.345 2.804 2.299 1.718 
Log (Corruption index) 1.617 0.647 1.421 0.731 1.776 0.517 
Growth opportunities 0.038 0.184 0.050 0.216 0.029 0.154 
Log (Creditor rights index) 1.593 0.386 1.670 0.390 1.530 0.370 
Total assets (mln) 101.571 1,058.930 51.939 788.529 141.893 1234.33 
Long-term debt (mln) 15.047 270.545 8.233 200.644 20.070 312.113 
Short-term debt (mln) 26.803 9,965.100 8.787 380.370 39.895 13,090.600 
Financial expenses (mln) 2.886 67.695 1.364 25.916 4.087 87.549 
Interest paid (mln) 1.870 32.641 1.144 22.736 2.327 37.550 
Net lending (mln) 2.986 78.897 1.750 52.652 3.889 93.523 
Number of affiliate-year 
observations 
1,039,827 466,108 573,719 
Number of parent firms 143,405 143,405 70,500 
Number of affiliates 261,117 164,827 136,090 
 
Panel E: Summary statistics for the actual financial coordination centres and other affiliates 
Variable Full sample 
Actual financial 
coordination centres 
Other affiliates 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Total debt-to-asset-ratio 0.591 0.281 0.479 0.294 0.591 0.281 
Statutory tax rate 0.266 0.066 0.336 0.018 0.266 0.066 
Weighted tax difference -0.005 0.037 0.008 0.015 -0.005 0.038 
Maximum tax difference 0.053 0.067 0.114 0.074 0.053 0.067 
Fixed asset ratio 0.319 0.312 0.156 0.269 0.319 0.312 
Log (Sales) 15.157 2.742 15.362 1.951 15.157 2.742 
Loss carry-forward 0.229 0.420 0.067 0.251 0.229 0.420 
Profitability 0.149 0.266 0.008 0.033 0.149 0.266 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel E: Summary statistics for the actual financial coordination centres and other affiliates 
Variable Full sample 
Actual financial 
coordination centres 
Other affiliates 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Inflation 2.768 2.329 2.297 1.136 2.768 2.329 
Log (Corruption index) 1.617 0.647 1.918 0.194 1.617 0.647 
Growth opportunities 0.278 0.498 0.149 0.445 0.278 0.498 
Log (Creditor rights index) 1.593 0.386 1.453 0.153 1.593 0.386 
Total assets (mln) 101.571 1,058.93 3,587.36 9,383.75 100.774 1,048.20 
Long-term debt (mln) 15.047 270.545 130.273 464.69 15.016 270.468 
Short-term debt (mln) 26.803 9,965.10 1,830.39 8,507.53 26.346 9,965.40 
Financial expenses (mln) 2.886 67.695 103.951 267.155 2.861 67.552 
Interest paid (mln) 1.870 32.641 23.034 43.815 1.864 32.635 
Net lending (mln) 2.986 78.897 71.191 323.128 2.969 78.734 
Number of affiliate-year 
observations 
1,039,827 238 1,039,589 
   
Number of parent firms 143,405 36 143,405 
Number of affiliates 261,117 27 261,090 
    
Panel F: Summary statistics for the multinational firms with the actual financial coordination 
centres 
Variable Full sample 
Actual financial 
coordination 
centres 
Parent firms Other affiliates 
 Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Total debt-to-asset 
ratio 
0.545 0.289 0.479 0.294 0.597 0.229 0.548 0.288 
Statutory tax rate 0.295 0.058 0.336 0.018 0.332 0.023 0.292 0.059 
Weighted tax 
difference 
-0.023 0.054 0.008 0.015 0.004 0.013 -0.025 0.055 
Maximum tax 
difference 
0.127 0.067 0.114 0.074 0.080 0.062 0.129 0.066 
Fixed asset ratio 0.332 0.323 0.156 0.269 0.701 0.259 0.337 0.320 
Log (Sales) 16.53 2.740 15.362 1.951 17.790 2.228 16.589 2.766 
Loss carry-forward 0.202 0.402 0.067 0.251 0.265 0.444 0.211 0.408 
Profitability 0.110 0.202 0.008 0.033 0.051 0.062 0.117 0.208 
Inflation 2.477 1.719 2.297 1.136 2.389 1.291 2.490 1.755 
Log (Corruption 
index) 
1.822 0.456 1.918 0.194 1.945 0.063 1.814 0.470 
Growth 
opportunities 
0.201 0.434 0.149 0.445 0.164 0.426 0.204 0.434 
Log (Creditor rights 
index) 
1.566 0.329 1.453 0.153 1.473 0.195 1.575 0.337 
Total assets (mln) 643.0 3,541.9 3,587.4 9,383.75 1,870.4 6,001.2 427.02 2,545.46 
Long-term debt 
(mln) 
99.85 961.25 130.27 464.690 784.78 3,881.0 83.209 822.661 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel F: Summary statistics for the multinational firms with the actual financial coordination 
centres 
Variable Full sample 
Actual financial 
coordination 
centres 
Parent firms Other affiliates 
 Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Short-term debt 
(mln) 
193.7 2,450.0 1,830.4 8,507.53 420.47 1,410.8 73.141 1,096.03 
Financial expenses 
(mln) 
14.07 84.764 103.95 267.155 37.321 86.873 7.397 45.679 
Interest paid (mln) 5.906 27.457 23.034 43.815 28.228 80.367 3.943 21.765 
Net lending (mln) 22.23 196.56 71.191 323.128 3.683 64.713 19.062 185.319 
Number of affiliate-
year observations 
3,936 238 68 3,630 
   
Number of parent 
firms 
36 36 36 36 
Number of affiliates 923 27 17 879 
     
Panel G: Summary statistics for parent firms and other affiliates 
Variable Full sample Parent firms Other affiliates 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Total debt-to-asset-ratio 0.591 0.281 0.560 0.265 0.595 0.283 
Statutory tax rate 0.266 0.066 0.284 0.053 0.263 0.067 
Weighted tax difference -0.005 0.037 0.003 0.016 -0.006 0.040 
Maximum tax difference 0.053 0.067 0.048 0.055 0.053 0.068 
Fixed asset ratio 0.319 0.312 0.422 0.294 0.307 0.312 
Log (Sales) 15.157 2.742 15.994 2.676 15.059 2.733 
Loss carry-forward 0.229 0.420 0.224 0.417 0.230 0.421 
Profitability 0.149 0.266 0.110 0.219 0.153 0.270 
Inflation 2.768 2.329 2.190 1.457 2.835 2.401 
Log (Corruption index) 1.617 0.647 1.819 0.383 1.593 0.667 
Growth opportunities 0.038 0.184 0.032 0.172 0.039 0.186 
Log (Creditor rights index) 1.593 0.386 1.528 0.375 1.600 0.386 
Total assets (mln) 101.571 1,058.930 255.189 1,894.200 83.742 912.137 
Long-term debt (mln) 15.047 270.545 35.073 433.653 12.515 242.111 
Short-term debt (mln) 26.803 9,965.100 92.672 21,402.500 18.801 7,464.55 
Financial expenses (mln) 2.886 67.695 7.859 98.423 2.285 62.948 
Interest paid (mln) 1.870 32.641 4.491 65.784 1.511 24.837 
Net lending (mln) 2.986 78.897 6.018 126.324 2.618 71.010 
Number of affiliate-year 
observations 
1,039,827 108,135 931,692 
Number of parent firms 143,405 31,414 143,405 
Number of affiliates 261,117 31,414 229,703 
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5.  Endogeneity issues 
The theoretical model is based on an assumption that variation in the tax mechanisms 
in exogenous with respect to firms’ leverage decisions (Møen et al., 2011, p. 20). However, 
there exist several sources of variation characterizing the tax variables that can be correlated 
with changes in firms’ capital structures. 
Firstly, corporate tax rates vary both across countries and across time, which affects 
all three tax mechanisms. An endogeneity issue arises if leverage decisions of multinational 
firms influence the tax changes over time. For example, large multinational corporations can 
act influentially and exert a pressure on governments in order to obtain preferable tax rates. 
However, the resulting tax changes are unlikely to be directly linked to the leverage choices 
of affiliates that operate in these countries. Nevertheless, an endogeneity problem emerges if 
countries’ governments alter their tax rates due to high debt shifting activity by firms that are 
located there.  Huizinga et al. (2008) control for this potential endogeneity issue by using 
populations of affiliate and parent countries as instrumental variables while constructing 
effective tax rates. Their obtained results are very similar to the baseline regression; hence, 
they do not find evidence for this endogeneity problem (p. 109). Consequently, I assume that 
corporate tax rates are exogenous with respect to leverage choices of multinational 
corporations. 
Secondly, variation in location choices of affiliates creates changes in the 
international debt shifting mechanisms (maximum tax difference and weighted tax difference 
variables). Also variation in assignment of capital among affiliates within multinational firms 
creates changes in the weighted tax difference variable. Thus, a potential endogeneity issue 
arises because investment decisions and capital structure decisions are done simultaneously, 
determining both location of affiliates and assignment of capital among affiliates within the 
group. For example, the problem occurs if a firm uses internal debt only for non-tax reasons 
and it has also established its financial coordination centre in a country with a low corporate 
tax rate. In order to deal with this potential issue, I follow Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen 
et al. (2011) and include both affiliate-specific control variables and parent (group) fixed 
effects in regressions. As claimed by Büttner and Wamser (2013, p. 70), inclusion of control 
variables and group fixed effects in the specification should control for changes in affiliates’ 
leverage that do not arise from tax engineering activities, but are correlated with the tax 
mechanisms. 
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Büttner and Wamser (2013) discuss an example of a country which has a higher tax 
rate than the lowest-taxed affiliate within the multinational group. Initially the firm does not 
have any affiliates located in this country. However, the country’s corporate tax rate 
decreases in the next period below the current minimum tax rate of the multinational group; 
therefore, the firm decides to restructure its international location and places an affiliate in 
the country. Consequently, the change in the international location structure increases the 
maximum tax difference variable for all other affiliates worldwide. The authors claim that 
the resulting increase in usage of internal debt is an endogenous change because it is an 
outcome of the firm’s reaction to tax rate changes. Hence, the authors state that this 
endogenous change may bias their estimates even in presence of group fixed effects (pp. 70 
– 71, 78). However, Møen et al. (2011) emphasize that even though the change in the 
international location structure is an endogenous decision, the consequent change in the 
maximum tax difference variable occurs due to an exogenous change in the tax rate. An issue 
can arise if the sensitivity of international location structure with respect to changes in tax 
rates differs among multinational firms; however, such permanent differences should be 
absorbed by the group fixed effects (p. 22). When using group fixed effects, the specification 
controls for any cross-sectional variation among multinational firms; thus, it utilizes only 
variation in tax mechanisms within each firm. 
Based on the discussion above, the assumption that variation in the tax mechanisms 
in exogenous with respect to firms’ leverage decisions seems reasonable. 
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6.  Empirical results 
6.1. Main variables of interest 
In this section I examine whether the theoretical predictions of the model hold for 
European multinational firms and their majority-owned European affiliates over the sample 
period (2003 – 2014). At first I analyse how the total debt-to-asset ratio is affected by the tax 
mechanisms. Then I examine the potential omitted variable biases associated with omitting 
any of the tax mechanisms from the specification. Furthermore, I assess the economic 
importance of the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms. Finally, I discuss how the 
total debt-to-asset ratio is affected by the control variables. 
The main regression results are presented in Table 3. For each observation, the 
weighted tax difference and maximum tax difference variables have been constructed. All 
regressions in the table control for parent, industry and year fixed effects. The R-squared 
values reported in all regressions are not adjusted for variance explained by the fixed effects 
variables (parents, industries and years). This implies that the overall effect of fixed effects 
variables on the fit of the model is not quantified; hence, the reported R-squared values are 
rather small. 
Regression (1) includes only the three tax mechanisms, and the results show that all 
three coefficients of interest are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The significance of the two international debt shifting mechanisms implies that an affiliate’s 
leverage reflects the overall international tax system faced by the multinational corporation. 
Furthermore, regression (2) includes also the control variables, which leads to a decrease in 
the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms, as compared to regression (1). Coefficient 
on the statutory corporate tax rate decreases by 12.1 percentage points, coefficient on the 
weighted tax difference variable decreases by 6.3 percentage points, and coefficient on the 
maximum tax difference variable slightly decreases by 0.3 percentage points. This implies 
that there exists a substantial subsidiary heterogeneity characterizing their leverage decisions, 
which is captured by the subsidiary-specific control variables. However, after inclusion of 
the control variables, the estimated coefficients on all tax mechanisms are still statistically 
significant and positive. 
Focusing on regression (2), the estimated size of 𝛽1, 0.164, reflects the effect of host 
country statutory corporate tax rate on affiliate’s total leverage. When the host country tax 
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rate increases by one percentage point, affiliate’s total debt-to-asset ratio increases by 0.164 
percentage points. The estimated coefficient is similar to the estimates found by Huizinga et 
al. (2008, p. 101) and Møen et al. (2011, p. 24), which are 0.184 and 0.197 respectively.34 
Furthermore, the two international debt shifting variables capture the effects which apply for 
multinational firms only. Firstly, the estimated size of 𝛽2, 0.054, reflects the effect of 
weighted tax difference on affiliate’s total leverage. When the weighted tax difference 
increases by one percentage point, affiliate’s total debt-to-asset ratio increases by 0.054 
percentage points. The estimated coefficient is 6.6 percentage points smaller than the 
coefficient reported by Huizinga et al. (2008, p. 101), and 22.5 percentage points smaller than 
the coefficient reported by Møen et al. (2011, p. 24).35 Furthermore, the estimated size of 𝛽3, 
0.051,  reflects the effect of maximum tax difference on affiliate’s total leverage. When the 
maximum tax difference increases by one percentage point, affiliate’s total debt-to-asset ratio 
increases by 0.051 percentage points. The estimated coefficient is 6.9 percentage points lower 
than the coefficient reported by Møen et al. (2011, p. 24). 
  
                                                 
34 Huizinga et al. (2008) refers to the variable as the “domestic” effect, as the coefficient on the 
statutory corporate tax rate reflects the impact of taxation on the optimal leverage ratio that applies for both 
purely domestic firms and multinational firms (p. 95). 
35 Huizinga et al. (2008) refers to the variable as the “international debt shifting” effect, as their 
specification includes only the weighted tax difference variable as the effect applying for multinational firms 
only (p. 95). The authors disregard the maximum tax difference variable (internal debt shifting mechanism) in 
their analysis. 
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Table 3: Impact of tax mechanisms on total debt-to-asset ratio 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) includes only the three tax mechanisms as independent variables. Regression (2) adds 
control variables to the specification. Regressions (3) and (4) examine the omitted variable bias occurring if 
maximum tax difference or weighted tax difference variables are omitted from the analysis. Regressions (5) to 
(7) examine the omitted variable bias occurring if two tax mechanisms are omitted from the analysis. The 
regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry and year fixed effects. The 
sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance 
at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Statutory tax rate 0.285*** 0.164*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.248***   
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)   
Weighted tax 
difference 
0.117*** 0.054*** 0.076***   0.232***  
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)   (0.011)  
Maximum tax 
difference 
0.054*** 0.051***  0.062***   0.174*** 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.011)   (0.008) 
Fixed asset ratio  -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (Sales)  0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward  0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability  -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption 
index) 
 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Growth opportunities  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (Creditor rights 
index) 
 -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.043*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed 
affiliates excluded 
No No No No No No No 
Parent, industry, year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 
Number of parent 
firms 
143,405 143,405 143,405 143,405 143,405 143,405 143,405 
R-squared 0.0104 0.0551 0.0556 0.0546 0.0550 0.0564 0.0531 
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The tax mechanisms are interrelated both between each other and among all affiliates 
worldwide that belong to the multinational corporation. Firstly, the tax variables are 
correlated by construction (each tax mechanism includes the host country corporate tax rate 
𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡), with correlation coefficients approximately 0.4, as observable in Table 4. Furthermore, 
a change in the corporate tax rate in a country j affects both the leverage decisions of affiliates 
which are located there, and the leverage decisions of all other affiliates worldwide that 
belong to the multinational corporation through the weighted tax difference variable. An 
increase in a country’s corporate tax rate increases the weighted tax difference of affiliates 
located there, which consequently leads to higher total debt-to-asset ratios of these affiliates. 
However, the weighted tax difference decreases for affiliates located in other countries, 
which leads to lower total debt-to-asset ratios of these affiliates. For an affiliate pi, a change 
in the host country corporate tax rate, 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡, by one percentage point affects its total leverage 
through all three tax mechanisms; thus, the total effect equals 𝛽1 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝜌𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3.
36 As 
observable from the equation, the total effect on the debt-to-asset ratio decreases in the 
relative size of affiliate pi, as shifting external debt from a small to a large affiliate constitutes 
a larger change in the total debt-to-asset ratio of the small affiliate than of the large affiliate. 
Table 4: Correlation matrix between tax mechanisms 
The tax mechanisms are correlated by construction. This table shows the pairwise correlation estimates between 
the tax variables. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table 2. 
 
 Statutory tax rate 
Weighted tax 
difference 
Maximum tax difference 
Statutory tax rate 1   
Weighted tax difference 0.4237 1  
Maximum tax difference 0.4811 0.2946 1 
6.2. Omitted variable bias 
Even though there exists multicollinearity between the tax mechanisms, their 
individual contributions on firms’ leverage can still be statistically identified. However, this 
also implies that the correlation leads to an omitted variable bias if any of the tax mechanisms 
are omitted from the specification. As observable in Table 3, regressions (5) to (7), the 
omitted variable bias is substantial if only one of the tax mechanisms enters the regression 
specification. In regression (5), where the host country corporate tax rate is the only tax 
                                                 
36 Given that the affiliate pi is not the financial coordination centre of the multinational group. 
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mechanism included in the specification, the estimated coefficient is biased upwards by 
approximately 51%.37 As observable in Table 3, regressions (3) and (4), the estimated 
coefficients are biased upwards also if only one of the tax mechanisms is omitted from the 
specification. If the maximum tax difference variable is omitted from the analysis, as in 
regression (3), the omitted variable bias is approximately 16% for coefficient on the statutory 
tax rate variable and 41% for coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable.38 If the 
weighted tax difference variable is omitted from the analysis, as in regression (4), the omitted 
variable bias is approximately 20% for coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable and 22% 
for coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable.39 Hence, the omitted variable bias 
overestimates the individual importance of the tax mechanisms on determining affiliates’ 
leverage if any of the tax mechanisms are omitted from the specification. However, it does 
not necessarily imply that the total tax sensitivity of leverage is overestimated. Omitted 
variable bias rather inappropriately estimates the allocation of the total tax effect on the 
different tax mechanisms, not the magnitude of the total tax effect in general. 
6.3. Relative importance of tax mechanisms 
To assess economic importance of the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms, 
a hypothetical example can be considered.40 Consider a multinational corporation that 
consists of two affiliates of equal size – one foreign subsidiary and the parent firm.41 The 
foreign subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax rate than tax rate of the 
parent firm. The subsidiary’s host country increases the statutory corporate tax rate by 10 
percentage points, keeping everything else constant. Table 5 shows the economic importance 
                                                 
37 Jog and Tang (2001) investigate the impact of U.S. tax reform on the debt-shifting behaviour of U.S. 
and Canadian multinational corporations, using only Canadian corporate tax rate as the independent variable. 
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) examine the impact of statutory tax rate on the total debt-to-asset ratio of 
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) of U.S. multinational firms. Using a dataset on multinational firms in 
the European Union, Moore and Ruane (2005) estimate the impact of corporate tax rates on firms’ leverage 
ratios, controlling for individual subsidiary characteristics. These are only a few studies that omit the 
international debt shifting mechanisms from their specifications. 
38 Huizinga et al. (2008) omit the maximum tax difference variable from their specification. 
39 All previous studies which examine sensitivity of total or external debt-to-asset ratio with respect to 
tax have omitted the weighted tax difference variable from their specifications, except Huizinga et al. (2008) 
and Møen et al. (2011). 
40 The hypothetical example is discussed also by Huizinga et al. (2008, pp. 100 – 102) and Møen et al. 
(2011, p. 27). 
41 The weighted tax difference variable is expressed as ∑ 𝜌𝑝𝑗𝑡(𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖 . As the parent firm and 
the subsidiary are of equal size, then 𝜌𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 0.5. Thus, the weighted tax difference variable of the subsidiary i 
equals 0.5(𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡). 
73 
 
 
of the tax mechanisms on affiliates’ leverage. The total effect on the subsidiary’s debt-to-
asset ratio is an increase of 2.42 percentage points. The effect found is 2.15 percentage points 
lower than the effect found by Møen et al. (2011, p. 26), and 0.2 percentage points lower than 
the effect found by Huizinga et al. (2008, pp. 101 - 102). For an affiliate with an average total 
debt-to-asset ratio in the sample (0.59), an increase in the statutory corporate tax rate by 10 
percentage points leads to an increase in the total debt of approximately 4.1% (= (0.59 + 
0.0242) / 0.59). Considering the tax mechanisms separately, the biggest effect on the total 
debt-to-asset ratio comes from the statutory corporate tax rate, which refers to the preference 
for debt over equity due to tax deductibility of interest payments. Also Møen et al. (2011) 
and Huizinga et al. (2008) find that the standard debt tax shield mechanism contributes 
relatively most to changes in affiliate’s leverage. Internal debt shifting mechanism has the 
second highest contribution, and external debt shifting mechanism contributes relatively least 
to changes in affiliate’s total leverage in my data sample. In the study by Møen et al. (2011), 
the two international debt shifting mechanisms are of about equal importance (p. 27). 
Furthermore, the external debt shifting mechanism not only affects the leverage choice of the 
affiliate that experiences the tax rate change, but also the leverage choice of the other affiliate. 
This implies that the 0.27 percentage point increase in the subsidiary’s total debt-to-asset 
ratio due to external debt shifting reduces the total debt-to-asset ratio of the other affiliate 
(the parent firm) by 0.27 percentage points. 
Table 5: Relative importance of tax mechanisms 
This table shows the economic importance of the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms. As a 
hypothetical example, consider a multinational firm that consists of two affiliates of equal size - one foreign 
subsidiary and the parent firm. The foreign subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax rate 
than tax rate of the parent firm. The host country of the subsidiary increases the corporate tax rate by 10 
percentage points, keeping everything else constant. Using the estimated coefficients from Table 3, regression 
(2), the table shows the direct and relative contributions of each of the tax mechanisms on the percentage point 
change in affiliate’s total debt-to-asset ratio. The first row (“Tax rate”) shows the direct effect of change in the 
statutory corporate tax rate, which characterizes firm’s preference for debt over equity due to tax deductibility 
of interest expenses. The second row (“Weighted tax difference”) shows the effect of external debt shifting, and 
the third row (“Maximum tax difference”) shows the effect of internal debt shifting. Detailed variable 
definitions are given in Table 2. 
 
 Coefficient 
Change 
in 𝑡𝑖𝑡 
𝜌𝑖𝑡 
Percentage point 
change in total 
debt-to-asset ratio 
Relative 
contribution 
Tax rate 0.164 0.1  1.64 68% 
Weighted tax difference 0.054 0.1 0.5 0.27 11% 
Maximum tax difference 0.051 0.1  0.51 21% 
Total    2.42 100% 
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6.4. Control variables 
The estimated coefficients on all firm-level and country-level control variables are 
statistically significant. Of the firm-level variables, fixed asset ratio is negatively related to 
affiliates’ debt, which can be explained by depreciation deductions of tangible assets that 
constitute a non-debt tax shield and act as a substitute for debt financing.42 
Logarithm of sales enters the regression positively, which is in line with the argument 
that large firms are able to borrow at more favourable financing terms due to their greater 
access to capital markets, lower default probability and less volatile assets.43  
Loss carry-forward affects leverage positively, which suggests that firms with loss 
carry-forwards tend to have less retained earnings and equity capital; therefore, they are 
willing to undertake more debt to finance their activities.44  
Profitability variable enters the regression negatively, which is in line with the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. Profitable firms can use their profits to reduce debt 
obligations or simply finance investments with retained earnings instead of debt.45,46 
Of the country-level control variables, inflation has a positive effect on leverage, as 
it decreases the real value of currently outstanding corporate debt and reduces cost of debt, 
which increases tax advantage of debt financing.47 
Logarithm of corruption index enters the regression negatively, which suggests that 
firms in corrupt countries are more leveraged. This finding can be explained by the high 
degree of monitoring ability and enforcement of debt financing, as debt obligations are 
contractual and legally binding. Hence, firms in corrupt countries tend to issue more debt and 
less equity to protect themselves from expropriation by management or bureaucrats. Another 
explanation for more indebted firms in corrupt countries is that it may be easier for corrupt 
bureaucrats to channel funds to connected firms as loans through banks that they control, 
rather than through equity market that they cannot influence to such an extent.48 
Growth opportunities have a positive effect on affiliates’ debt, which can be explained 
by shareholders’ willingness to pass on the risk to debtholders if firms’ growth forecasts are 
                                                 
42 Findings consistent with DeAngelo & Masulis (1980), Frank & Goyal (2009) and other studies. 
43 Findings consistent with Booth et al. (2011), Fama & French (2002) and other studies. 
44 Findings consistent with Gopalan et al. (2007). 
45 Findings consistent with Graham (2000), Myers (1993) and other studies. 
46 More discussion on the firm-level control variables and their impact on firms’ indebtedness is 
presented in section 4.4.1. 
47 Findings consistent with Frank & Goyal (2009), Mintz & Weichenrieder (2010), Modigliani (1982) 
and other studies. 
48 Findings consistent with La Porta et al. (2002), Venanzi et al. (2014) and other studies. 
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unsustainable and risky. Moreover, the economic and political networks of owners of rapidly 
growing firms may provide them with an easy access to the credit market, as the credit market 
is more likely to finance firms with better future growth expectations.49 
Logarithm of creditor rights index enters the regression negatively, which suggests 
that firms in countries with strong creditor rights are less leveraged. This finding is in line 
with the demand side view of the financial market, which claims that strong creditor 
protection makes firms unwilling to make long-term cash flow commitments to repay debt. 
In countries characterized by strong creditor rights, management can be easily laid off upon 
default and replaced by creditors or neutral third-party trustees. Hence, managers tend to 
issue less debt in countries with strong creditor rights.50,51 
  
                                                 
49 Findings consistent with Awan et al. (2010) and Gupta (1969). 
50 Findings consistent with Cho et al. (2014) and Rajan & Zingales (1995). 
51 More discussion on the country-level control variables and their impact on firms’ indebtedness is 
presented in section 4.4.2. 
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7.  Robustness tests and extensions 
7.1. Large and small multinational firms 
Large multinational firms may be better able to pursue tax engineering activities due 
to more income, better connections and more affiliates facing different tax rates than small 
multinational firms, which makes it less costly for large multinational firms to avoid paying 
high taxes. In order to examine the potential heterogeneity between large and small firms, I 
control for the size of multinational firms in regressions. Firstly, I split the data sample 
according to the median number of foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms (3 
subsidiaries), which can be observed in regressions (1) and (2) in Table 6. The smallest 
multinational firms with one or two subsidiaries constitute 44% of the data sample. I also 
split the sample according to the median total assets of multinational firms (52.3 million 
euros), which can be observed in regressions (3) and (4). As observable in the table, large 
multinational firms are more likely to engage in international debt shifting than small 
multinational firms. Coefficients on the weighted tax difference and maximum tax difference 
variables decrease and become statistically insignificant when only the smallest multinational 
firms are included in the data sample, which shows that these firms are less responsive to 
changes in the international debt shifting mechanisms. This finding can be explained by the 
potentially large fixed costs associated with international debt shifting activities. 
Consequently, only firms that have reached a certain size are able to overcome the prohibitive 
costs and shift debt across countries. Another explanation for the small estimated coefficients 
on international debt shifting variables is that the parent fixed effects applied to regressions 
are very close to having subsidiary fixed effects, which are likely to absorb a significant 
amount of variation in affiliates’ leverage. 
However, the estimated coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable is 
larger for small multinational firms, compared to large firms. As small firms are less likely 
to engage in tax planning due to cost reasons, they might become more responsive to statutory 
corporate tax rate changes that affect affiliates’ leverage decisions in host countries. Hence, 
the standard debt tax shield mechanism or the general preference for debt might matter most 
for small multinational firms. Moreover, as large multinational firms actively engage in 
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international debt shifting activities, the relative importance of the standard debt tax shield 
mechanism might decrease for large multinational firms.52 
To examine whether very large multinational firms react differently to tax incentives, 
the main regression is run on the 25% largest multinational firms in the sample, which have 
at least 527.6 million euros in total assets. As observable in regression (5), very large 
multinational firms are slightly less responsive to the standard debt tax shield mechanism 
than large multinational firms (as compared to regression (4)). However, coefficients on the 
international debt shifting mechanisms are very similar to those of large multinational firms. 
Thus, there seem to be no substantial differences in leverage responses to tax mechanisms, 
when comparing large and very large multinational firms. 
I also examine whether leverage responses to tax mechanisms are different for the 
10% largest multinational firms, which have at least 4,294 million euros in total assets. As 
observable in regression (6), the estimated coefficient on the standard debt tax shield 
mechanism is largely unchanged (slightly lower by 0.2 percentage points, as compared to 
regression (5) on the very large multinational firms). However, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant as a result of an increased standard error due to the smaller sample size. The 
estimated coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable is 6 percentage points lower, as 
compared to regression (5), and also statistically insignificant. This can be explained by a 
potentially large measurement error, while calculating the weighted tax difference variable, 
which depends on financial and tax data on all affiliates that belong to the multinational 
group. The median number of subsidiaries per multinational group is 58 among the 10% 
largest firms, while the median number of subsidiaries is only 3 for the whole data sample. 
Consequently, for a very large multinational group which has many subsidiaries, potential 
measurement errors can be particularly large. Finally, the maximum tax difference variable 
is 5 percentage points larger, as compared to regression (5), which indicates more internal 
debt shifting of the 10% largest multinational firms. 
Finally, regression (7) is run on all multinational firms in the data sample and includes 
dummy variables for the sales quintile to which an affiliate belongs in a particular year, 
                                                 
52 This finding can be explained by thin capitalization rules that are defined over internal and external 
debt. Causing the same concealment costs in circumventing the rules, the optimal mix of external and internal 
debt is reached when the marginal agency costs of external debt equal the marginal tax payments in the internal 
bank. Beyond that point, internal debt is always cheaper, as its tax costs are constant, while agency costs of 
external debt increase further. This implies that multinational firms in such a setting have external debt that 
does not react to the standard debt tax shield mechanism at all (Fellkjær & Steinum, 2013). 
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instead of logarithm of sales as a measure of firms’ size. The smallest firms are in the quintile 
1, which is left out from the specification. As observable in the table, there exists a positive 
relation between firm’s size and its leverage ratio, as the estimated coefficients on all sales 
quintiles are positive. Moreover, the estimated coefficients increase with firm’s size. Hence, 
the larger the firm, the more leverage it is likely to have. 
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Table 6: Large and small multinational firms 
This table splits data sample into large and small multinational firms (MNCs) according to the total number of 
foreign subsidiaries of the multinational firm (regressions (1) and (2)), and according to the total assets of the 
multinational firm (regressions (3) and (4)). The median number of subsidiaries is 3, while the median value of 
total assets is 52.3 mln euros. Regression (5) is run on a sample of the 25% largest MNCs (total assets at least 
527.6 mln euros). Regression (6) is run on a sample of the 10% largest MNCs (total assets at least 4,294 mln 
euros). Regression (7) is run on the sample of all MNCs, and includes sales quintiles instead of logarithm of 
sales. The dependent variable in the regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are 
given in Table 2. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry and 
year fixed effects. The sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 
years (2003 – 2014). White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 
Small MNCs 
Large 
MNCs 
Small 
MNCs 
Large 
MNCs 
Very large 
MNCs 
Very large 
MNCs 
All MNCs 
 
< 3 
subsidiaries 
≥ 3 
subsidiaries 
< 52.3 
mln euro 
≥ 52.3 
mln euro 
≥ 527.6 
mln euro 
≥ 4,294 
mln euro 
 
Statutory tax rate 0.222*** 0.165*** 0.229*** 0.126*** 0.101** 0.099 0.178*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.046) (0.083) (0.016) 
Weighted tax 
difference 
0.041 0.081** 0.043 0.075*** 0.081* 0.015 0.061*** 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.031) (0.026) (0.044) (0.081) (0.017) 
Maximum tax 
difference 
0.026 0.049*** 0.037 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.109*** 0.049*** 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.033) (0.012) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.004 -0.081*** 0.007** -0.090*** -0.100*** -0.119*** -0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Log (Sales) 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027***  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
Sales quintile 2       0.080*** 
       (0.002) 
Sales quintile 3       0.116*** 
       (0.002) 
Sales quintile 4       0.147*** 
       (0.002) 
Sales quintile 5       0.188*** 
       (0.002) 
Loss carry-
forward 
0.069*** 0.105*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.090*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.048*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption 
index) 
-0.033*** -0.007*** -0.031*** -0.006*** 0.008*** 0.021*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Growth 
opportunities 
0.010*** 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 
Small MNCs 
Large 
MNCs 
Small 
MNCs 
Large 
MNCs 
Very large 
MNCs 
Very large 
MNCs 
All MNCs 
 
< 3 
subsidiaries 
≥ 3 
subsidiaries 
< 52.3 
mln euro 
≥ 52.3 
mln euro 
≥ 527.6 
mln euro 
≥ 4,294 
mln euro 
 
Log (Creditor 
rights index) 
-0.050*** -0.030*** -0.063*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed 
affiliates 
excluded 
No No No No No No No 
Parent, industry, 
year fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
460,619 579,208 519,887 519,940 259,886 104,130 1,039,827 
Number of 
parent firms 
137,556 21,511 131,643 22,450 5,352 1,004 143,405 
R-squared .0429 .0771 .0493 .0789 0.0801 .1007 0.0515 
7.2. Preferential tax regimes 
The empirical results show that all tax mechanisms have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the total debt-to-asset ratios of European affiliates that belong to 
European multinational firms. However, the economic importance of the tax mechanisms, 
especially the two international debt shifting mechanisms, is relatively small. This 
observation can occur because international debt shifting is not a common method for tax 
avoidance or because statutory corporate tax rates do not reflect the effective tax rates that 
multinational corporations actually face. This suggests that the use of statutory corporate tax 
rates while calculating the tax mechanisms might create a measurement error and a 
subsequent downward bias in the estimated coefficients. As an example, a difference between 
statutory corporate tax rates and effective corporate tax rates arises when countries offer tax 
benefits for internal banks (financial coordination centres) of multinational firms. The 
preferential tax regimes and tax benefits are likely to significantly reduce the effective tax 
rates that multinational firms pay in these countries. This is particularly important because 
many multinational firms have established their financial coordination centres in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Mintz, 2004, p. 422; Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008, p. 4). 
Belgium had a coordination centre regime until 2005, where the taxable profit of 
coordination centres was calculated according to “cost plus” method – a mark-up (the “plus”) 
was applied to expenses (the “cost”) associated with a transaction. However, a substantial 
portion of operating expenses was omitted from the costs of the coordination centre while 
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calculating the taxable profit. Hence, the effective tax rate that financial coordination centres 
actually paid in Belgium was negligible (Green, 2003; Quaghebeur, 2005, p. 14). 
Consequently, by 2003, more than 200 multinational companies had set up their financial 
coordination centres in Belgium (Green, 2003, p. 23).53 Multinational firms that engaged in 
the coordination centre regime accounted for 33% of Belgium’s FDI inflows and 36% of FDI 
outflows during the time period from 1995 to 2005 (United Nations, 2007, p. 77). In 2005 
Belgium introduced the notional interest deduction regime (applicable from tax year 2006), 
which reduces tax discrimination between debt and equity by enabling firms to subtract a 
notional interest charge on equity from taxable profits. Also this regime encourages firms to 
set up their affiliates in Belgium due to reductions in firms’ taxable profits. In 2012 Belgian 
law firm Laga made a survey in which 80% of respondent firms claimed that the notional 
interest deduction regime was relevant for their operations (American Chamber of Commerce 
in Belgium, n.d.). 
Also the Netherlands offers substantially lower effective corporate tax rates on 
interest, royalties, dividend and capital gains income from foreign subsidiaries. The 
Netherlands hosts approximately 12,000 mailbox companies that channel 4 billion euros 
every year and pay very low taxes on their operations (SOMO, 2014).54 Attracted by the 
Netherlands’ tolerant regulations and many tax treaties, multinational firms such as Dell, 
Google, Merck & Co. and Yahoo have shifted their profits through the country. Using 
sophisticated schemes, for example, “Dutch Sandwich”, multinational firms shifted 10.2 
trillion euros through the Netherlands in 2010 (Drucker, 2013). 
Furthermore, companies use Luxembourg as a tax conduit because they can send 
money in and out and pay very low taxes. Luxembourg also offers specific financial holding 
regimes. More than 170 of Fortune 500 companies have established an affiliate in 
Luxembourg, and the country has the highest foreign investment in the European Union. The 
capital city Luxembourg hosts 148 global banks, and there are more than 40,000 companies 
registered in the country (Walt, 2015). Moreover, Luxembourg uses secret tax agreements 
                                                 
53 As compared to Panel B of Table 2, 4,846 potential financial coordination centres have been set up 
in Belgium during 2003 – 2014, according to my data sample. This implies that substantially more multinational 
firms have established their financial coordination centres in Belgium after 2003. This can be explained by the 
increased amount and size of European multinational firms, by increased globalization in Europe, and by a 
higher firms’ willingness to undertake tax saving activities and minimize the global tax burden. However, note 
that I have assumed that the potential financial coordination centres in my data sample are the lowest-taxed 
affiliates within multinational firms; hence, they might not be a perfect approximation of reality. 
54 Mailbox companies do not have an important commercial presence in a country and do not actively 
engage in economic activities. 
82 
 
 
with multinational firms that provide tax allowances for more than 350 firms worldwide, as 
revealed by the so-called LuxLeaks papers, released at the end of 2014 (Galizia, Cabra, 
Williams, Díaz-Struck & Rudder, 2014). The data shows that auditing companies, such as 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and EY, have allowed large multinational firms to avoid paying 
large amounts of taxes in their home countries. 
If a multinational corporation locates its financial coordination centre in one of the 
countries with preferential tax regimes, the effect of the lower effective tax rate is not picked 
up by the specification when calculating the tax mechanisms. Moreover, as the statutory 
corporate tax rates are relatively high in these countries, coefficients on the maximum tax 
difference variable of all affiliates that belong to the multinational firm are likely to be 
downward biased. In order to examine the effective tax rates that multinational firms pay in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, I calculate the average actual tax rates that firms 
have paid based on their profit and loss statements.55 As observable in Table 7, firms in all 
industries pay approximately half the statutory corporate tax rate, which can be explained by 
various allowances, loss carry-forwards and other individual firm characteristics. When 
considering only firms involved in financial services industries and holding activities, the 
difference is even larger – the statutory corporate tax rate is approximately three times larger 
than the actual tax rate. Hence, financial coordination centres of multinational firms in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg face a lower effective tax rate than the statutory 
corporate tax rate in my data sample.56 
Table 7: Actual tax rates 
This table compares the average actual tax rates that multinational firms pay in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg (based on taxation expenses reported in their profit and loss statements) with the average statutory 
corporate tax rates. A distinction is made between the actual tax rates faced by affiliates in all industries and 
only affiliates involved in financial services industries and holding activities. The sample consists of majority-
owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). 
 Actual tax rate Statutory corporate tax rate 
Country All industries 
Financial services industries 
and holding activities 
All industries 
Belgium 0.170 0.132 0.340 
Netherlands 0.147 0.084 0.264 
Luxembourg 0.108 0.075 0.291 
                                                 
55 I calculate the actual tax rate by dividing the actual taxation paid by the profit and loss before tax. 
56 The same conclusion is reached in section 4.5.4., where I calculate the effective tax rate of the actual 
financial coordination centres in the data sample. The effective tax rate faced by financial coordination centres 
in Belgium is 5.1%. 
83 
 
 
This suggests that the rather low economic importance of the international tax 
mechanisms estimated in the main specification may be explained by the preferential tax 
regimes and subsequent measurement errors in the tax mechanisms. To examine whether 
existence of preferential tax regimes leads to a downward bias in the estimated coefficients 
on the tax mechanisms, I adjust corporate tax rates downwards for affiliates that operate in 
financial services industries or engage in holding activities in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. I adjust corporate tax rates for these affiliates to 13.2% in Belgium, 8.4% in 
the Netherlands and 7.5% in Luxembourg, which are the actual tax rates that multinational 
firms pay in these countries. 
Regression (1) in Table 8 shows results of the original specification of regression (2) 
in Table 3, while regressions (2) and (3) show the original specifications of regressions (3) 
and (4) in Table 6 in order to make the results more easily comparable. As observable in 
regression (4) in Table 8, results are robust to the adjustment for preferential tax regimes. As 
compared to the initial specification, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate has 
slightly decreased, while coefficients on the international debt shifting mechanisms have 
increased. Coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable has increased by 0.6 percentage 
points, while coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable has increased by 0.4 
percentage points. This suggests that the adjustment for preferential tax regimes has slightly 
decreased the measurement errors in estimated coefficients, which led to a downward bias in 
the coefficients initially. Thus, the lower corporate tax rates proxy for the effective tax rates 
that financial coordination centres face in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
I also check whether the estimated coefficients change when I adjust tax rates 
downwards to 10% for these affiliates, in line with Møen et al. (2011, p. 33). The choice of 
10% tax rate is based on available data on Norwegian firms that have financial coordination 
centres in Belgium, the Netherlands or Luxembourg and pay approximately 10% as their 
corporate tax rate. The obtained coefficients on the tax mechanisms are largely unchanged, 
compared to regression (4). Furthermore, I examine whether the estimated coefficients 
change when I adjust tax rates downwards to 5.1% for these affiliates, based on the actual 
tax rate paid by financial coordination centres in Belgium, as found in section 4.5.4. After 
this adjustment, coefficients on the tax mechanisms are slightly larger, compared to 
regression (4). Finally, I examine whether coefficients on the tax mechanisms increase when 
tax rates in Malta and Switzerland are also adjusted downwards to reflect preferential tax 
regimes in these countries. Malta has an attractive tax regime for foreign companies (Vella, 
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2014), while Switzerland has one of the largest financial sectors in the world due to its 
banking sector’s secrecy (“Switzerland's Financial Identity Crisis,” 2014). Also after this 
adjustment the coefficients on the two international debt shifting variables increase only 
slightly, which can be explained by the relatively few potential financial coordination centres 
in the data sample that are located in Malta and Switzerland (31 and 30 affiliates 
respectively). As changes in the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms are rather 
small, the obtained results are not reported in the study. 
Overall, the estimated coefficients on the weighted tax difference and maximum tax 
difference variables increase only slightly after the adjustment for preferential tax regimes. 
A potential explanation is controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules that are used in many 
countries in order to limit profit shifting to lower-taxed countries (OECD, 2013a, p. 16). 
While the rules applicable to controlled foreign corporations vary among countries, the main 
mechanism is that parent firms of multinational companies must include in their income 
certain amounts earned by their controlled foreign corporations. Egger and Wamser (2011) 
examine German CFC rules and find that the rules have a significant effect on multinational 
firms’ operations. The authors claim that CFC rules are associated with much less real 
investment due to the high corporate tax rate in Germany (p. 18). Furthermore, Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012) examine German CFC rules during the time period from 1996 to 2005 
and find that the rules successfully restrict profit shifting to low-tax countries and are an 
important measure to limit tax avoidance (p. 1507).  
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union made the Cadbury-Schweppes 
decision on September 12, 2006, where it ruled that taxation based on CFC legislation is a 
violation of the freedom of establishment (Court of Justice, 2006). Consequently, the CFC 
rules do not exert a substantial role in Europe since 2006.57 Evidence of this has been found 
by Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) who examine whether the decision by the Court of Justice 
affected the allocation of passive assets of German multinational firms. The paper shows that 
passive investments in European countries with low statutory corporate tax rates (Ireland, 
Estonia, Latvia and Poland) increased compared to countries with low corporate tax rates 
outside Europe (p. 11). Hence, the results show that after the Cadbury-Schweppes case in 
2006, the CFC rules became harder to apply in Europe. This suggests that the rules might 
still have limited tax avoidance and reduced possibilities to engage in preferential tax regimes 
during the time period from 2003 to 2006 in my data sample. Thus, the effect of tax 
                                                 
57 European CFC rules are still applicable for affiliates outside Europe. 
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mechanisms on firms’ leverage, when adjusted for preferential tax regimes, might be 
underestimated during this time period. 
Another potential explanation for the rather small increase in coefficients on the 
international debt shifting mechanisms is that only the largest multinational firms might be 
able to engage in the preferential tax regimes and exploit the lower effective tax rates. To 
examine this possibility, I divide the data sample into large and small multinational firms, 
based on total assets of multinational firms. The median value of total assets is 52.3 million 
euros, which is used as a threshold to divide the sample. Regression (5) in Table 8 shows 
results for the sample of small multinational firms, while regression (6) shows results for the 
sample of large multinational firms. 
As observable in regression (5), coefficients on the statutory corporate tax rate and 
the weighted tax difference variables have slightly decreased, while coefficient on the 
maximum tax difference variable has increased and become statistically significant, as 
compared to regression (2). Furthermore, as observable in regression (6), coefficients on the 
statutory corporate tax rate and the maximum tax difference variables have slightly increased, 
while coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable has slightly decreased, as compared 
to regression (3). Overall, the estimated coefficients are largely unchanged after the 
adjustment for preferential tax regimes, and it seems that the adjustment does not affect large 
multinational firms to a greater extent than small firms. This suggests that the ability to 
engage in the preferential tax regimes and subsequently face lower effective tax rates does 
not vary according to size of the multinational firm. 
As the adjustment for preferential tax regimes changes the estimated coefficients on 
the tax mechanisms only slightly, statutory corporate tax rates seem to be a good enough 
approximation to the effective tax rates of multinational firms. However, the use of statutory 
corporate tax rates in the main analysis is still likely to bias the estimated coefficients on the 
tax mechanisms downwards due to the measurement error that arises because statutory 
corporate tax rates are larger than the effective tax rates. More precise adjustments to 
statutory corporate tax rates are necessary in order to derive the effective tax rates faced by 
multinational firms.58 
                                                 
58 As an example, the effective tax rates calculated by Huizinga et al. (2008) are adjusted for double 
taxation and double tax relief and take into account taxation of dividends in both host and home countries. Even 
though it seems that international double taxation is no longer important in Europe, a study by business 
federation BUSINESSEUROPE concluded that double taxation is still an issue, which hinders cross-border 
business and investments in Europe (BUSINESSEUROPE, 2013, p. 3). Hence, the effective tax rates calculated 
by Huizinga et al. (2008) may be better proxies for the effective tax rates than statutory corporate tax rates. 
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Table 8: Preferential tax regimes 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3, while regressions (2) 
and (3) show the original specifications of regressions (3) and (4) in Table 6 in order to make the results more 
easily comparable. In regression (4) corporate tax rates are adjusted downwards to 13.2% in Belgium, 8.4% in 
the Netherlands and 7.5% in Luxembourg for affiliates involved in financial services industries or holding 
activities. In regressions (5) and (6) I divide the sample into large and small firms according to total assets of 
the multinational group. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry 
and year fixed effects. The sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 
12 years (2003 – 2014). White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original Preferential tax regimes 
 All firms Smallest Largest All firms Smallest Largest 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.229*** 0.126*** 0.162*** 0.213*** 0.140*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.027) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) 
Weighted tax 
difference 
0.054*** 0.043 0.075*** 0.060*** 0.034 0.073*** 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.026) (0.017) (0.031) (0.025) 
Maximum tax 
difference 
0.051*** 0.037 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.056** 0.063*** 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** 0.007** -0.090*** -0.065*** 0.006** -0.090*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.093*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption 
index) 
-0.009*** -0.031*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.031*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (Creditor rights 
index) 
-0.037*** -0.063*** -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.064*** -0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Lowest-taxed 
affiliates excluded 
No No No No No No 
Parent, industry, year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
1,039,827 519,887 519,940 1,039,827 519,887 519,940 
Number of parent 
firms 
143,405 131,643 22,450 143,405 131,643 22,450 
R-squared 0.0551 .0493 .0789 0.0552 .0493 .0793 
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7.3. Domestic firms 
The international debt shifting mechanisms are only active for multinational firms, as 
there is no variation in affiliates’ tax rates for purely domestic firms. Thus, my main analysis 
is done on multinational firms, which is in line with Møen et al. (2008) who also examine 
only multinational firms in their analysis. However, Huizinga et al. (2011) use data on all 
European companies in their main data sample. Only in robustness tests the authors exclude 
purely domestic firms from the data sample and test the specification on multinational firms 
only. Their obtained results are very similar to results of the benchmark regression, run on 
all European firms in the Amadeus database (p. 102). 
In order to examine whether inclusion of purely domestic firms changes the estimated 
coefficients on the tax mechanisms in my data sample, I extend the main data sample and 
include also purely domestic firms in the analysis. Regression (1) in Table 9 restates the 
original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 for an ease of comparison. The main data 
sample is extended in regression (2) and includes also purely domestic firms in Europe. As a 
result, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable decreases by 9.1 percentage 
point, while coefficients on the weighted tax difference and maximum tax difference 
variables increase by 5.5 percentage points and 4.7 percentage points respectively. Hence, 
inclusion of domestic firms in the data sample reduces the effect of the standard debt tax 
shield on affiliates’ leverage. This can be explained by low net income of small domestic 
firms, and by relatively many loss-making firms among small domestic firms.59 Loss carry-
forwards act as alternative tax shields for loss-making firms, which implies that these firms 
have little incentives to use the debt tax shield. Furthermore, even though purely domestic 
firms constitute approximately 72% of the data sample in regression (2) and the international 
debt shifting variables equal zero for these firms due to no variation in statutory corporate 
tax rates within the firm, the effect of the international tax mechanisms on affiliates’ leverage 
increases in the extended sample. 
To check whether the obtained results differ depending on size of domestic firms that 
are included in the extended sample, I divide the sample of domestic firms into large and 
small firms. Threshold is the median value of total assets of domestic firms, which is 6.86 
million euros in the data sample. Regression (3) is run on all multinational firms and small 
                                                 
59 The median net income is approximately 7.4 times larger of large domestic firms, as compared to 
small domestic firms. 
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purely domestic firms (total assets of the firm less than 6.86 million euros). Regression (4) is 
run on all multinational firms and large purely domestic firms (total assets of the firm more 
than or equal to 6.86 million euros). 
As observable in the table, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable 
decreases by 11.7 percentage points when small domestic firms are included in the sample, 
while the coefficient decreases by 1.6 percentage points when large multinational firms are 
included in the data sample. This indicates that inclusion of domestic firms in the data sample 
reduces the effect of the standard debt tax shield on affiliates’ leverage, especially when small 
domestic firms enter the data sample. As discussed above, small domestic firms have low net 
income and tend to incur losses; therefore, they have little incentives to use the debt tax 
shield. Furthermore, inclusion of domestic firms in the data sample increases coefficients on 
the international tax mechanisms, especially when small domestic firms enter the data 
sample. As small domestic firms are less responsive to the standard debt tax shield, which 
leads to a substantially lower estimated coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable after 
inclusion of small domestic firms, multinational firms tend to overcompensate in the data 
sample, which leads to higher estimated coefficients on the two international tax mechanisms. 
To examine whether exclusion of loss-making multinational and domestic firms 
changes the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms, I run the regressions (2) to (4) on 
a data sample that excludes firms with loss carry-forwards. I have not reported the obtained 
results in the study, as the estimated coefficients on all tax mechanisms increase only slightly 
in all regressions.  Coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable is still rather small 
in regressions (2) and (3), as compared to the original regression (1). This suggests that small 
domestic firms tend to have specific characteristics or other non-debt tax shields that reduce 
their incentives to exploit the standard debt tax shield. 
Furthermore, to check whether the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms 
change when only comparable domestic firms enter the data sample, I use propensity score 
matching technique. This technique is used in the study by Egger et al. (2010) to match 
foreign-owned firms with comparable domestically owned firms. Firstly, I find the 
probability of being a multinational firm by probit model, assuming a normal cumulative 
density function. I use several observable variables as determinants of whether the firm is 
likely to be a multinational firm – the age of the firm, its profitability, growth opportunities 
and sales. Older firms are more likely to become multinationals than firms which have existed 
only for a few years. Furthermore, as revealed by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), 
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multinational firms tend to be more productive, which suggests that they are more likely to 
experience high growth, profitability and growing sales than purely domestic firms (p. 300). 
I have not reported the results of the probit model in the thesis; however, the estimated results 
show that all variables have a statistically significant and positive effect on probability of 
being a multinational firm. This suggests that older, more profitable, larger (in terms of sales) 
and growing firms are more likely to be multinational firms. 
Furthermore, the predicted probability of being a multinational firm (the estimated 
propensity score) is used as a matching mechanism to construct a group of purely domestic 
firms that are very similar to the multinational firms, based on the observable variables 
discussed above. I use the nearest matching estimator to find for each multinational firm 
(treated unit) one or several comparable purely domestic firms (untreated units). Finally, I 
drop multinational firms and their matched domestic counterparts whose propensity scores 
are below 25% or over 75% in order to arrive at a sample of comparable domestic and 
multinational firms. Firms with propensity scores below 25% are very unlikely to be 
multinational firms, which suggests that these firms might be small, unprofitable and rather 
unresponsive to tax incentives; therefore, they are excluded from the data sample.60 Firms 
with propensity scores above 75% are very likely to be multinational firms; hence, domestic 
firms with more than 75% probability of being multinational firms might have specific 
characteristics or unfavourable features that prevent them from becoming multinational 
firms. These characteristics might influence their leverage responses to tax; thus, these firms 
are excluded from the data sample. 
As observable in regression (5), coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable 
decreases by 3.7 percentage points, while coefficients on the weighted tax difference and 
maximum tax difference variables increase by 1.7 and 3.4 percentage points respectively 
after inclusion of comparable domestic firms in the data sample. The estimated coefficients 
on the tax mechanisms are similar to the coefficients in regression (4), where large purely 
domestic firms are included in the data sample. This occurs because large domestic firms are 
more likely to be multinationals; hence, they enter the data sample in regression (5), while 
small domestic firms are excluded from this sample. 
Finally, regression (6) is run only on purely domestic firms in Europe. Only statutory 
corporate tax rate changes and changes in control variables within a country identify the 
                                                 
60 As found in section 7.1., small multinational firms are less responsive to international tax incentives 
than large firms. 
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coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable for purely domestic firms. As 
observable in the table, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable is positive, 
which suggests that domestic firms’ leverage increases with an increase in the standard debt 
tax shield. However, the coefficient is statistically insignificant, which can be explained by 
parent fixed effects that substantially reduce variation in data on purely domestic firms.61 
Furthermore, the rather small and insignificant coefficient on the standard debt tax shield 
mechanism can be explained by small purely domestic firms that enter the data sample. As 
discussed above, small domestic firms have less incentives to use the debt tax shield as they 
have low net income and alternative non-debt tax shields. 
  
                                                 
61 I also estimate the regression on purely domestic firms without any parent fixed effects; however, 
the coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate becomes negative and statistically significant. This suggests 
that control for group fixed effects is necessary due to heterogeneity among firms in the data sample. Finally, I 
estimate the regression on purely domestic firms with subsidiary fixed effects, which increases the coefficient 
on the statutory corporate tax rate more than two times, and it becomes statistically significant. 
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Table 9: Domestic firms 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) extends the main sample and includes majority-owned 
affiliates of purely domestic European firms in the data sample. Regression (3) extends the main sample and 
includes small purely domestic firms in the data sample (with total assets less than 6.86 mln euros). Regression 
(4) extends the main sample and includes large purely domestic firms in the data sample (with total assets more 
than or equal to 6.86 mln euros). Regression (5) is run on comparable multinational and domestic firms that, 
according to propensity score matching, have a 25% to 75% probability to be multinational firms. Regression 
(6) is run on purely domestic firms only. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include 
parent, industry and year fixed effects. The sample used in regression (1) consists of majority-owned affiliates 
of European multinational firms (MNCs) over 12 years (2003 – 2014), while the sample used in regressions (2) 
to (5) adds data on majority-owned affiliates of purely domestic European firms. The sample used in regression 
(6) consists of majority-owned affiliates of purely domestic European firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance 
at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Original 
All MNCs 
and 
domestic 
MNCs and 
small 
domestic 
MNCs and 
large 
domestic 
Comparable 
MNCs and 
domestic 
Domestic 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.073*** 0.047*** 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.060*** 0.071***  
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)  
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.076*** 0.085***  
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)  
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** -0.032*** -0.016*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log (Creditor rights 
index) 
-0.037*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.026*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates 
excluded 
No No No No No No 
Parent, industry, year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,039,827 3,792,982 2,416,406 2,416,407 1,956,861 2,753,155 
Number of parent firms 143,405 553,653 450,752 287,420 144,419 425,045 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0525 .0502 .0611 0.0731 0.0463 
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7.4. Constant historical ownership structure 
As discussed in section 4.1., the Amadeus database does not provide historical 
ownership data, and information on ownership structures of European firms is available only 
for the last reported date. An assumption about a constant historical ownership structure 
would lead to misclassified subsidiary-parent relations as ownership structures tend to change 
over time. Misclassifications arise regarding which multinational firms own which 
subsidiaries in the time period before the last reported year. Consequently, a significant noise 
can be introduced in the international debt shifting mechanisms as they depend on statutory 
corporate tax rates and asset shares of all affiliates that belong to the multinational 
corporation. In order to eliminate such misclassifications, I use the Orbis database initially to 
obtain historical ownership data on European firms, and afterwards link this data with 
financial data from the Amadeus database. 
However, several authors use ownership data from the Amadeus database and assume 
a constant ownership structure over their sample periods. As an example, the empirical results 
and descriptive statistics presented by Huizinga et al. (2008) show that the authors assume a 
constant ownership structure over their sample period of 10 years (1994 – 2003) and do not 
discuss the possible biases that such an assumption might introduce. Furthermore, 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) examine income shifting of multinational firms in response 
to tax and assume a constant ownership structure over their sample period of 11 years (1995 
– 2005). Even though the authors discuss the drawbacks of assuming a constant historical 
ownership structure as of the last reported date (2005 in their sample), they claim that, in line 
with previous studies, it is not an important concern. The authors claim that inclusion of some 
subsidiaries in the data sample which were not affiliated with the parent firm in the earlier 
years introduces noise in the estimated coefficients that leads to a downward bias in their 
results (p. 99). Also Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005), examining whether multinational 
firms share their profits across borders during the time period from 1993 to 1998, and 
Miniaci, Parisi and Panteghini (2014), analysing the link between subsidiary capital structure 
and tax in Europe during the time period from 1998 to 2007, acknowledge that the Amadeus 
database does not provide historical ownership data and assume a constant ownership 
structure over their time periods. 
In order to examine whether an assumption about a constant historical ownership 
structure would introduce a bias in my results, I assume that the ownership structure as of 
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2014 (the last year for which ownership data is available in the Orbis database) holds for the 
whole sample period from 2003 to 2014. Thus, I assume that subsidiary-parent relations 
remain constant over a period of 12 years. 
The obtained results are observable in regression (2) in Table 10. Regression (1) 
restates the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 to make the results more easily 
comparable. As observable in the table, the number of observations have increased by 22% 
due to misclassifications in firms’ ownership structures over time. The new data sample 
includes affiliates, which were not actually affiliated with their parent firms in the earlier 
years. Furthermore, the number of parent firms has decreased by approximately 7%, as any 
parent firms and their subsidiaries that ceased their operations before 2014 are excluded from 
the new data sample. Only parent firms and their majority-owned subsidiaries that were 
active in 2014 enter the new data sample. This introduces a survivorship bias in the data 
sample – firms that perform worst are likely to be excluded from the sample as they no longer 
exist in 2014, while firms that were successful enough to survive until 2014 are included in 
the sample. As observable in regression (2), coefficient on the weighted tax difference 
variable has decreased by more than 50% and become statistically insignificant when 
ownership structure is assumed to be constant over the sample period of 12 years. Coefficient 
on the maximum tax difference variable has remained approximately constant, while 
coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable has increased by 6 percentage points. The 
substantial decrease in the estimated coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable 
shows the importance of correctly classified historical subsidiary-parent relations. When 
historical relations are misclassified, it affects the total assets of the multinational 
corporation, each affiliate’s share in the total assets, and the differences in statutory corporate 
tax rates among affiliates within the multinational group. Thus, the subsequent bias in the 
estimated coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable is likely to substantial. 
Moreover, misclassified ownership structures are also likely to bias the coefficient on the 
maximum tax difference variable, as it depends on the statutory corporate tax rate of the 
corporation-specific lowest-taxed affiliate. 
The obtained coefficients on the international tax mechanisms can also be biased 
downwards because minority-owned subsidiaries are included in the data sample as majority-
owned subsidiaries due to misclassified subsidiary-parent relations. The parent firm is unable 
to substantially influence financial policies or capital structures of minority-owned 
subsidiaries in response to the tax mechanisms. Moreover, coordination of several owners’ 
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interests is difficult if they face different financing and tax conditions, which leads to 
conflicts of interest due to different goals with respect to profit shifting and other financial 
choices. 
In contrast to other authors who claim that misclassified subsidiary-parent relations 
are unlikely to be a major concern in their studies, my results show that the misclassifications 
introduce a bias in the estimated relation between affiliates’ leverage and tax. Bias in the 
estimated coefficients is particularly large bias when the independent variables are 
constructed based on data on all affiliates within the multinational group. 
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Table 10: Constant historical ownership structure 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) is run on a data sample that assumes a constant 
historical ownership structure over the sample period, based on subsidiary-parent relations as of 2014. The 
regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry and year fixed effects. The 
sample consists of affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) 
 Original Constant historical ownership 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.224*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** -0.061*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.084*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.050*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Log (Creditor rights index) -0.037*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates excluded No No 
Parent, industry, year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,039,827 1,269,198 
Number of parent firms 143,405 133,478 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0524 
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7.5. Majority-owned subsidiaries outside Europe 
If European parent firms have majority-owned subsidiaries also outside Europe, the 
parent firms are able to shift debt and profits to these subsidiaries as well. As an example, a 
parent firm may have a majority-owned subsidiary located in a tax haven outside Europe, 
where the effective corporate tax rate is almost zero. The multinational firm might send all 
income to this subsidiary, while the subsidiary would act as a financial coordination centre 
and lend out money to all other affiliates within the multinational group. However, this effect 
would not be picked up by the maximum tax difference variable because my data sample 
includes only European affiliates. Thus, the maximum tax difference variable might seem 
smaller than it actually is due to unavailability of financial data on subsidiaries outside 
Europe. Also the weighted tax difference variable would be unadjusted for the total assets 
and corporate tax rates of subsidiaries outside Europe due to unavailability of their financial 
data. Hence, existence of majority-owned non-European affiliates of European multinational 
firms is likely to bias the estimated coefficients on the international debt shifting mechanisms. 
Huizinga et al. (2008) discuss that due to this limitation of the Amadeus database, 
they cannot examine how tax differences between European affiliates and non-European 
affiliates affect capital structure choices of European multinational firms. The authors claim 
that this is not an important concern as European multinational firms are likely to obtain the 
largest part of their income from operations in Europe (p. 96). Møen et al. (2011) control for 
majority-owned affiliates outside Europe in their main analysis by restricting their data 
sample to German multinational firms that have all their affiliates in Europe. In robustness 
tests, the authors run regressions on an extended sample of affiliates of German multinational 
firms around the world, and an extended sample of affiliates of German multinational firms 
in Europe, irrespective of whether the firms have other affiliates outside Europe. The model 
performs worse in the extended sample of affiliates around the world, which can be explained 
by better data quality in European countries and presence of other factors which are more 
important for investments outside Europe than taxation. However, the model performs better 
in the extended sample of affiliates in Europe (coefficients are more accurately estimated), 
which can be explained by the increased sample size and inclusion of large multinational 
firms in the extended data sample (p. 35 – 38). 
In order to examine whether leverage responses to tax differ for European 
multinational firms that have majority-owned affiliates outside Europe and European 
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multinational firms that do not have majority-owned affiliates outside Europe, I firstly obtain 
historical ownership data on majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms 
outside Europe from the Orbis database. Then I check whether the parent firms in my main 
data sample own any affiliates outside Europe, based on the historical ownership information. 
Regression (1) in Table 11 restates the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 to 
make the results more easily comparable.  Regression (2) in Table 11 includes only European 
multinational firms with majority-owned affiliates outside Europe, while regression (3) 
includes only European multinational firms without majority-owned affiliates outside 
Europe. Firms with affiliates outside Europe constitute 35% of the main sample. As 
observable in regression (2), when only the firms which have affiliates outside Europe are 
included in the data sample, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax rate variable increases 
by 6.2 percentage points. However, coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable 
decreases by 4.3 percentage points and loses its statistical significance, while coefficient on 
the maximum tax difference variable decreases by 1.2 percentage points and becomes less 
statistically significant. 
Changes in the estimated coefficients in regression (2) can be explained by a potential 
measurement error in the international debt shifting variables that arises due to disregarding 
financial and tax data on affiliates outside Europe. Coefficient on the weighted tax difference 
variable is affected most because it depends on asset shares and tax data on all affiliates that 
belong to the multinational group. If the multinational firm has many majority-owned 
affiliates outside Europe, the estimated coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable is 
particularly biased. Coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable is affected less 
because it depends only on tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate within the multinational 
group. If the lowest-taxed affiliate is located in Europe, the estimated coefficient is unbiased. 
If the lowest-taxed affiliate is located outside Europe, the multinational firm might still decide 
to establish its financial coordination centre in the lowest-taxed affiliate in Europe, 
considering development of financial markets, corruption and creditor rights protection 
outside Europe. Hence, bias in the estimated coefficient on the maximum tax difference 
variable is likely to be rather small, compared to bias in the estimated coefficient on the 
weighted tax difference variable. 
Furthermore, as observable in regression (3), when only the firms which do not have 
any affiliates outside Europe are included in the data sample, coefficients on the statutory 
corporate tax rate and weighted tax difference variables decrease by 1.6 and 0.8 percentage 
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points respectively, while coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable increases by 
1.1 percentage point. The results suggest that the international debt shifting mechanisms have 
a larger effect on leverage decisions of European multinational firms which do not have any 
affiliates outside Europe. This occurs because potential measurement errors in the 
international debt shifting variables are much smaller for these firms as financial and tax data 
on their European affiliates is available in the data sample. 
Furthermore, I include a dummy variable (Out of Europe dummy) in the regression 
that equals 1 if a multinational firm has affiliates outside Europe, and 0 otherwise. As 
observable in regression (4), coefficients on the tax mechanisms change only slightly and 
retain their statistical significance, while the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable is 
statistically significant and positive. Hence, if a European multinational firm has majority-
owned affiliates outside Europe, the debt-to-asset ratio of its European affiliates is 0.4 
percentage points higher on average, compared to firms without any affiliates outside Europe. 
This suggests that multinational firms tend to locate their financial coordination centres in 
tax havens outside Europe, which reduces the maximum tax difference variable of all 
affiliates within the multinational group and leads to a higher leverage. 
However, all large multinational firms are likely to have affiliates outside Europe, 
which introduces a selection bias in the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable. To 
reduce the selection bias, I create two other dummy variables. The first dummy variable 
(Lower than minimum tax dummy) equals 1 if a multinational firm has majority-owned 
affiliates outside Europe whose minimum statutory corporate tax rate (tax rate of the lowest-
taxed affiliate outside Europe) is lower than the minimum tax rate among firm’s European 
affiliates. If the multinational firm has majority-owned affiliates outside Europe whose 
statutory corporate tax rate is lower than the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate in Europe, 
I expect that the debt level of its European affiliates should increase. Furthermore, the second 
dummy variable (Higher than maximum tax dummy) equals 1 if a multinational firm has 
majority-owned affiliates outside Europe whose maximum statutory corporate tax rate (tax 
rate of the highest-taxed affiliate outside Europe) is higher than the maximum tax rate among 
firm’s European affiliates. If the multinational firm has majority-owned affiliates outside 
Europe whose statutory corporate tax rate is higher than the tax rate of the highest-taxed 
affiliate in Europe, I expect that the debt level of its European affiliates should decrease. 
As observable in regression (5), coefficients on the tax mechanisms change only 
slightly and retain their statistical significance. The estimated coefficient on the Lower than 
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minimum tax dummy is statistically significant and positive, which suggests that 
multinational firms tend to establish their financial coordination centres in tax havens outside 
Europe. As effective tax rates that financial coordination centres pay in tax havens are very 
low, the maximum tax difference variable of all affiliates that belong to the multinational 
group increases. Hence, if a multinational firm has a majority-owned affiliate outside Europe 
whose tax rate is smaller than the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate in Europe, the total 
leverage ratio of firm’s European affiliates is 0.6 percentage points higher on average, 
compared to firms without such affiliates outside Europe. Furthermore, also the estimated 
coefficient on the Higher than maximum tax dummy is statistically significant and positive. 
This suggests that if a multinational firm has a majority-owned affiliate outside Europe whose 
tax rate is higher than the tax rate of the highest-taxed affiliate in Europe, the total leverage 
ratio of firm’s European affiliates is 0.4 percentage points higher on average, compared to 
firms without such affiliates outside Europe. This finding does not conform to the expected 
results that debt-to-asset ratios of European affiliates should decrease if higher-taxed 
affiliates are located outside Europe due to higher tax savings available outside Europe. 
The rather small coefficient on the Lower than minimum tax dummy and the small 
and positive coefficient on the Higher than maximum tax dummy suggest that multinational 
firms take other concerns into account while deciding upon debt shifting to affiliates outside 
Europe. Development of financial markets, political stability and corruption level in the 
country might influence the willingness of multinational firms to adjust capital structures of 
their affiliates outside Europe in response to tax incentives. Furthermore, also withholding 
taxes matter for debt shifting to affiliates outside Europe. Hence, leverage decisions of 
European affiliates are likely to be affected to a rather small extent if the multinational firm 
has affiliates outside Europe. 
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Table 11: Majority-owned affiliates outside Europe 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) is run on a sample of European affiliates that belong 
to European multinational firms (MNCs) which have majority-owned affiliates outside Europe. Regression (3) 
is run on a sample of European affiliates that belong to European multinational firms which do not have any 
majority-owned affiliates outside Europe. Regression (4) includes Out of Europe dummy variable which equals 
1 if a multinational firm has majority-owned affiliates outside Europe, and 0 otherwise. Regression (5) includes 
Lower than minimum tax dummy which equals 1 if a multinational firm has majority-owned affiliates outside 
Europe whose minimum corporate tax rate is lower than the minimum tax rate among firm’s European affiliates, 
and Higher than maximum tax dummy which equals 1 if a multinational firm has majority-owned affiliates 
outside Europe whose maximum corporate tax rate is higher than the maximum tax rate among firm’s European 
affiliates. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry and year fixed 
effects. The sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 
– 2014). White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Original 
MNCs with 
affiliates 
outside 
Europe 
MNCs without 
affiliates 
outside Europe 
Out of 
Europe 
dummy 
Min and 
max tax 
dummies 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.226*** 0.148*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.011 0.046* 0.056*** 0.052*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.017) (0.015) 
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** 0.039** 0.062*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.010) 
Out of Europe dummy    0.004***  
    (0.002)  
Lower than minimum tax 
dummy 
    0.006*** 
     (0.001) 
Higher than maximum 
tax dummy 
    0.004*** 
     (0.001) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** -0.101*** -0.023*** -0.065*** -0.062*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Inflation 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 11 (continued)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Original 
MNCs with 
affiliates 
outside 
Europe 
MNCs without 
affiliates 
outside Europe 
Out of 
Europe 
dummy 
Min and 
max tax 
dummies 
Log (Creditor rights 
index) 
-0.037*** -0.030*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates 
excluded 
No No No No No 
Parent, industry, year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,039,827 368,207 671,620 1,039,827 1,039,827 
Number of parent firms 143,405 13,665 137,415 143,405 143,405 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0464 0.1011 0.0544 .0559 
7.6. Holding companies 
Multinational firms are often characterized by indirect ownership structures that 
involve holding companies. Holding companies do not usually produce any products or 
services themselves, but they are established by multinational firms to implement tax 
efficient financing in firms’ affiliates.62 Several countries offer special tax regimes for 
interest income and dividends that holding companies receive; for example, foreign affiliates 
located in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland are able to obtain tax 
allowances if they mainly provide internal financial services or operate as holding companies 
(Weichenrieder, 1996, p. 41).63 Consequently, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland are host countries for many holding companies in Europe (Mintz & 
Weichenrieder, 2010, pp. 46, 80). Hence, a tax saving financing structure is possible if parent 
firm provides the holding firm with equity, and the holding firm forwards these funds as debt 
to other affiliates within the multinational group. Unlike dividend payments, interest 
expenses of subsidiaries to the holding company are tax deductible, and if the holding 
                                                 
62 For a broader discussion on advantages of indirect ownership structures and holding companies, see 
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010, pp. 77 – 122). 
63 Also thin capitalization rules historically allowed a preferential treatment for holding companies. As 
an example, before 2001 German thin capitalization rules had a safe haven ratio (total debt-to-equity ratio) equal 
to 9:1 for holding companies, while it was 3:1 for other companies. In 2001 the safe haven ratio was reduced to 
1.5:1 for ordinary companies and to 3:1 for holding companies, which still allowed potential loopholes in the 
rules. Finally, in 2004 the safe haven ratio was set at 1.5:1 for all companies (Overesch & Wamser, 2010, pp. 
564 – 565; Weichenrieder & Windischbauer, 2008, pp. 3 – 4). 
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company is tax exempt on its interest income, it might be possible to send the interest income 
back to the parent firm almost tax-free.64 
Another potential mechanism how multinational firms can use holding companies for 
tax purposes affects my analysis directly. The parent firm can establish a holding company 
with the main purpose to endow it with a very high amount of debt. These funds can then be 
used by the holding company to shift equity to other affiliates within the multinational 
corporation. Thus, the holding company can be heavily leveraged, while it seems that other 
affiliates within the thinly capitalized multinational group have very low total debt-to-asset 
ratios. As an example, the Norwegian company Statoil Fuel & Retail was not thinly 
capitalized prior to being acquired by an international Canadian-owned retail group 
Alimentation Couche-Tard in 2012. After acquisition, Statoil Fuel & Retail was provided 
with a lot of equity capital from Couche-Tard Norway (Norwegian holding company that 
was the sole shareholder of Statoil Fuel & Retail after acquisition), which was used to repay 
Statoil Fuel & Retail’s external debt. Consequently, firm’s debt-to-asset ratio decreased. 
However, Couche-Tard Norway had received a lot of internal debt and equity capital from a 
heavily leveraged holding company in Luxembourg, and these funds were used to acquire 
Statoil Fuel & Retail and to increase Statoil Fuel & Retail’s capital. Hence, even though it 
seemed that Statoil Fuel & Retail had a very low total debt, it actually belonged to a heavily 
leveraged multinational group and its actual leverage ratio substantially increased after the 
acquisition (Foss, 2014, pp. 37 - 56). 
This financing structure might lead to biased estimates of the effect of tax on 
affiliates’ leverage if the main data sample consists of a few heavily-indebted affiliates 
(holding companies) and many affiliates with small levels of debt. To control for the 
possibility that only one or a few affiliates are loaded with large amounts of debt, which they 
afterwards distribute as equity to other affiliates within the multinational group, I create one 
total debt-to-asset ratio per multinational firm per country which aggregates information from 
all firm’s affiliates operating within a particular country.65 Firstly, I aggregate total liabilities 
of all affiliates of the multinational firm that operate within a country to create the numerator 
of the aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio. Furthermore, I add equity of the holding company 
of the multinational firm within a country to the aggregated total liabilities of all affiliates of 
the multinational group within a country to create the denominator of the aggregated total 
                                                 
64 For this to be possible, the dividends that the parent firm receives should be tax exempt. 
65 Aggregation procedure follows Foss (2014, pp. 23 – 30). 
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debt-to-asset ratio. Hence, I create one total debt-to-asset ratio per multinational firm, country 
and year. The same procedure is done in all countries where the multinational firm has 
affiliates. The aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio is expressed in equation (14): 
𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑅𝐴 =
∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸+∑ (𝐷𝑖
𝐼−𝐹𝑖
𝐼)𝑖𝑖
𝑉1+∑ 𝐷𝑖
𝐸+∑ (𝐷𝑖
𝐼−𝐹𝑖
𝐼)𝑖𝑖
, (14) 
where 𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑅𝐴 is the aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio of a multinational firm in 
country A, 𝐷𝑖
𝐸 is external debt of an affiliate i which belongs to the multinational firm and 
operates in the country A, 𝐷𝑖
𝐼 is internal debt of the affiliate i, 𝐹𝑖
𝐼 are internal receivables of 
the affiliate i, and 𝑉1 is equity of the holding company which belongs to the multinational 
firm and operates in the country A. As the Amadeus database does not provide data on 
internal transactions within firms, it is not possible to obtain information on 𝐹𝑖
𝐼 or the internal 
receivables of affiliates within a multinational firm. Consequently, I aggregate total liabilities 
without deduction of internal receivables, which leads to double counting of internal 
transactions within a firm. If the firm has no internal debt, the aggregated total debt-to-asset 
ratio is unbiased. However, the more internal debt and internal receivables there are within 
the firm, the more the aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio is biased upwards. 
Aggregation allows using only one observation of aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio 
per multinational firm, country and year, instead of observations of several affiliates. As the 
high leverage of the holding company is added to the aggregated leverage within a country, 
the multinational concern appears thinly-capitalized and the bias in the effect of tax 
mechanisms on total leverage is eliminated. Moreover, using only equity of the holding 
company while calculating the aggregated total assets (denominator of the aggregated total 
debt-to-asset ratio) eliminates the bias that arises because affiliates have received a lot of 
equity from the highly leveraged holding companies. 
Regression (1) in Table 12 restates the original specification of regression (2) in Table 
3 to make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) is run on the aggregated data 
sample to control for highly leveraged holding companies. As observable in the table, the 
number of observations and number of parent firms are substantially smaller in regression 
(2). This occurs because I assume that the holding company within a particular country is an 
affiliate whose NACE Rev. 2 industry code refers to activities of holding companies (code 
6420). If there are no such affiliates within a particular country per multinational firm and 
year, the aggregation procedure cannot be implemented; therefore, I do not include the 
multinational firm-country observation in the data sample. Furthermore, the number of 
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observations decreases because the new data sample consists of aggregated multinational 
firm observations per country, instead of many observations of different affiliates per 
multinational firm and country. 
After the adjustment for holding companies, coefficient on the statutory corporate tax 
rate variable increases by 12 percentage points, coefficient on the weighted tax difference 
variable increases by 8 percentage points, and coefficient on the maximum tax difference 
variable increases by 0.8 percentage points. Hence, the results show that multinational firms 
engage in more external and internal debt shifting than was estimated in the original 
specification. Moreover, leverage decisions of multinational firms are also more responsive 
to the standard debt tax shield mechanism after the adjustment. 
Furthermore, aggregation leads to changes in coefficients on firm-level control 
variables, as aggregated observations per multinational firm, country and year are created 
also for these variables. Coefficient on the fixed asset ratio increases by 22.6 percentage 
points and changes its sign from statistically negative to positive, coefficient on the logarithm 
of sales increases by 4.5 percentage points, coefficient on the loss carry-forward variable 
decreases by 7.9 percentage points, and coefficient on the profitability variable decreases by 
14.2 percentage points. Changes in the estimated coefficients on firm-level control variables 
occur because the unit of observation in the data sample is no longer an affiliate, but an 
aggregated multinational firm-country observation. Consequently, the aggregated data 
sample is considerably smaller than the data sample used in the original specification. 
Furthermore, a selection bias might be present in the new data sample. As an example, only 
firms that have holding companies enter the sample, which might characterize rather large 
multinational firms with many affiliates. Leverage responses of such firms to control 
variables might differ from the average response of all firms that are included in the original 
data sample. 
The obtained results suggest that existence of holding companies and the resulting 
lower leverage of other affiliates within multinational firms lead to a downward bias in the 
estimated coefficients on all tax mechanisms in the original specification. Leverage responses 
to tax seem to be substantially higher after the adjustment, which suggests that multinational 
firms engage in more international debt shifting than was estimated initially. However, the 
findings can be influenced by a selection bias because only firms that have holding companies 
enter the aggregated data sample. If only large firms have holding companies, coefficients on 
the tax mechanisms might increase in the new data sample because large firms are more likely 
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to engage in international debt shifting, as found in section 7.1. Furthermore, the findings can 
be influenced by a potentially erroneous construction of the aggregated total debt-to-asset 
ratio. If the aggregated debt-to-asset ratio is biased due to double counting of internal 
receivables and payables, the estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms might be biased 
as well, especially coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable, which represents 
internal debt shifting. Thus, a more precise construction of the aggregated debt-to-asset ratio 
is necessary in order to examine the actual effect of tax on aggregated leverage. To construct 
a precise aggregated leverage ratio, another database must be used to obtain financial data, 
as the Amadeus database does not provide data on internal transactions. 
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Table 12: Holding companies 
The dependent variable in the regression (1) is the total debt-to-asset ratio. The dependent variable in the 
regression (2) is the aggregated total debt-to-asset ratio, which aggregates data per each multinational firm, 
country and year. Detailed variable definitions are given in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the 
original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to make the results more easily comparable. 
Regression (2) controls for the existence of holding companies in the data sample and the resulting lower 
leverage of other affiliates. Firm-level control variables are aggregated per each multinational firm, country and 
year in regression (2). The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry 
and year fixed effects. The sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 
12 years (2003 – 2014) in regression (1), while the sample in regression (2) consists of aggregated multinational 
firm-country observations of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) 
 Original Control for holding companies 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.284*** 
 (0.016) (0.075) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.134** 
 (0.017) (0.066) 
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** 0.059 
 (0.012) (0.045) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** 0.161*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.186*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.010** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Log (Creditor rights index) -0.037*** -0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates excluded No No 
Parent, industry, year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,039,827 59,625 
Number of parent firms 143,405 5,865 
R-squared 0.0551 0.1516 
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7.7. Loss carry-forwards 
As discussed in section 6.4., loss carry-forward dummy variable enters the regression 
with a positive sign, which suggests that the dummy variable explains specific characteristics 
of the firm, for example, its expected performance, which may indicate a positive relation 
between firm’s loss carry-forwards and its financial leverage. Also, firms with loss carry-
forwards are likely to have no retained earnings, less equity and more incentives to use debt 
to finance their activities. However, as discussed by Büttner, Overesch and Wamser (2011), 
affiliates with loss carry-forwards have less incentives to engage in tax avoidance, as loss 
carry-forwards act as non-debt tax shields and offset affiliates’ taxable profits. The authors 
use an interaction term between statutory corporate tax rate and loss carry-forward dummy 
in their analysis and find that the there exists a significant negative effect of loss carry-
forward on tax elasticity of debt-to-asset ratio (p. 118). 
In order to examine whether loss carry-forwards affect tax elasticity of debt 
negatively in my data sample as well, I create interaction terms between all three tax 
mechanisms and the loss carry-forward dummy. Regression (1) in Table 13 restates the 
original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 to make the results more easily comparable. 
As observable in regression (2) which includes the loss carry-forward interaction terms, the 
interaction term between statutory tax rate and loss carry-forward, and between weighted tax 
difference and loss carry-forward affect affiliates’ leverage negatively. The interaction term 
between maximum tax difference and loss carry-forward affects affiliates’ leverage 
positively; however, coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable alone has decreased 
by 4 percentage points and become statistically insignificant after inclusion of interaction 
terms in the specification. 
Hence, my results confirm a significant adverse effect of loss carry-forward on the 
estimated effect of corporate tax rate and weighted tax difference variables on affiliates’ total 
leverage. Regression (2) suggests that if an affiliate has losses to be carried forward, the effect 
of statutory tax rate on its total debt-to-asset ratio decreases by approximately 62%, while the 
effect of weighted tax difference variable decreases by approximately 265% and becomes 
negative. Finally, the effect of maximum tax difference variable increases substantially and 
becomes statistically significant at 1%. These findings seem to be particularly relevant 
because approximately 23% of affiliates in the main data sample have loss carry-forwards. 
The standard debt tax shield and external debt shifting mechanisms are less important for 
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leverage decisions of affiliates with loss carry-forwards, while internal debt shifting 
mechanism is more important for their leverage decisions than for affiliates that do not report 
loss carry-forwards. The increased effect of maximum tax difference variable on loss-making 
affiliates’ leverage suggests that multinational firms tend to use internal debt to finance loss-
making affiliates. 
Finally, I divide the data sample into two parts – the affiliates that report loss carry-
forwards and the affiliates that do not report loss carry-forwards, to examine whether effects 
of the tax mechanisms on affiliates’ total leverage differ between these affiliates. Regression 
(3) is run on affiliates without loss carry-forwards, while regression (4) is run on affiliates 
with loss carry-forwards. As observable in the table, the estimated coefficients on statutory 
corporate tax rate and weighted tax difference variables are smaller and statistically 
insignificant for the sample of affiliates with loss carry-forwards, as compared to the sample 
of affiliates without loss carry-forwards. However, the estimated coefficient on maximum 
tax difference variable is slightly larger for the sample of affiliates with loss carry-forwards. 
Hence, these findings confirm the results obtained above – leverage of affiliates with loss 
carry-forwards is less responsive to variation in corporate tax rate and weighted tax difference 
variables, and more responsive to variation in maximum tax difference variable than leverage 
of affiliates without loss carry-forwards. 
In line with Büttner et al. (2011), these findings exhibit an implication for tax policies. 
As firms with loss carry-forwards are less willing to use more debt or engage in external debt 
shifting in response to tax incentives, the use of debt for tax avoidance activities should 
decrease during or after a financial crisis or a cyclical downturn in the economy. Thus, in 
case of a financial downturn, the anti-tax avoidance rules, such as thin capitalization 
regulations or earnings stripping rules, could be relaxed, as these regulations are based on the 
assumption that multinational firms use debt extensively to shift debt and avoid taxes (p. 
118). 
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Table 13: Loss carry-forwards 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) includes loss carry-forward interaction terms to 
examine whether tax elasticity of debt differs for firms with loss carry-forwards. Regression (3) is run on 
affiliates without loss carry-forwards, and regression (4) is run on affiliates with loss carry-forwards. The 
regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and include parent, industry and year fixed effects. The 
sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance 
at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Original 
Loss carry-
forward 
interactions 
Affiliates 
without loss 
carry-forwards 
Affiliates with loss 
carry-forwards 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.185*** 0.222*** -0.035 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.039) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.141*** 0.058*** 0.012 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) 
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** 0.011 0.045*** 0.049*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) 
Statutory tax rate * Loss carry-
forward 
 -0.115***   
  (0.013)   
Weighted tax difference * Loss 
carry-forward 
 -0.375***   
  (0.022)   
Maximum tax difference * Loss 
carry-forward 
 0.182***   
  (0.012)   
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.110***   
 (0.001) (0.003)   
Profitability -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004* -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Log (Creditor rights index) -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates 
excluded 
No No No No 
Parent, industry, year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 13 (continued)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Original 
Loss carry-
forward 
interactions 
Affiliates 
without loss 
carry-forwards 
Affiliates with loss 
carry-forwards 
Number of observations 1,039,827 1,039,827 801,434 238,393 
Number of parent firms 143,405 143,405 125,5507 64,358 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0552 0.0443 0.0679 
7.8. Non-linear tax responses 
All regression specifications presented in the study are linear in the tax mechanisms, 
based on previous literature and the theoretical model, where cost functions are quadratic. 
However, multinational firms might respond to the tax mechanisms in a non-linear fashion. 
For example, firms might be able to engage in tax planning activities without any costs 
initially; however, when thin capitalization rules become binding, costs of increasing the 
leverage even more might increase substantially (Møen et al., 2011, p. 39).66 Also, as shown 
by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), the effect of corporate tax rate on firms’ total debt-to-
asset ratio might be concave in tax rate, which suggests that the marginal effect of tax on 
leverage decreases for higher corporate tax rates (pp. 132 – 133). In order to examine whether 
firms’ leverage responses to tax are non-linear, I include quadratic tax mechanisms in the 
specification. Regression (1) in Table 14 restates the original specification of regression (2) 
in Table 3 to make the results more easily comparable. In regression (2) the quadratic terms 
of the three tax mechanisms are included in the specification. 
As observable in Table 14, the estimated coefficients on the non-linear tax 
mechanisms are statistically significant (even though coefficient on the quadratic maximum 
tax difference variable is only significant at 10%). Moreover, the estimated coefficients on 
the quadratic statutory corporate tax rate variable and the quadratic maximum tax difference 
variable are negative, which shows evidence that the tax effects are concave in statutory 
corporate tax rate and maximum tax difference. This suggests that for a higher statutory 
corporate tax rate or for a higher difference between the host country corporate tax rate and 
the corporate tax rate of the financial coordination centre of the multinational group, the 
marginal effect of tax on the total debt-to-asset ratio decreases. Finally, the estimated 
                                                 
66 Thin capitalization rules limit the amount of leverage for which interest is tax deductible; therefore, 
costs of increasing leverage above the threshold rise substantially (Blouin et al., 2014, p. 3). 
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coefficient on the quadratic weighted tax difference variable is positive, which suggests that 
for a higher weighted difference between the host country corporate tax rate and corporate 
tax rates of all other affiliates within the multinational group, the marginal effect of tax on 
the total leverage ratio increases and the affiliate is likely to receive even more external debt. 
Also Møen et al. (2011) obtain negative coefficients on the quadratic statutory 
corporate tax rate variable and the quadratic maximum tax difference variable, and a positive 
coefficient on the quadratic weighted tax difference variable (p. 40). However, only 
coefficient on the quadratic weighted tax difference variable is statistically significant in their 
study, while all quadratic tax mechanisms are statistically significant in my study. Overall, 
their estimated responses of firms’ leverage to non-linear tax mechanisms are similar to my 
estimates. 
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Table 14: Non-linear tax mechanisms 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) controls for non-linear tax responses and includes 
quadratic tax mechanisms in the specification. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares and 
include parent, industry and year fixed effects. The sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European 
multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** 
denotes significance at 1% level. 
  (1) (2) 
  Original Non-linear tax responses 
Statutory tax rate  0.164*** 0.366*** 
  (0.016) (0.055) 
(Statutory tax rate)2   -0.372*** 
   (0.097) 
Weighted tax difference  0.054*** 0.075*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) 
(Weighted tax difference)2   0.393*** 
   (0.100) 
Maximum tax difference  0.051*** 0.079*** 
  (0.012) (0.019) 
(Maximum tax difference)2   -0.154* 
   (0.080) 
Fixed asset ratio  -0.065*** -0.064*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (Sales)  0.027*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward  0.093*** 0.093*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability  -0.044*** -0.044*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption index)  -0.009*** -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Growth opportunities  0.022*** 0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (Creditor rights index)  -0.037*** -0.036*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates excluded  No No 
Parent, industry, year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Number of observations  1,039,827 1,039,827 
Number of parent firms  143,405 143,405 
R-squared  0.0551 0.0546 
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7.9. Fixed effects 
All regressions presented in the study have included parent, industry and year fixed 
effects. Parent fixed effects control for systematic differences among multinational firms, 
year fixed effects capture aggregate shocks occurring over the sample period, and industry 
fixed effects capture differences in borrowing costs across industries.67 However, if there 
exist systematic differences among subsidiaries, the obtained results can be biased due to 
omitted variables at the subsidiary level. In order to deal with this potential issue, I included 
affiliate-specific control variables in the previous regressions to capture heterogeneity 
characterizing affiliates’ financing costs. Another method to control for potential unobserved 
subsidiary heterogeneity that characterizes their leverage is to include subsidiary fixed effects 
in the regression.68 
Regression (1) in Table 15 restates the original specification of regression (2) in Table 
3 to make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) is estimated with subsidiary 
fixed effects. As observable in the table, coefficients on all tax mechanisms decrease, and 
coefficient on the maximum tax difference variable becomes statistically insignificant and 
negative in regression (2). However, for many affiliates in the data sample, financial data is 
available for less than 12 years – on average, 7 years of financial data are available per 
affiliate. For firms with short availability of data, it is rather difficult to precisely estimate 
subsidiary fixed effects (Huizinga et al., 2008, p. 112). Nevertheless, even when I restrict the 
data sample to include only affiliates with at least 10 years of financial data, coefficients on 
the tax mechanisms are similar. The obtained results suggest that subsidiary fixed effects 
substantially reduce variation in the data. Hence, control for heterogeneity among 
multinational firms seems to be more relevant while estimating leverage responses to tax than 
control for heterogeneity among subsidiaries in my data sample. 
Finally, in order to examine what occurs when regression controls for no subsidiary 
or parent (group) fixed effects, I run the regression without any subsidiary or parent fixed 
effects (industry and year fixed effects remain in the regression). As observable in regression 
(3), coefficients on the statutory corporate tax rate and maximum tax difference variables 
have decreased, when compared to regression (1), by 8 percentage points and 19.4 percentage 
                                                 
67 More discussion on the choice of fixed effects is provided in section 3.3. and section 5. 
68 Due to inclusion of subsidiary fixed effects, I drop parent (group) fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects from the regression. Year fixed effects remain in the regression. 
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points respectively. Coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable has increased by 31.2 
percentage points. Hence, the substantial changes in coefficients on the tax mechanisms 
confirm the importance of controlling for fixed effects in the regression, as there exists 
substantial heterogeneity among parent firms and subsidiaries in the data sample. 
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Table 15: Fixed effects 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the total debt-to-asset ratio. Detailed variable definitions are given 
in Table 2. Regression (1) shows the results of the original specification of regression (2) in Table 3 in order to 
make the results more easily comparable. Regression (2) includes subsidiary and year fixed effects. Regression 
(3) includes industry and year fixed effects. The regressions are estimated by the ordinary least squares. The 
sample consists of majority-owned affiliates of European multinational firms over 12 years (2003 – 2014). 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * denotes significance 
at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Original Subsidiary fixed effects No fixed effects 
Statutory tax rate 0.164*** 0.130*** 0.084*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) 
Weighted tax difference 0.054*** 0.017** 0.366*** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) 
Maximum tax difference 0.051*** -0.004 -0.143*** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.065*** 0.033*** -0.055*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log (Sales) 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss carry-forward 0.093*** 0.055*** 0.094*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Corruption index) -0.009*** -0.045*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Growth opportunities 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log (Creditor rights index) -0.037*** -0.011*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Lowest-taxed affiliates excluded No No No 
Parent, industry, year fixed effects Yes   
Subsidiary, year fixed effects  Yes  
Industry, year fixed effects   Yes 
Number of observations 1,039,827 1,039,827 1,039,827 
Number of parent firms 143,405 143,405 143,405 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0426 .0619 
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8. Conclusion 
Companies worldwide are prone to adjust their capital structures in order minimize 
tax payments in response to different tax legislations. Hence, examination of tax-efficient 
leverage structures is an important concern both for multinational corporations and for tax 
authorities that are determined to reduce the extent of tax avoidance. The previous literature 
has established that corporate financing structures depend on both tax factors and non-tax 
considerations, such as bankruptcy costs and agency costs. However, even though several 
empirical papers study international debt shifting and multinational firms’ leverage responses 
to tax, they disagree on the mechanism. 
Consequently, my study aims to close four gaps in the existing literature. Firstly, I 
explore whether international debt shifting mechanisms are significant determinants of 
capital structures of European multinational firms. More specifically, I consider sensitivity 
of firms’ leverage to national and international corporate tax rates, represented by three tax 
mechanisms. The standard debt tax shield mechanism is the host country statutory corporate 
tax rate, relevant for both domestic firms and multinational firms. The external debt shifting 
mechanism (weighted tax difference) is measured as the weighted sum of differences 
between the corporate tax rate faced by an affiliate and tax rates faced by the parent firm and 
all other affiliates that belong to the multinational firm. The internal debt shifting mechanism 
(maximum tax difference) is measured as the difference between the corporate tax rate faced 
by an affiliate and the tax rate of the lowest-taxed affiliate within the multinational firm. 
Secondly, I investigate significance of omitted variable bias that is present in the previous 
literature, arising from omitting one of the debt shifting mechanisms from the analysis. 
Furthermore, I examine whether correctly specified historical ownership relations between 
subsidiaries and parent firms are important for analysis of debt shifting behaviour of 
European multinational firms. Finally, I examine whether European affiliates that belong to 
multinational firms with majority-owned affiliates outside Europe respond differently to tax 
incentives than European affiliates of multinational firms whose all affiliates operate in 
Europe. 
I use the model specification proposed by Møen et al. (2011) and test the model’s 
predictions on a large data sample of European multinational firms and their majority-owned 
European affiliates during the time period from 2003 to 2014. The empirical results show 
that affiliates’ leverage depends on the host country corporate tax rate and the corporate tax 
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rates of all other affiliates that belong to the multinational corporation, as all tax mechanisms 
are statistically significant and positive determinants of affiliates’ leverage. The findings 
confirm that international debt shifting among affiliates within a multinational group is a 
widely used technique of European multinational firms. These results provide answer to the 
first sub-question of my thesis – external and internal debt shifting mechanisms are important 
determinants of leverage structures of European multinational firms. 
As a hypothetical example, consider a multinational corporation that consists of two 
affiliates – one foreign subsidiary and the parent firm. The two affiliates are of equal size and 
the foreign subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax rate than the parent 
firm. Consider that the subsidiary’s host country increases the corporate tax rate by 10 
percentage points, keeping everything else constant. According to my obtained estimates, the 
total effect on the subsidiary’s debt-to-asset ratio will be an increase of 2.42 percentage 
points, while the total effect on the parent firm’s debt-to-asset ratio will be a decrease of 0.27 
percentage points. The effect found is 2.15 percentage points lower than the effect found by 
Møen et al. (2011) and 0.2 percentage points lower than the effect found by Huizinga et al. 
(2008). For an affiliate with an average total debt-to-asset ratio in the sample (0.59), an 
increase in the statutory corporate tax rate of 10 percentage points will lead to an increase in 
the total debt of approximately 4.1%. 68% of this increase is explained by the standard debt 
tax shield which can be exploited by both purely domestic firms and multinational firms. 
32% of this increase is explained by the international debt shifting mechanisms, where the 
maximum tax difference mechanism contributes approximately two times more than the 
weighted tax difference mechanism. 
Even though the effects of the international debt shifting mechanisms on affiliates’ 
leverage are statistically significant, the effects are rather small. This can be explained by 
existence of preferential tax regimes for financial coordination centres, which leads to lower 
effective tax rates in countries with such jurisdictions. As statutory corporate tax rates are 
used as approximations for effective corporate tax rates in my study, the estimated 
coefficients on the international debt shifting mechanisms are likely to be biased downwards 
due to measurement error. 
Nevertheless, control for international debt shifting is highly important while 
examining multinational firms’ leverage responses to tax due to correlation between the tax 
mechanisms. Correlation leads to an omitted variable bias if any of the tax mechanisms are 
omitted from the specification. When the host country corporate tax rate is the only tax 
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mechanism included in the specification, its coefficient is biased upwards by approximately 
51%. If the maximum tax difference variable has been omitted from the analysis, the omitted 
variable bias is approximately 16% for coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable and 41% 
for coefficient on the weighted tax difference variable. If the weighted tax difference variable 
has been omitted from the analysis, the omitted variable bias is approximately 20% for 
coefficient on the statutory tax rate variable and 22% for coefficient on the maximum tax 
difference variable. These results provide answer to the second sub-question of my thesis – 
there exists a substantial omitted variable bias arising from omitting any of the tax 
mechanisms from the specification. Thus, the previous studies that examine firms’ leverage 
responses to tax and omit any of the tax mechanisms from their analyses are characterized by 
biased estimated coefficients on the tax mechanisms that are included in the specification. 
Furthermore, adjustments for historical ownership changes between subsidiaries and 
parent firms are important while examining firms’ leverage responses to tax. Even though 
several studies claim that misclassified ownership relations are not a major concern in their 
analyses, my results show the importance of correctly specified corporate structures. The 
international debt shifting mechanisms are particularly affected if historical ownership 
relations are misclassified, as these variables are constructed based on data on all affiliates 
within the multinational group. The obtained results provide answer the third sub-question 
of the thesis – correctly specified historical ownership relations between subsidiaries and 
parent firms are important while examining debt shifting behaviour of European 
multinational firms. 
Finally, empirical results show that European affiliates that belong to multinational 
firms with majority-owned affiliates outside Europe are more indebted. Moreover, these 
affiliates seem to be less responsive to international tax incentives than affiliates that belong 
to multinational firms with only European affiliates. The obtained results can be explained 
by a potential measurement error in the international debt shifting variables that arises due to 
disregarding financial and tax data on affiliates outside Europe. Coefficient on the weighted 
tax difference variable is affected most because it depends on asset shares and tax data on all 
affiliates that belong to the multinational group. These findings provide answer to the fourth 
sub-question of the thesis – European multinational firms that have majority-owned affiliates 
outside Europe seem to react differently to tax incentives than European firms with only 
European affiliates due to measurement errors in the international tax mechanisms. 
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Overall, based on my obtained results, I can answer the main research question of the 
thesis – capital structures of European multinational firms are responsive to international tax 
incentives. 
8.1. Suggestions and discussion 
As revealed by the obtained results, international debt shifting of European 
multinational firms leads to lower taxable profits and corporate taxation levels in high-taxed 
countries. Lower-taxed countries are likely to benefit from international debt shifting because 
firms that operate in these countries tend to be less leveraged, which leads to higher corporate 
taxation levels in the lower-taxed countries. However, it seems that the lower-taxed countries 
have to reduce their budgeted expenses, even though many multinational firms have located 
their affiliates in these countries. As an example, the Netherlands that has a preferential tax 
regime had a budget deficit of 24.9 billion euros in 2012. Moreover, the 27 member states of 
the European Union had a total annual budget deficit of 519.5 billion euros in 2012. Hence, 
while multinational firms are able to avoid taxes and exploit preferential tax regimes, 
countries in Europe face budget deficits and must cut funding or salaries for the public sector 
(Drucker, 2013). 
Moreover, international debt shifting is likely to create deadweight losses due to costs 
of implementing debt shifting strategies for multinational firms and efficiency costs arising 
from deviations from firms’ optimal leverage ratios based on non-tax considerations 
(Dischinger, Glogowsky & Strobel, 2010, p. 3). In order to eliminate these deadweight losses 
and reduce international debt shifting, an international harmonization of effective corporate 
tax rates is necessary. Another mechanism to fight tax avoidance can be an introduction of a 
common consolidated corporate tax base for multinational firms’ activities in different 
countries. The European Commission has already proposed a plan for establishing a common 
consolidated corporate tax base for firms’ EU-wide activities. However, the tax base reform 
requires a unanimous support from all countries within the European Union, which might 
demand intense political pressure and be rather difficult to achieve (Oliver & Houlder, 2015). 
Furthermore, the obtained results show that large multinational firms are relatively 
more likely to engage in international debt shifting than small multinational firms. Hence, 
specific policy mechanisms can be designed to focus especially on the largest multinational 
corporations and limit their ability to shift debt across affiliates for tax avoidance reasons. 
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Also, as tax incentives to use more leverage or engage in external debt shifting decrease when 
firms have losses to carry forward, the use of debt for tax avoidance reasons is likely to 
decrease during or after a financial crisis or a cyclical downturn in the economy. Thus, in 
case of a financial downturn, the anti-tax avoidance rules, such as thin capitalization 
regulations or earnings stripping rules, could be relaxed, as these regulations are based on the 
assumption that multinational firms use debt extensively to shift debt and avoid taxes. 
Overall, increased transparency of tax information and more stringent requirements 
from multinational firms are necessary to ensure a fair tax system. If tax authorities do not 
implement mechanisms to reduce international debt shifting in response to tax incentives, 
multinational firms will continue to exploit loopholes in regulations and use debt extensively 
to shift profits and avoid taxes. 
Finally, there are two suggestions based on my study that can be implemented in the 
future research within debt shifting of multinational firms. Firstly, it might be interesting to 
examine firms that change their status from domestic firms to multinational firms and vice 
versa over time. As changes in the status create large changes in the international debt shifting 
variables, tracing the entire history of firms that change their status and examining their 
leverage responses to the status change might lead to interesting findings. Secondly, using a 
dataset which has data on firms’ internal and external leverage would allow examining firms’ 
responses to taxation in terms of changes in both internal and external debt. Also summary 
and descriptive statistics would allow a deeper analysis of whether the data sample supports 
the model’s predictions, for example, when examining net lending at the parent firm or 
financial coordination centre level. 
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Appendix A. Optimal external debt-to-asset ratio 
In order to find the optimal external debt-to-asset ratio of an affiliate i, I reorder the 
first order condition for external debt (equation (6))69: 
𝜇 ∙ 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 = 𝜇 ∙ 𝑏∗ + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − 𝛾𝑏𝑖
𝐸 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 − 𝛾 ∙ ∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝐸 ∙ 𝜌𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , (15) 
where 𝜌𝑖 =
𝐾𝑖
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
 represents the real capital employed in affiliate i as a share of the 
total real capital employed in the multinational corporation. 
Furthermore, by subtracting equation (6) for an affiliate j from equation (6) for an 
affiliate i, the following expression is obtained: 
𝑏𝑗
𝐸 = 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 −
𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗
𝜇
∙ 𝑟. (16) 
Inserting equation (16) into equation (15) results in: 
𝜇 ∙ 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 = 𝜇 ∙ 𝑏∗ + 𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑟 − 𝛾𝑏𝑖
𝐸 ∙ 𝜌𝑖 − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝛾 ∙ ∑
𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗
𝜇
∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝜌𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . (17) 
Following Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen et al. (2011), this approach requires an 
assumption that withholding taxes are equal in all countries. 
Furthermore, ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  can be expressed as following: 
∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 = ∑
𝐾𝑗
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
=
∑ 𝐾𝑖−𝐾𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑖
= 1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑗≠𝑖 . (18) 
Then equation (18) can be inserted into equation (17). By gathering all terms with 𝑏𝑖
𝐸 
on the left hand side, I obtain the optimal external debt-to-asset ratio as in equation (10).  
                                                 
69 Equations following Møen et al. (2011, p. 43). 
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Appendix B. Statutory corporate tax rates 
Table B1 shows statutory corporate tax rates by European countries in the data sample 
over the sample period (2003 – 2014). Tax rates are reported in percentages. Data on statutory 
corporate tax rates in Europe was obtained from KPMG’s corporate tax rates table and 
corporate and indirect tax rate survey (KPMG, n.d.; KPMG, 2009), and the OECD’s 
corporate income tax rates table and economic surveys (OECD, n.d.b.; OECD, 2013b). 
Table B1: Statutory corporate tax rates 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Albania 23 23 23 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 
Andorra 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 
Austria 34 34 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Belarus 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 18 18 18 
Belgium 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 30 30 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bulgaria 24 20 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Croatia 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Cyprus 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 13 25 
Czech Republic 31 28 26 24 24 21 20 19 19 19 19 19 
Denmark 30 30 28 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Estonia 26 26 24 23 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Finland 29 29 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 25 20 
France 35 35 35 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 33 
Germany 40 39 39 39 39 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Gibraltar 22 22 22 22 22 22 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Greece 35 35 32 29 25 25 25 24 20 20 26 26 
Hungary 18 16 16 17 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 
Iceland 18 18 18 18 18 15 15 18 20 20 20 20 
Ireland 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Italy 34 33 33 33 33 28 28 28 28 28 28 31 
Kosovo 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Latvia 19 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Liechtenstein 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Lithuania 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 15 
Luxembourg 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Macedonia 15 15 15 15 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Malta 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Moldova 20 20 18 15 15 0 0 0 0 12 12 12 
Monaco 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Montenegro 20 20 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Netherlands 35 35 32 30 26 26 26 26 25 25 25 25 
Norway 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 27 
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Table B1 (continued)             
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Poland 27 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 33 28 28 28 27 27 27 27 27 32 32 23 
Romania 25 25 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Russia 24 24 24 24 24 24 20 20 20 20 20 20 
San Marino 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Serbia 14 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 
Slovakia 25 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 23 22 
Slovenia 25 25 25 25 23 22 21 20 20 20 17 17 
Spain 35 35 35 35 33 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 26 26 26 26 22 22 
Switzerland 24 24 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 18 
Turkey 30 33 30 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Ukraine 30 30 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 21 19 18 
United Kingdom 30 30 30 30 30 28 28 28 26 24 23 21 
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Appendix C. Variable definitions and data sources 
Table C1 provides definitions and data sources for dependent and independent 
variables used in the study. 
Table C1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 
(financial leverage) 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets Amadeus 
Aggregated total debt-to-
asset ratio 
Numerator of aggregated total debt-
to-asset ratio: Aggregated total 
liabilities of all affiliates of the 
multinational firm that operate within 
a country 
Denominator of aggregated total debt-
to-asset ratio: Sum of equity of the 
holding company of the multinational 
firm within a country and aggregated 
total liabilities of all affiliates of the 
multinational firm within a country 
Amadeus 
Statutory corporate tax rate 
(standard debt tax shield 
mechanism) 
Host country statutory corporate tax 
rate of an affiliate i 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
Weighted tax difference 
(external debt shifting 
mechanism) 
Asset-weighted sum of differences in 
the corporate tax rate faced by an 
affiliate i and tax rates faced by the 
parent firm and all other affiliates that 
belong to the multinational 
corporation 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
Maximum tax difference 
(internal debt shifting 
mechanism) 
Difference between the corporate tax 
rate faced by an affiliate i and tax rate 
of the lowest-taxed affiliate in the 
multinational corporation 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
Fixed asset ratio 
(tangibility) 
Ratio of fixed assets to total assets Amadeus 
Firm size Logarithm of sales 
Logarithm of firms’ operating revenue 
(turnover) for firms located in 
Denmark, Ireland, Russia and the 
United Kingdome 
Amadeus 
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Table C1 (continued)   
Variable Definition Source 
Loss carry-forward Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm 
has losses that it can carry forward 
Amadeus 
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets 
Ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) to total assets for firms 
located in Russia 
Amadeus 
Inflation Annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index 
World Development 
Indicators of the World 
Bank; World Economic 
Outlook Database of the 
International Monetary 
Fund; Consumer Prices 
Database of the OECD  
Corruption Logarithm of annual corruption index. 
Corruption index is within [0;10] 
interval, where 10 indicates a country 
with a very low level of corruption 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of the World 
Bank  
Growth opportunities Median annual growth in sales per 
industry and country 
Amadeus 
Creditor rights Logarithm of annual strength of legal 
rights index. Strength of legal rights 
index is within [0;10] interval, where 
10 indicates a country with a very 
high creditor protection 
World Development 
Indicators of the World 
Bank  
Sales quintile Dummy variables for the sales 
quintile to which a firm belongs in a 
particular year 
Amadeus 
Out of Europe dummy  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
multinational firm has majority-
owned affiliates outside Europe 
Orbis Ownership database 
Lower than minimum tax 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
multinational firm has majority-
owned affiliates outside Europe 
whose minimum statutory corporate 
tax is lower than the minimum tax rate 
among firm’s European affiliates 
Orbis Ownership database; 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
Higher than maximum tax 
dummy  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
multinational firm has majority-
owned affiliates outside Europe 
whose maximum statutory corporate 
tax is higher than the maximum tax 
rate among firm’s European affiliates 
Orbis Ownership database; 
KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
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Table C1 (continued)   
Variable Definition Source 
Statutory tax rate * Loss 
carry-forward;  
Weighted tax difference * 
Loss carry-forward;  
Maximum tax difference * 
Loss carry-forward 
Loss carry-forward interaction terms 
between tax mechanisms and the 
loss carry-forward dummy 
Amadeus; KPMG’s 
corporate tax rates table and 
corporate and indirect tax 
rate survey; OECD’s 
corporate income tax rates 
table and economic surveys 
(Statutory tax rate)2;  
(Weighted tax difference)2;  
(Maximum tax difference)2  
  
 
 
Quadratic tax mechanisms KPMG’s corporate tax rates 
table and corporate and 
indirect tax rate survey; 
OECD’s corporate income 
tax rates table and economic 
surveys 
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Appendix D. Year-by-year summary statistics 
Table D1 provides year-by-year summary statistics of the total debt-to-asset ratio 
and the tax mechanisms. 
Table D1: Year-by-year summary statistics 
Variable Year Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2003 0.624 0.263 6,899 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2004 0.615 0.261 36,172 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2005 0.614 0.264 48,776 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2006 0.611 0.263 62,705 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2007 0.608 0.268 78,701 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2008 0.601 0.273 92,519 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2009 0.588 0.283 127,367 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2010 0.584 0.282 124,409 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2011 0.588 0.288 163,983 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2012 0.584 0.288 165,357 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2013 0.570 0.293 130,770 
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2014 0.544 0.277 2,169 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2003 0.312 0.052 6,899 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2004 0.299 0.058 36,172 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2005 0.287 0.078 48,776 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2006 0.292 0.070 62,705 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2007 0.293 0.069 78,701 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2008 0.273 0.058 92,519 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2009 0.262 0.061 127,367 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2010 0.266 0.061 124,409 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2011 0.255 0.062 163,983 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2012 0.254 0.064 165,357 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2013 0.242 0.066 130,770 
Statutory corporate tax rate 2014 0.251 0.055 2,169 
Weighted tax difference 2003 -0.006 0.038 6,899 
Weighted tax difference 2004 -0.006 0.039 36,172 
Weighted tax difference 2005 -0.007 0.043 48,776 
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Table D1 (continued)     
Variable Year Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Weighted tax difference 2006 -0.007 0.045 62,705 
Weighted tax difference 2007 -0.006 0.046 78,701 
Weighted tax difference 2008 -0.005 0.037 92,519 
Weighted tax difference 2009 -0.005 0.037 127,367 
Weighted tax difference 2010 -0.006 0.039 124,409 
Weighted tax difference 2011 -0.005 0.037 163,983 
Weighted tax difference 2012 -0.005 0.037 165,357 
Weighted tax difference 2013 -0.002 0.034 130,770 
Weighted tax difference 2014 -0.001 0.029 2,169 
Maximum tax difference 2003 0.045 0.068 6,899 
Maximum tax difference 2004 0.053 0.072 36,172 
Maximum tax difference 2005 0.057 0.075 48,776 
Maximum tax difference 2006 0.064 0.076 62,705 
Maximum tax difference 2007 0.067 0.076 78,701 
Maximum tax difference 2008 0.055 0.065 92,519 
Maximum tax difference 2009 0.053 0.065 127,367 
Maximum tax difference 2010 0.056 0.066 124,409 
Maximum tax difference 2011 0.051 0.064 163,983 
Maximum tax difference 2012 0.050 0.064 165,357 
Maximum tax difference 2013 0.039 0.057 130,770 
Maximum tax difference 2014 0.024 0.041 2,169 
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Appendix E. Obtaining data in Orbis and Amadeus 
databases 
1. To obtain historical ownership data on European multinational firms, start with 
the Orbis database. Firstly, choose region of subsidiaries (Location – World 
region/ Country/ Region in country). As I examine European subsidiaries only, I 
select Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
 
 
2. Select only subsidiaries that are owned by a shareholder (Ownership data – 
Companies owned by a shareholder – Shareholder’s characteristics). As I examine 
European multinational firms only, I select Western Europe and Eastern Europe 
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regions. Furthermore, I select the option that at least one shareholder owns at least 
50% in the subsidiary, as I examine only majority-owned subsidiaries. 
 
 
 After defining regions of subsidiaries and their shareholders, the search strategy 
shows how many subsidiaries are found as a search result. 
 
3. Click “View list of results” to view the list of subsidiaries found as a search result, 
their BvD ID numbers, ticker symbols and ISIN numbers. 
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4. To obtain ownership data on the subsidiaries found, a new list must be defined 
(Define the format – List format – Create/ modify a format – New format). 
 
Furthermore, choose Identification numbers – BvD ID number; Ownership data – 
Shareholders – Shareholder information – BvD ID number, Direct %, Total %. 
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Then click on “Modify”, next to the Shareholder – BvD ID number entry. In “Filter” 
tab, click on “Direct of total %”, to choose which shareholders to display in the list. 
As I examine only majority-owned subsidiaries, I select that the ownership share is at 
least 50%. 
 
To obtain historical ownership data on subsidiaries, click on “Archived Data” tab and 
select the years for which historical ownership data is necessary. 
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The obtained list on historical ownership relations between subsidiaries and 
shareholders can be exported to Excel by clicking “Export” tab. 
 
5. To obtain financial data on subsidiaries and their shareholders, use the Amadeus 
Financials database. In Step 2, choose the format of company codes (BvDEP ID 
number), and either manually enter company codes from the Orbis database or 
upload a file containing company codes. 
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Appendix F. Do file of the main specification 
*** DO FILE OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
encode nace_prim_code, gen(nacerev2primarycodes) 
rename fias fixedassets 
rename toas totalassets 
rename ncli noncurrentliabilities 
rename culi currentliabilities 
rename turn sales 
rename plbt plbeforetax 
rename taxa taxation 
rename plat plaftertax 
rename ebta ebitda 
rename cntrycde countryisocode 
rename pcntrycde pcountryisocode 
rename parents_code parents_final 
rename pl net_income 
*** DROP PURELY DOMESTIC FIRMS 
generate foreign=(countryisocode!=pcountryisocode) 
label variable foreign "=1 if foreign; =0 if domestic" 
egen id_parent = group( parents_final ) 
bysort id_parent year: egen MNC=max(foreign) 
label variable MNC "=1 if MNC; =0 if domestic firm" 
drop if MNC==0 
*** CHECK IF ALL OBSERVATIONS HAVE COUNTRY ISO CODES AND PARENT 
COUNTRY ISO CODES 
sort countryisocode 
sort pcountryisocode 
*** MERGE OBSERVATIONS WITH TAX RATES 
merge m:m year countryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Effective Corporate 
Tax Rates.dta", generate(_mergeTax) 
sort _mergeTax 
drop if _mergeTax==2 
drop if _mergeTax==1 
merge m:m year pcountryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Parents Effective 
Corporate Tax Rates 22.03.dta", generate(_mergeParentTax) 
drop if _mergeParentTax==2 
drop if _mergeParentTax==1 
*** 
rename fixedassets fixedassets_sub 
rename totalassets totalassets_sub 
rename sales sales_sub 
rename plbeforetax plbeforetax_sub 
rename taxation taxation_sub 
rename plaftertax plaftertax_sub 
rename ebitda ebitda_sub 
rename net_income net_income_sub 
*** 
egen id_subsidiary = group(subsidiary_code) 
gen taxrate_percentage=taxrate/100 
label variable taxrate_percentage "Statutory tax rate" 
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***  ACCOUNTS IN DIFFERENT CURRENCIES - MUST CONVERT INTO EUROS 
gen fixed_assets_euro=fixedassets_sub*exchrate2 
gen total_assets_euro=totalassets_sub*exchrate2 
gen sales_euro=sales_sub*exchrate2 
gen plbeforetax_euro=plbeforetax_sub*exchrate2 
gen taxation_euro=taxation_sub*exchrate2 
gen plaftertax_euro=plaftertax_sub*exchrate2 
gen ebita_euro=ebitda_sub*exchrate2 
gen noncurrentliabilities_euro=noncurrentliabilities*exchrate2 
gen currentliabilities_euro=currentliabilities*exchrate2 
gen net_income_euro=net_income_sub*exchrate2 
gen debt_euro=debt*exchrate2 
gen cred_euro=cred*exchrate2 
gen fiex_euro=fiex*exchrate2 
gen inte_euro=inte*exchrate2 
gen ltdb_euro=ltdb*exchrate2 
gen loan_euro=loan*exchrate2 
*** CREATE SUBSIDIARY-YEAR OBSERVATIONS PER VARIABLES USED, DUE TO 
SLIGHT REPORTING DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL DATA PER SUBSIDIARY, PER 
YEAR 
egen fixed_assets = mean( fixed_assets_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen total_assets= mean( total_assets_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
gen total_assets_mil=total_assets/1000000 
label variable total_assets_mil "Total assets(mln)" 
label variable total_assets "Total assets" 
generate total_liabilities_euro= noncurrentliabilities_euro+ currentliabilities_euro 
replace total_liabilities_euro= currentliabilities_euro if noncurrentliabilities_euro==. & 
total_liabilities_euro==. 
replace total_liabilities_euro= noncurrentliabilities_euro if currentliabilities_euro==. & 
total_liabilities_euro==. 
egen total_liabilities= mean( total_liabilities_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen sales= mean( sales_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
label variable sales "Sales" 
egen plbeforetax  = mean( plbeforetax_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen taxation= mean( taxation_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen plaftertax= mean( plaftertax_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen ebitda= mean( ebita_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen net_income = mean( net_income_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen debtors=mean( debt_euro ), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen creditors=mean (cred_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
egen financial_expenses=mean(fiex_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
label variable financial_expenses "Financial expenses (mln)" 
egen interest_paid=mean(inte_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
label variable interest_paid "Interest paid (mln)" 
egen long_term_debt=mean(ltdb_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
label variable long_term_debt "Long-term debt (mln)" 
egen short_term_debt=mean(loan_euro), by( subsidiary_code year ) 
label variable short_term_debt "Short-term debt (mln)" 
*** DROP SUBSIDIARY-YEAR OBSERVATIONS THAT OCCUR MORE THAN ONCE PER 
PARENT FIRM IN THE SAME YEAR 
by subsidiary_code year, sort: gen pid = _n 
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bysort subsidiary_code year id_parent: generate drop_parent=1 if year==year[_n + 1] & 
id_parent==id_parent[_n + 1] 
label variable drop_parent "=1 if parents are the same and years the same; =0 otherwise" 
drop if drop_parent==1 
drop loan effectivetaxrate taxrate_benelux_smaller taxrate_belenux efftaxrate_smaller_benelux 
belenux_actual _mergeTax ptaxrate peffectivetaxrate ptaxrate_benelux_smaller 
ptaxrate_belenux pefftaxrate_smaller_benelux pbelenux_actual _mergeParentTax  ptoas 
cred ncas sales_sub fire fiex fipl plbeforetax_sub taxation_sub plaftertax_sub 
net_income_sub inte ebitda_sub pexchrate2 fixedassets_sub totalassets_sub  
fixed_assets_euro total_assets_euro sales_euro plbeforetax_euro taxation_euro 
plaftertax_euro ebita_euro noncurrentliabilities_euro currentliabilities_euro 
net_income_euro total_liabilities_euro  
*** CONTROL VARIABLES 
merge m:m year countryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Creditor rights.dta", 
generate(_mergeCreditorRights) 
drop if _mergeCreditorRights==2 
drop if _mergeCreditorRights==1 
label variable log_creditor_rights_index "Log(Creditor rights index)" 
merge m:m year countryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Inflation.dta", 
generate(_mergeInflation) 
drop if _mergeInflation==2 
rename inflation_percentage_points inflation_percentage_points_pp 
gen inflation_percentage_points=inflation_percentage_points_pp*100 
label variable inflation_percentage_points "Inflation" 
merge m:m year countryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Political risk 
index.dta", generate(_mergePoliticalRisk) 
drop if _mergePoliticalRisk==2 
label variable log_political_risk "Log(Political risk index)" 
merge m:m year countryisocode using "C:\Users\Aija\Desktop\Aija Orbis\Corruption 
index.dta", generate(_mergeCorruption) 
drop if _mergeCorruption==2 
label variable log_corruption_index "Log(Corruption index)" 
gen profitability=ebitda/total_assets 
label variable profitability "Profitability" 
generate log_sales=ln(sales) 
label variable log_sales "Log(Sales)" 
sort subsidiary_code year 
bysort subsidiary_code: gen growth_opp=(sales-sales[_n-1])/sales[_n-1] 
bysort  nacerev2primarycodes countryisocode year: egen growth_opp_final=median( 
growth_opp) 
rename growth_opp growth_sales 
rename growth_opp_final growth_opp 
label variable growth_opp "Growth opportunities" 
gen loss_carryforward=( net_income<0) 
label variable loss_carryforward "Loss carry-forward" 
gen fixed_asset_ratio= fixed_assets/ total_assets 
label variable fixed_asset_ratio "Fixed asset ratio" 
gen net_lender=debtors-creditors 
label variable net_lender "Net lending" 
drop creditorrights scale0100 creditor_rights_index creditor_rights_index_0_10 
_mergeCreditorRights inflation inflation_percent _mergeInflation politicalriskindex 
indexonscale0100 political_risk_0_10 _mergePoliticalRisk corruptionindex 
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corruptionindex0100 corruption_index corruption_index_0_10 _mergeCorruption 
growth_sales 
*** DROP OBSERVATIONS WITH EXTREME TOTAL DEBT-TO-ASSET RATIOS (TDARs) 
generate tdar=total_liabilities/total_assets 
sum tdar 
drop if tdar<0 
drop if tdar>1 
label variable tdar "Total debt-to-asset-ratio" 
*** TOUSE 
gen touse = !missing(id_parent, log_creditor_rights_index, profitability, 
nacerev2primarycodes, tdar, taxrate_percentage, log_sales, fixed_asset_ratio, 
inflation_percentage_points, log_corruption_index, growth_opp, loss_carryforward, 
net_lender, financial_expenses, interest_paid, long_term_debt, short_term_debt ) 
drop if touse==0 
*** MAXIMUM TAX DIFFERENCE VARIABLE 
bysort id_parent year: egen tax_min=min(taxrate) 
gen max_tax_diff=(taxrate - tax_min)/100 
label variable max_tax_diff "Maximum tax difference" 
gen NLS=( max_tax_diff!=0) 
label variable NLS "NLS (not the lowest taxed subsidiary)" 
*** WEIGHTED TAX DIFFERENCE VARIABLE 
egen total_assets_MNC = total( total_assets ), by(id_parent year) 
generate share= total_assets/ total_assets_MNC 
drop if taxrate==. 
set more off 
local i=1 
bysort id_parent year: egen Sb=count( id_subsidiary ) 
egen MaxSb=max(Sb) 
while(taxrate[_n+`i']!=.)&`i'<=MaxSb{ 
bysort id_parent year: gen wdiff`i'=((taxrate-taxrate[_n+`i'])/100)*(share[_n+`i']) 
replace wdiff`i'=0 if wdiff`i'==. 
bysort id_parent year: gen wdiff_`i'=((taxrate-taxrate[_n-`i'])/100)*(share[_n-`i']) 
replace wdiff_`i'=0 if wdiff_`i'==. 
local i=`i'+1 
} 
egen weighted_tax_diff=rowtotal(wdiff*) 
drop wdiff* 
label variable weighted_tax_diff "Weighted tax difference" 
*** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
replace touse = !missing(id_parent, log_creditor_rights_index, profitability, 
nacerev2primarycodes, tdar, weighted_tax_diff, taxrate_percentage, max_tax_diff, 
log_sales, fixed_asset_ratio, inflation_percentage_points, log_corruption_index, 
growth_opp, loss_carryforward, net_lender, financial_expenses, interest_paid, 
long_term_debt, short_term_debt ) 
labsumm tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff max_tax_diff fixed_asset_ratio log_sales 
loss_carryforward profitability inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index 
growth_opp log_creditor_rights_index total_assets_mil long_term_debt short_term_debt 
financial_expenses interest_paid net_lender if touse 
labsumm tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff max_tax_diff fixed_asset_ratio log_sales 
loss_carryforward profitability inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index 
growth_opp log_creditor_rights_index total_assets_mil long_term_debt short_term_debt 
financial_expenses interest_paid net_lender if touse & NLS==1 
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labsumm tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff max_tax_diff fixed_asset_ratio log_sales 
loss_carryforward profitability inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index 
growth_opp log_creditor_rights_index total_assets_mil long_term_debt short_term_debt 
financial_expenses interest_paid net_lender if touse & NLS==0 
codebook id_parent if touse 
*** YEAR DUMMIES 
tabulate year, gen(yr) 
*** REGRESSIONS OF MAIN SPECIFICATION 
eststo clear 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff max_tax_diff yr* if touse, 
ivar(id_parent ) jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) 
mover(mover) mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp1 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp1 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(1)") basefont(fs10) 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff max_tax_diff log_sales 
fixed_asset_ratio inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index growth_opp 
loss_carryforward log_creditor_rights_index profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) 
jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) 
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp2 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp2 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(2)") basefont(fs10) merge 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar taxrate_percentage weighted_tax_diff log_sales fixed_asset_ratio 
inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index growth_opp loss_carryforward 
log_creditor_rights_index profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) 
jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) 
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp3 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp3 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(3)") basefont(fs10) merge 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar taxrate_percentage max_tax_diff log_sales fixed_asset_ratio 
inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index growth_opp loss_carryforward 
log_creditor_rights_index profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) 
jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) 
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust  
predict tdarp4 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp4 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(4)") basefont(fs10) merge 
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eststo: felsdvreg tdar taxrate_percentage log_sales fixed_asset_ratio 
inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index growth_opp loss_carryforward 
log_creditor_rights_index profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) 
jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) 
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp5 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp5 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(5)") basefont(fs10) merge 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar weighted_tax_diff log_sales fixed_asset_ratio 
inflation_percentage_points log_corruption_index growth_opp loss_carryforward 
log_creditor_rights_index profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) 
jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) 
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp6 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp6 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) summdec(0) summtitles("R-
squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  ctitles("OLS regression 
results""(6)") basefont(fs10) merge 
eststo: felsdvreg tdar max_tax_diff log_sales fixed_asset_ratio inflation_percentage_points 
log_corruption_index growth_opp loss_carryforward log_creditor_rights_index 
profitability yr* if touse, ivar(id_parent ) jvar(nacerev2primarycodes) feff(feff) peff(peff) 
xb(xb) res(res) mover(mover) mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs) group(group) robust 
predict tdarp7 if touse 
corr tdar tdarp7 if touse 
di r(rho)^2 
outreg using Main_specification.doc, se sdec(3) starloc(1) starlevels(10 5 1)  summstat(r2\N) 
summdec(0) summtitles("R-squared"\"Number of observations") varlabels  colwidth(20)  
ctitles("OLS regression results""(7)") basefont(fs10) merge 
esttab est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7 using Main_specification_esttab.doc, r2 se star(* 0.10 
** 0.05 *** 0.01) compress obslast nonum varwidth(30) label 
mtitles("(1)""(2)""(3)""(4)""(5)""(6)""(7)") title("OLS regression results") drop(yr*) b(3) 
se(3) r2(3)  
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